


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9 April 1985

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL



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9 April 1985

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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GENERAL

ANALYSTS VIEW U.S. NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION DRIVE

PM191343 Paris LE MONDE in French 16 Mar 85 p 4

[Jacques Isnard article: "Nuclear Arms Are Still a Priority in the United States Despite Emphasis on Space Defense"]

[Text] Is President Reagan indulging in double-talk? On the one hand he is attracting world attention with his Strategic Defense Initiative (star wars), which is sparking off rather metaphysical debates on the supposed importance of this space shield in the year 2010. On the other hand, he is deciding on an unprecedented qualitative and quantitative modernization of the U.S. nuclear panoply for the end of the century. Is Mr Reagan playing on the need for dreams or the fear of nightmares according to the individual viewpoint, and trying -- with "star wars" -- to make people forget the immediate situation, the one which the Pentagon is obstinately shaping through its annual financial effort?

The French strategic analysis services have been asking these questions since the U.S. President felt able to justify his preference for space defense by explaining that, all things considered, nuclear deterrence (that famous balance of terror) would soon be a museum piece. In their view, you just have to closely examine the U.S. military budget and to make "projections backed by figures to note that Mr Reagan's statements are one thing and his actions another.

Unless the new Geneva talks interrupt the U.S. Armed Forces' nuclear equipment effort, the development of the U.S. strategic arsenal until the year 2000 will produce, according to the estimates of the French services, an increase in around 25 percent in nuclear warheads, on submarines ballistic missiles, and bombers: around 13,600 in 1985, and a little more than 16,410 in the year 2000, peaking at more than 16,960 nuclear warheads deployed in 1995.

As early as 1990

The number of nuclear warheads will exceed 16,000 as early as 1990 if you add together -- leaving aside the weapons available in store -- all ground-based missiles (ICBM's) and sea-based missiles (on submarines), and all the Air Force weapons (be they transported by bombers in a first operational wave (rotation) or in possible subsequent waves).

We are therefore witnessing a development of new weapon systems in the American panoply, some of which are generally known and others, which are more secret, are known only to experts.

Power and Accuracy

The French services give a few examples of this, such as the MX missile buried in silos (with 10 nuclear warheads whose power of destruction will be adjustable according to the desired effect), the submarine-based Trident II D-5 missile (8 warheads), the TLAM-N missiles launched from a nuclear attack submarine or a surface vessel (against land targets), or Strategic Air Command's new strategic bomber (B-83) which will have a power of 1,100 kilotons, and which will be possible to drop at supersonic speed and at an altitude of 450 meters.

If all the projects new being launched by the Pentagon are completed before the year 2000, the French services think we can expect a proliferation (a 77-percent increase) in 15 years of the number of ground-based nuclear warheads, and a major increase (43 percent) in the number of weapons (bombs and air-to-surface missiles) in the Air Force.

This contradicts the widely accepted idea that the naval component -- the nuclear submarines which are apparently, the least vulnerable instrument of deterrence -- should be given priority in the long term. In reality, the Poseidon submarines presently in service will be gradually withdrawn from the active arsenal and will not be replaced unit for unit by Trident submarines, which, however, carry a much more elaborate missile. Hence the observation that the number of warheads in the naval component should decrease from 5,345 now to around 4,600 in the next 15 years.

The boost given by Mr Reagan to his strategic arsenal does not just affect the number of weapons. It is also related to their performances, be it power or accuracy of fire. These last two factors, the French services point out, go together: to obtain a particular effect, the more accurate a weapon is the less powerful it needs to be, unless a minimum necessary energy is fixed for destroying "hardened" (protected) targets.

According to French calculations, we are witnessing a narrowing of the range of power of U.S. nuclear warheads around a central value which, in the year 2000, will be between 200 kilotons and 2 e [expansion unknown], whereas these energies now range between 40 kilotons and 9 megatons.

At the same time the accuracy of fire is improving. The MX missile, the first 21 of which will be delivered between March 1986 and April 1987, hits its target to within 100 meters, after an intercontinental trajectory, and the Midgetman missile, now being studied, will have an accuracy of 30 meters over a distance of 11,000 km, whereas the existing Minuteman falls within 220 meters, or even 350 meters for the oldest models. With a radius of action of 11,000 km the submarine-launched Trident II D-5 will launch its eight warheads with an accuracy of within 150 meters. The accuracy with which bombs are dropped depends on the skill of the crew's navigator.

To keep its pledges, the Pentagon plans to devote around \$6.5 billion in 1986 to strategic nuclear arms research alone. This is almost double what Mr Reagan announced to finance preparations for his space defence system (\$3.7 billion). When compared these two figures illustrate the existing priority in U.S. military research.

CSO: 5200/2528

GENERAL

ISLAND PEACE MOVEMENT ALIGNING WITH 'TREATY NOW' ON ZONE

Godthaab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 6 Feb 85 p 29

[Article: "Greenland to Participate in Nordic Nuclear Free Zone"]

[Text] Sorsunnata [Greenland peace movement], which has joined the council for "Treaty Now," believes that in the coming years there will be efforts for making the Nordic area a nuclear free zone.

"Treaty Now" is a common Nordic movement with one demand: the Nordic area as a treaty-bound nuclear free zone. The movement is open to all who can and will support this demand. "Treaty Now" has a council with members from all the Nordic countries. It is in this council that Sorsunnata is being challenged to join with a representative from Greenland.

In addition to this council, "Treaty Now" has a group of leading Nordic jurists to provide advice on legal and international relationships, as well as a group of Nordic politicians to advise on parliamentary issues. Sorsunnata believes that Greenland also should be represented in these groups.

During the period from Hiroshima Day--6 August 1984--to Nagasaki Day--9 August 1985 (named after the two atomic bomb explosions 40 years ago), "Treaty Now" is holding an action year.

The objective is to have the Nordic area established as a nuclear free zone before the end of 1985 through parliamentary decisions in the various Nordic countries.

Sorsunnata has received the invitation from "Treaty Now" positively. Simultaneously, Sorsunnata's executive committee has made clear in an open letter that Greenland must be a part of this nuclear free zone since it believes that it is unreasonable that the boundary line of the zone should lie somewhere in the Danish Strait between Iceland and Greenland. This letter also was sent to home rule government leader Jonathan Motzfeldt and to ICC president Hans Pavia Rosing.

Sorsunnata has named teacher Baltser Andersen from Qasigiannnguit as the movement's representative to "Treaty Now." The first meeting of the council will be held on 9 March in Oslo and Sorsunnata will participate if the movement can obtain a subsidy for the trip from the home rule government.

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CSO: 3613/117

GENERAL

SPANISH PAPER VIEWS U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS PLANS

PM221129 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 15 Feb 85 p 8

[Editorial: "Nuclear Weapons in Spain?"]

[Text] EL PAIS' report yesterday of secret U.S. plans to deploy nuclear weapons in several countries including Spain has prompted great concern. Neither the statement from the Diplomatic Information Bureau (OID), nor the remarks by [Deputy Prime Minister] Alfonso Guerra in the corridors of the Senate, nor the note from the U.S. Embassy can diminish this concern: It is more likely to increase it. The problem needs to be examined from two angles--one regarding the U.S. Government's stance; the other regarding Spain's response.

All indications are that the secret Pentagon document approved by the White House dates back to 1975. The document specifies that in the event of an emergency the United States will deploy a number of nuclear warheads in Spain. But the meaning of "emergency" is not defined, and long experience shows that crises can be either real or imaginary, by accident or deceit. It is easy to imagine how far real or less real emergency situations could influence the stances of a government subject to unforeseeable pressures and threats. In any case the treaty with the United States negotiated by Jose Maria de Areilza and signed in 1976 contains the following clause: "The United States will not stockpile nuclear weapons or their nuclear accessories [complementos nucleares] on Spanish soil" (Article 1 of Supplementary Accord on Facilities No 6). This is a categorical statement entirely incompatible with the 1975 secret document that has just been discovered. Spain cannot omit to demand explanations from the United States because that would imply acceptance as normal of a violation on the Pentagon's instructions of the agreement signed with Spain on such a crucial issue as nuclear weapons. The Washington government cannot confine itself to saying it will not deploy nuclear weapons while failing to honor the treaties and accords that it has signed with other countries. Because this is precisely what the document calls into question. Washington has not even made a clear statement to the effect that it is willing to respect Spain's desire not to accept nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Such an omission implies not a lack of courtesy but a policy, an intention to use our territory for this purpose if it proves possible to do so.

This is also the reason why the Spanish Government's efforts to persuade the public that there is no threat of a deployment of nuclear warheads in Spain are unfounded. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of the resolution passed by the Congress of Deputies in October 1981 because following that date the 1982 convention with the United States negotiated by Minister Perez-Llorca weakens the Spanish position to a large extent. Instead of the clause quoted earlier, the 1982 convention states as follows: "The stockpiling and deployment on Spanish soil of nonconventional weapons or their components will be subject to the Spanish Government's approval." It is enough to compare this sentence with that in the 1976 treaty to realize the extent to which Spain's rejection of the deployment of nuclear warheads is weakened. In particular it is incomprehensible how the Socialist Party, which came to power after the convention was signed but before its ratification, has accepted this clause. The only defense lies in the words "subject to the Spanish Government's approval"--doubtless decisive. The serious point is that the secret Pentagon document contains prior authorization for U.S. troops to deploy nuclear weapons in the event of emergencies. This without informing the Spanish Government of it, as the OID note conforms. It thus appears to constitute a U.S. interpretation of the agreement with Spain concerning military orders which undermines an essential point in the 1982 convention concerning nuclear weapons. To fail to demand with all due energy a thorough clarification of this matter would mean relinquishing the defense of a Spanish stance desired by the citizens.

CSO: 5200/2515

GENERAL

REPORTAGE ON VISIT BY ANDREY GROMYKO

Meets Gonzalez

PA281617 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1517 GMT 28 Feb 85

[Text] Madrid, 28 Feb (EFE) -- Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko began his second official visit to Spain with a meeting with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez. Gonzalez and Gromyko met at Moncloa Palace, the residence of the prime minister, for 40 minutes. Subsequently, the prime minister hosted a luncheon for the chief of Soviet diplomacy.

Gonzalez received Gromyko at the palace entrance. He was accompanied by Spanish Foreign Minister Fernando Moran, Soviet Ambassador to Spain Yuriy Dubinin, and Spanish ambassador in the USSR Jose Luis Xifra.

According to official sources, the two politicians reviewed the international situation and their bilateral relations at the meeting held without any specific agenda. The talks between Gonzalez and Gromyko will continue during the luncheon that will also be attended by the Spanish foreign minister and the two ambassadors.

Gromyko, who arrived in Madrid this morning, will remain in the Spanish capital for 48 hours and will be received by King Juan Carlos at Zarzuela Palace tomorrow. Upon his arrival in Madrid from Rome, Gromyko was received at Barajas Airport by his Spanish counterpart, Moran, and other top officials of the Spanish diplomacy and the respective ambassadors.

At the airport, Moran insisted that there is no fixed agenda for the dialogue with the head of Soviet diplomacy. However, he did indicate that "there is room for all topics" and that he hoped "the conversations will be successful." According to Moran, Spain will not make an announcement on the placing of nuclear weapons in space during Gromyko's visit; but, he added, "we will exchange viewpoints on this matter." The foreign minister added that he does not expect any pressure from the Soviets regarding Spain's decision to remain in NATO. "We," he said, "do not accept pressures from anyone." Moran added: "We want to improve our bilateral relations with all countries, including the USSR. The Spanish king and queen's visit to the Soviet Union last year was a positive first step in this direction." The Spanish minister said that Gromyko's visit will not serve for the USSR to capitalize on the tensions between Spain and the United States in the wake of recent incidents like the expulsion of two U.S. diplomats.

Meets Moran

1D282056 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 2000 GMT 28 Feb 85

[Text] The Spanish and Soviet foreign ministers, Moran and Gromyko, respectively, held a meeting this afternoon for about 3 hours -- it was precisely 2 and 1/2 hours -- on the first day of the official visit by the Soviet foreign minister to Spain. Bilateral subjects and the forthcoming meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva on space weapons the main subjects in the talks. At the end, Gromyko said that there is no reason why the friendship between Spain and the Soviet Union should harm other countries.

[Begin Gromyko recording in Russian with superimposed Spanish translation] I am taking advantage of this occasion to talk here to the press representatives and I wish to underline that we would like to continue to develop our relations with Spain. We hope that this is a mutual desire. This should not cause any harm to any other third country if it is occupying a position of peace and friendship. This is what I wish to say. [end recording]

No 'Pressure' on NATO

LD010154 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 2300 GMT 28 Feb 85

[Excerpts] The development of relations between the Soviet Union and Spain should not harm third countries. This was said in Madrid tonight by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko after long and intensive talks with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez and his Spanish counterpart Fernando Moran. Gromyko faced reporters with a smile and a relaxed expression.

The Soviet foreign minister was met by journalists on the steps of the Santa Cruz Palace [foreign ministry] and did not object to making a statement. Gromyko and Moran had previously had a 2 and a 1/2 hour meeting in which they examined the principal international problems and the state of bilateral relations. Foreign Minister Moran once again stressed that he had not received any kind of pressure on Spain's membership in NATO:

[Begin Moran recording] An explanation was given on Spain's general position and what I should like to say to you is that on the part of Foreign Minister Gromyko there was absolutely no pressure or assertion in the sense of why are you doing this? Why don't you do that? We both explained our position which is exactly that which Spanish public opinion knows, and the (?concern) of our allies. [end recording]

The imminent resumption of the negotiations on the control and limitation of arms was, as expected, the dominant subject, and associated with this is the Soviet concern about the U.S. space defence plans:

[Begin Moran recording] He explained to me the Soviet position on Geneva and I got the impression that the Soviet Union has a will to negotiate, and of course something which is no secret to you is that they attach great importance to the subject of the deployment... the exploration of space with a view to the deployment of [words indistinct] this is a very important point for the Soviet Union. [end recording]

In the bilateral sphere, Moran regretted that trade had not proceeded at the same pace as cultural cooperation. An increase in trade does not seem to be easy, but not because

of a lack of political will, Spanish diplomatic sources told RNE [Madrid Domestic]. In 8 short years of diplomatic relations quite a lot has been done. With a country like the USSR an increase in trade would mean depriving other countries of purchases, other countries which have a much more longstanding tradition of exchange with Moscow. These same sources did not hesitate to describe as "very good" relations between the two countries. They even said that it can be said without exaggeration that there are no disputes despite the different political positions which the two countries occupy in the world.

Tomorrow Gromyko will be received by the king at the Zarzuela Palace and will continue his talks with Moran. Three agreements on cooperation will also be signed tomorrow. Without ruling it out altogether, diplomatic sources say that it is unlikely that the Soviet foreign minister will hold a news conference.

Space Weapons Discussed

PA010339 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2244 GMT 28 Feb 85

[Text] Madrid, 28 Feb (EFE)--Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko today discussed the international situation and bilateral relations with Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez and Fernando Moran, his Spanish counterpart.

No official statements or communiques were issued providing further details on the discussions during Gromyko's meeting with Gonzalez or his subsequent meeting with Moran.

Nevertheless, one of the topics of discussion was the militarization of space because before receiving his Soviet colleague, Moran himself said that this would be one of the topics on their open agenda. The meeting between Gromyko and Gonzalez lasted 40 minutes.

Later, both officials continued their talks during a luncheon, and then Gonzalez departed for Uruguay to attend the inauguration of President Julio Maria Sanguinetti. The Soviet foreign minister, who has held his post for 28 years, declined to comment.

Gromyko, who arrived in Madrid from Rome at 1030 GMT, met in the afternoon with Moran, who stressed that he did not expect any pressure from the Soviet side regarding Spain's decision to remain in NATO because "we don't accept pressure from anyone."

This is Gromyko's second official visit to Spain. It returns a visit paid to Moscow by his Spanish counterpart in May 1983 as part of the retinue of the Spanish monarchs. The previous visit was in November 1979.

Spain and the Soviet Union will sign three agreements during Gromyko's current visit. One of the agreements will prevent double taxation from being imposed on Spanish citizens living in the USSR and vice versa. Another agreement will expand the Spanish-Soviet cultural and scientific cooperation agreement of 1978, and the third agreement will make it possible to publish diplomatic documents exchanged by Spain and Russia from the 17th century to 1917.

Tomorrow, the Soviet official will be received by King Juan Carlos and will hold a second round of talks with Moran. Gromyko, who is accompanied by his wife Lydia, will have dinner tonight at a typical Madrid restaurant.

CSO: 5200/2515

GENERAL

EDITORIAL VIEWS AIMS, OUTCOME OF GROMYKO VISIT

PM051235 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 2 Mar 85 p 8

[Editorial: "Spain and USSR: Fear of Normalization"]

[Text] Since their establishment 8 years ago, Spanish-Soviet diplomatic relations have been marked by a certain degree of mistrust due mainly to historical factors. As Minister Gromyko now arrives for his second official visit to Madrid both the Socialist government and the conservative opposition support Spain's continued membership in the Atlantic alliance. Although it may seem contradictory, this fact constitutes a basis for the normalization of relations. In fact, even on the occasion of the king's visit to the USSR last May and his meetings with President Chernenko, the latter's speech at the gala Kremlin dinner made it quite clear that the USSR accepted Spain's adherence to the Washington treaty and, on the other hand, considered Spain's opposition to the deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory of particular interest.

On his first official visit to Madrid over 5 years ago, when the Center Democratic Union was in power, Gromyko mainly voiced the desire for Spain to pursue its "independent foreign policy line." This time he has confined himself to suggesting that Spain's membership of the Atlantic alliance and its relations with the United States should not hinder the development of Spanish-Soviet relations, since they do not harm "third countries."

The Soviet foreign minister arrived in Madrid following a visit to Rome. All the signs are that his chief aim on the eve of the USSR-U.S. Geneva talks is to discover how much cohesion exists within NATO on nuclear issues, particularly regarding the militarization of space, and if possible to stimulate within the West critical or contrary stances particularly with respect to Washington's commitment to press ahead with its "star war" plans. In this connection the present Spanish Government's desire to pursue a foreign policy distinct from those of other NATO countries prompt it not only to be particularly sensitive to the Reagan administration's attitude to Nicaragua but also to try to find a "suitable status" within the Atlantic alliance.

The desire to maintain a different kind of dialogue with the USSR must be regarded as part of this specific foreign policy. Spain has nothing to do with NATO's 1979 "two-track decision" which led to the deployment of the U.S. Euromissiles. Spain also keeps its distance over "star wars" -- the next diplomatic battle in East-West relations -- though the government seems to be in no hurry and continues to study the issue before issuing a final verdict, as Foreign Minister Fernando Moran said Thursday. Apart from the criticisms due to certain aspects of Soviet policy, such as the occupation of

Afghanistan, it must not be forgotten that the USSR is one of the world's two major powers and that its influence on the chief international issues is an objective fact impossible to ignore. This is why dialogue with Moscow is obligatory, especially inasmuch as Spain may seek to distance itself from much of the policy of its Atlantic allies, specifically from that part of it leading to the crazy arms race.

Apart from an exchange of opinions on major political issues, Andrey Gromyko's visit of course provides an opportunity to broach bilateral matters. An important remnant of the civil war remains in the USSR -- the 1,100 former refugee children, most of whom are unable to return because of lack of money. They must return soon if we want them to return alive. It is a matter of surmounting bureaucratic obstacles that have hitherto impeded a humanitarian and sensible solution. There are also a number of secondary issues which the Soviets have continued to stress in recent years. The opening of consulates in Andalusia, the Canary Islands, Catalonia, and the Basque country; an exchange of military attaches with Spain; and an increase in the complement of Soviet personnel who service the fishing fleet operating near the Canary Island. In general there seems to have been no change in the circumstances which over the years have prompted Spain's negative responses to these Soviet requests. However, it is not impossible to reach understandings on specific points -- such as the exchange of military attaches, which already takes place with other communist governments, or the opening of a consulate in Barcelona. Possible Spanish concessions in these areas could facilitate an increase in trade between the two countries -- beneficial to both -- under conditions that will reduce the deficit in a balance of trade chronically tipped against Spain.

CSO: 5200/2515

GENERAL

FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER VISITS SOVIET UNION

Dumas Arrives in Moscow

OW110917 Beijing XINHUA in English 0645 GMT 11 Mar 85

[Text] Moscow, March 11 (XINHUA) -- French Minister for External Relations Roland Dumas arrives here this afternoon for two-day talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko about ongoing Soviet-U.S. nuclear arms control negotiations. This is Dumas' first visit to the Soviet Union since he assumed his post last December. It is another attempt at Soviet and Western European contacts this year such as Federal Germany Foreign Minister Genscher's one-day visit on March 4, to narrow the gap between the two countries on Geneva arms control talks. Roland Dumas and his Soviet counterpart will also discuss East-West relations and bilateral issues including trade problems. The Soviet newspaper IZVESTIYA said that it hopes the upcoming talks with Dumas would "help bring the Soviet Union and France closer on the issues of strengthening peace and security."

Dumas, Gromyko Talk

OW120459 Beijing XINHUA in English 0257 GMT 12 Mar 85

[Text] Moscow, March 11 (XINHUA) -- Talks between visiting French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas and Soviet Premier Nikolay Tikhonov and Foreign Minister Gromyko in Moscow today shows that the two sides share similar stance on the U.S. space weapons program. The talks took place as schedule despite the death of Soviet leader K. Chernenko on which Dumas offered profound condolences.

Gromyko stressed the "special danger" of the U.S. space weapons program and hoped that the problems of nuclear and space weapons should be solved in the U.S.-Soviet Geneva talks.

Dumas said he favored a balance of forces on the lowest possible level, hoping that the U.S. and the Soviet Union would work out a solution to prevent the arms race in outer space which would result in the reduction of nuclear weapons. Dumas said France is willing to continue the Paris-Moscow dialogue to resolve France's deficit in trade with the Soviet Union.

The two foreign ministers also discussed other international issues such as the Middle East and Central America. Roland Dumas arrived here on March 10 for a two-day visit.

CSO: 5200/4005

GENERAL

LI YIMANG VIEWS EFFORTS TO CURB ARMS RACE

XINHUA Cites Li Yimang's Views

OW111748 Beijing XINHUA in English 1727 GMT 11 Mar 85

[Text] Beijing, March 11 (XINHUA) -- China will make determined efforts to curb the arms race and abolish nuclear weapons to ease international tension, a Chinese official said here tonight. Li Yimang, president of the Association for International Understanding of China, was speaking at a banquet given by him to honor a visiting delegation from the National League of the Protection of the Japanese Constitution, led by its Chairman Ichio Asukada, former chairman of the Japanese Socialist Party. Li said world opinion was concerned about the negotiations on reducing nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union. He said: "It is our hope that the negotiations will be undertaken in earnest so as to help promote peace." Li said different situations, experiences and ideologies should not be a barrier to mutual contacts and cooperation among peace movements in various countries. In establishing links with peaceful organizations from other countries, his association followed the principle of mutual respect, not forcing views on others and seeking common ground while reserving differences.

Asukada said the superpowers' hegemonism had made the world more unstable. "We oppose any form of hegemonism. We are seeking peaceful coexistence that transcends differing social systems," he said. Present at the banquet were Qiao Shi, alternate member of the Secretariat of the Communist Party Central Committee; Qian Liren, head of the International Liaison Department of the party Central Committee; Zhang Xiangshan, vice-president of the China-Japan Friendship Association; and Lei Jiqiong and Wang Meng, vice-presidents of the Association for International Understanding of China.

On Disarmament, Relations

OW120336 Beijing XINHUA in English 0321 GMT 12 Mar 85

["New Soviet Leader Calls for Disarmament Agreement, Better Relations With China" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Moscow, March 11 (XINHUA) -- New Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev today called for an agreement on disarmament and "serious improvement" of relations with China.

Gorbachev was elected general secretary at an extraordinary plenum of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee today following the death of Konstantin Chernenko at the age of 74 yesterday.

"The only reasonable way out of the existing situation is agreement of the confronting forces on an immediate termination of the race in arms, above all, on nuclear arms, on earth and its prevention in space. An agreement on an honest and equitable basis without attempts at 'outplaying' the other side and dictating terms to it," said Gorbachev who at 54 is the youngest Soviet leader after the Second World War. [sentence as received]

Referring to the Soviet-U.S. negotiations to begin in Geneva tomorrow, Gorbachev said Moscow wants an end to the arms race, a freeze of nuclear arsenals and a real and major reduction of the arms stockpiles, and not the development of ever new weapons systems.

"We would like our partners in the Geneva negotiations to understand the Soviet Union's position and respond in kind. Then agreement will be possible," he said.

On ties with China, he said: "We would like a serious improvement of relations with the Chinese People's Republic and believe that, given reciprocity, this is quite possible."

On relations with the United States, Gorbachev said the Soviet Union does not strive for military superiority over the United States and NATO, or for unilateral advantages over them. But he warned that any encroachment on Soviet security will "meet with a crushing retaliatory strike."

Gorbachev said Moscow would follow a course of peace and peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries, and pledged to promote friendship with other socialist nations and support the struggle for liberation and independence.

On domestic affairs, the new general secretary demanded "a decisive turn in transferring the national economy to the tracks of intensive development" and persistent perfection of "the economic mechanism and the entire management system."

He called for efforts "to remove from our life all alien phenomena, all encroachments on the interests of society and its citizens, to strengthen socialist legality."

CSO: 5200/4005

GENERAL

FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN HOLDS WEEKLY BRIEFING

OW061112 Beijing XINHUA in English 1104 GMT 6 Mar 85

[Text] Beijing, March 6 (XINHUA) -- Chinese Foreign Ministry's spokesman reaffirmed at today's weekly news briefing that China stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. This is China's consistent position, he said, and on this basis, the Chinese delegation to the Geneva disarmament negotiation conference is ready to take part in the discussions on complete prohibition of nuclear tests. He said this in response to a question -- whether China's readiness to participate in the discussions meant a major change in its position on disarmament.

He said, the disarmament talks conference has met with many difficulties and made little headway. The Chinese delegation is willing to join other delegations in working for the success of the conference, he said.

Answering a question about U.S. Under Secretary of State Michael Armacost's visit to China, the spokesman said Armacost will come to China in mid-March for what he termed "a normal working visit."

CSO: 5200/4005

GENERAL

BRIEFS

STATE ADDRESS NOTED--Moscow, 11 Mar (XINHUA)--The Soviet Communist Party will "invariably adhere" to its present course despite the death of the nation's leader, according to the address to the Soviet people made this afternoon by the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers. The address said the party, the state and all the people of the Soviet Union suffered a grave loss in the death of Konstantin Chernenko, an outstanding party and state figure. The address said that the Soviet Union "has always advocated constructive dialogue and practical measures to lessen international tension." It warned that the Soviet Union will not allow any other country or coalition of states to gain military superiority, and will strengthen its defense power. The Soviet party will continue to carry on the policy of perfecting in all ways the socialist society, according to the address. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 1602 GMT 11 Mar 85 LD]

CSO: 5200/4005

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SECTION ON TALKS FROM GORBACHEV SPEECH TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE

PM121128 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Mar 85 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "Speech by Comrade Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 11 March"]

[Excerpts] We value the successes of detente achieved in the seventies and are prepared to participate in a continuation of the process of establishing peaceful, mutually beneficial cooperation between states, on principles of equality, mutual respect, and noninterference in international affairs. New steps in this direction could fittingly mark the 40th anniversary of the great victory over Hitlerite fascism and Japanese militarism.

Never before has such a frightful threat loomed over mankind as in our day. The only sensible way out of the present situation is an accord between the forces opposed to each other on the immediate cessation of the arms race, primarily the nuclear race, and the nonallowance of it in space; an accord on an honest and equal basis, without attempts to outplay the other side and dictate its conditions to it; an accord that will help us all to move forward toward the desired goal: the full destruction and banning forever of nuclear weapons, and the full elimination of the threat of nuclear war. We are firmly convinced of this.

The negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States will begin tomorrow in Geneva. The approach of the Soviet Union to these negotiations is well known. I can only confirm yet again: We are not striving to achieve unilateral advantages over the United States or over the NATO countries, or for military superiority over them. We want a termination to the arms race and not a continuation of it, and thus we are proposing to freeze nuclear arsenals, to cease the further deployment of missiles. We want a real and major cutback in the armaments that have been stockpiled, and not the creation of more and more weapons systems, in space or on earth. One would like our partners in the Geneva negotiations to understand the position of the Soviet Union and to reciprocate. Then an agreement would be possible, and the peoples of the world would breathe a sigh of relief.

The CPSU is a party with an international outlook.

In a complicated international situation it is important now as never before to maintain the defense potential of our socialist homeland at such a level that potential aggressors will know well that any encroachment on the security of the Land of the Soviets and its allies, on the peaceful life of the Soviet people, will be met with a shattering retaliatory blow. Our glorious Armed Forces will continue to have at their disposal everything necessary for this.

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

COMMENTS ON U.S. ATTITUDE AS TALKS BEGIN

U.S. Uses Talks as Camouflage

LD202337 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1917 GMT 20 Mar 85

[From the "World Today" program presented by Vsevolod Shishkovskiy]

[Excerpt] The new Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons taking place in Geneva, where, incidentally, the next meeting of the full complement of the two countries' delegations will be held tomorrow, continue to hold first place among the events of international life. This is understandable. Their enormous significance is determined by the nature of the global questions on the agenda, questions upon which the future of mankind depends.

Our country's positions, as is stressed in most commentaries, is clear and constructive. We are striving to do everything possible to prevent the spread of the arms race into space, and to end it on earth. This end is served by the numerous Soviet peace initiatives and proposals which ease the progress of negotiation and the attainment of positive results.

All that is required is the readiness and sincere wish of the U.S. side to hold an honest and constructive dialogue. However, the first signs that Washington intends to use the Geneva talks to camouflage its plans to further build up nuclear armaments have already appeared. Can the continuing deployment of U.S. first-strike nuclear missiles in the countries of West Europe be called a display of goodwill? To say nothing of the fact that not a single military program has been curtailed in the United States.

Karpov Criticizes U.S. Approach

LD161933 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 16 Mar 85

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report by correspondent Gennadiy Vedenyapin from Geneva]

[Text] The Soviet-American talks opened here in Geneva this week with a meeting between the heads of the delegations. The agenda has mutually interconnected questions of reducing nuclear arsenals -- strategic and medium-range -- and of preventing the arms race in near-earth space.

At the first plenary session, the participants in the Soviet-American dialogue began to outline their principled positions with regard to the essence of the talks.

[Begin V.P. Karpov, head of USSR delegation, recording; identified by caption] The talks have just begun. It is still too early to say with certainty what results they will lead to and when. The USSR's delegation has been instructed by the Soviet leadership to conduct the talks in a businesslike manner and constructive spirit while striving to get effective solutions on the whole range of questions pertaining to nuclear and space arms.

Certain statements made in Washington by officials in connection with the talks cannot but put one on one's guard. A striving can be discerned and felt in these statements to review the accord with regard to the subject matter, tasks, and goals of the talks reached on 7 and 8 January during Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko's meeting with Secretary of State Shultz. For instance, as far as space is concerned, one gets the impression that during the negotiations the American side wishes to talk not about the issue of space being peaceful, not about banning the deployment of the strike space weapons, but about, well, as it were, to deliver lectures on the alleged benefit of the American star wars concept -- a concept which, in essence, aims to make space a source of threat of war to mankind.

The Soviet side will strive to ensure at the talks that the 8 January accord becomes, in its entirety, the basis for conducting serious talks on space and nuclear arms.

Only an approach which provides for a comprehensive examination and resolution of the questions entrusted to the delegations can lead to the attainment of mutually acceptable results. [end recording]

Space Arms, Other Issues Linked

LD171957 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 17 Mar 85

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by NOVOSTI political observer Spartak Beglov]

[Text] The Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons have just started in Geneva. The attitude of the broad international public to them is uniform; profound concern is being expressed everywhere that the talks should lead to the desired result: the staving off of a new and extraordinarily dangerous upturn in the arms race. The first reports from Geneva indicate that the talks started in a businesslike atmosphere, but, in the press and public circles of many countries, concern is nevertheless still being expressed over the U.S. side's approach to these talks.

This concern is connected with the U.S. Administration's attempts, which intensified on the eve of Geneva, to distort the sense of the previously reached joint accord on the subject and aims of the talks and cast doubt on the principle of close linkage of all three questions being discussed and resolved: the nonmilitarization of space and the limitation and reduction of strategic and medium-range nuclear missile weapons.

The design being pursued by Washington is clear: to detach the question of averting an arms race in space from this collection of issues and leave itself free to realize the plan for creating antimissile defense with space-based elements. One should not be surprised how unceremoniously the initiators of the star wars plan ignore warnings by specialists in the sphere of arms control, both in the United States itself and in other countries. They are unanimous in the view that the

realization of these plans could lead to extremely dangerous consequences for the strategic situation. It is characteristic and that the majority of the former leaders of the Pentagon are in the camp of the critics of this department's military adventure in space: Robert McNamara, Harold Brown, and others. As though stressing the numerous critical statements, the former British prime minister, the Conservative Edward Heath, this week said that the Washington plan for deploying weapons in space would not free the world from nuclear weapons. On the contrary, its realization would lead to an unprecedented and dangerous escalation of the arms race. And indeed, what sort of contribution by the United States to the freeing of the world from nuclear weapons can we be talking about if the start of the talks in Geneva was marked by a new step by Washington towards a buildup of its strategic nuclear arsenal? One of the U.S. Congress subcommittees has come out in favor of the demands of the President for the allocation of \$1.5 billion for an additional 21 MX intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In these circumstances the reminder from Moscow that there is only one way towards constructive agreements in Geneva resounded in the timeliest fashion and with the utmost weight. The only wise way out of the situation which has been created, as was stressed at the extraordinary CPSU Central Committee plenum, is an accord by the opposing forces on an immediate stop to the arms race, and above all nuclear arms race, on earth and the refusal to permit it in space -- an accord on an honest and equal basis, without attempts to outsmart the other side and dictate conditions to it; an accord which will help everyone to move forwards toward the desired goal: the complete destruction and banning forever of nuclear weapons and the complete elimination of the threat of nuclear war.

'Legitimate Suspicion' of U.S.

LD181642 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1605 GMT 18 Mar 85

["For a Responsible Attitude to Obligations Undertaken" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 18 Mar (TASS) -- TASS military affairs observer Vladimir Bogachev writes:

Any serious talks are primarily a patient search for mutually acceptable solutions and readiness on the part of each of the sides to take into account the legitimate interests of the other participants. The talks on limiting and reducing arms can lead to effective accords only if neither side sets out to achieve one-sided military advantages and if the solutions proposed are based on the principle of equality and equal security.

The Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space armaments, which have started in Geneva, are attracting great attention from the world public primarily because the military-political situation in the world has been acutely aggravated in recent years and the threat of a thermonuclear war has grown considerably. The American plans to prepare for "star wars" and the United States' deployment of first-strike missiles right on the doorstep of the socialist countries, as well as Washington adopting programs for an unprecedented growth in strategic nuclear systems, undermine military-strategic stability and raise the level of military confrontation.

The January meeting in Geneva between Andrey Gromyko and George Shultz, and the joint Soviet-U.S. statement that the aim of talks between the USSR and the United States will be to draw up effective accords aimed at preventing the arms race in space and ending

it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear weapons, and strengthening strategic stability, opened up promising prospects of normalizing international relations and returning them into the path of detente.

The Soviet Union has come to the talks in Geneva with the very best of intentions, in the opinion that for successful progress forward there must first and foremost be a strict observance of the provisions contained in the 8 January 1985 statement by the USSR and the United States. The Soviet side is not diverging one inch from the agreed aims of the talks.

On the other hand, there is legitimate suspicion over the practical action that Washington has taken in the military sphere after the start of the talks. Even after 12 March the United States has been continuing to undertake efforts to build up those same armaments which were to be subject to limitation and reduction through talks in accordance with the accord reached in January.

Under pressure from the White House, a U.S. Congress subcommittee has allocated funds for the production of another 21 MX ICBM's. By literally twisting the arms of the leaders of the Belgian Government, Washington has managed to get their agreement to the deployment of nuclear cruise missiles on the country's territory. The Reagan administration, contrary to the aim of the talks which is clearly formulated in the joint statement, is continuing stubbornly to insist on its right to implement its program of preparations for "star wars." Such an approach by Washington to solving the problem of preventing the militarization of space may itself create almost insuperable barriers in the path of achieving an accord on the whole complex of questions under discussion in Geneva. A possibility still exists for progress to be achieved at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons.

But this possibility could be wrecked by the adventuristic actions of Washington, which is destroying the spirit and the letter of the joint USSR-U.S. statement on the object and aims of the talks.

The suspicion arises that Washington, as before, intends to use the talks on arms limitations and reductions in order to conceal its illusory plans for achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union.

The peoples of the world are waiting for the U.S. finally to take a more responsible attitude to the obligations it has adopted as regards the talks, and for Washington finally to take specific, practical actions aimed at creating an atmosphere of trust and goodwill in Geneva.

SDI's, MX's Impact

PM181516 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 16 Mar 85 p 3

["View of Events" by political observer Sergey Losev: "On the Principles of Equality and Security"]

[Text] The start of the Soviet-American talks on preventing the militarization of space and on reducing strategic arms and medium-range nuclear weapons was marked by a meeting of the heads of the USSR and U.S. delegations in Geneva 12 March.

The agreement reached in Geneva during the January meeting provides that the subject of the talks will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms -- both strategic and intermediate range -- with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. It was also agreed at that time that the objective of the talks will be to work out agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating in on earth and limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability. The coordination and implementation of measures in these directions can ensure real progress along the path of halting the arms race, eliminating the threat of nuclear war, and ultimately liquidating nuclear weapons.

The threat of a thermonuclear war now is more real than ever before. It is, therefore, natural that mankind perceives the start of the Geneva talks as a ray of hope. But successful progress requires primarily strict observance of the provisions of the joint U.S.-USSR statement published at the conclusion of the meeting between A.A. Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz. This is the honest stance actually held by the Soviet Union.

"The USSR's approach to these talks," M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, emphasized, "is well known. I can only confirm yet again: We are not striving to gain unilateral advantages over the United States or the NATO countries or to attain military superiority over them; we want an end and not a continuation of the arms race, and are therefore proposing to freeze nuclear arsenals and halt the further deployment of missiles; we want a real and major reduction of stockpiled weapons and not the creation of more and more new weapons systems, be they in space or on earth.

"We would like our partners in the Geneva talks to understand the Soviet Union's position and respond by reciprocating. An agreement would then become possible. The world's peoples would breathe a sigh of relief."

Questions concerning the Geneva talks which have now started were also touched on during M.S. Gorbachev's 13 March conversation with U.S. Vice President G. Bush in the Kremlin.

The general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee confirmed the Soviet Union's readiness -- given the same readiness on the American side -- to take practical actions toward improving Soviet-American relations, which would be highly significant for improving the international situation as a whole and for the strengthening of peace. It was, at the same time, declared again that the USSR will never compromise the legitimate interests of its own security or the interests of its allies.

Much can be heard from official Washington nowadays about the administration's desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union and even to attain tangible results in Geneva, but the administration's behavior and actions in no way correspond with these assurances. On the very day when the Geneva talks started, the United States took a new step toward whipping up the arms race. Under massive White House pressure, one of the House of Representatives subcommittees appropriated funding for the production of 21 more MX first-strike ICBM's. Congressman J. Addabbo stressed in this connection that the appropriation of funds to build a new batch of MX's at the time when the Soviet-American dialogue was beginning "contradicts common sense."

Senator W. Proxmire described as "rubbish" and "nonsense" White House claims that the approval of the MX program -- R. Reagan spoke of it as the "legs" of the Geneva negotiating table -- would supposedly help efforts in the arms control sphere. Proxmire noted that "approximate equality in strategic nuclear warheads exists"

between the USSR and the United States and that the production of new strategic missiles would only whip up the arms race and impose additional burdens on the federal treasury which is, in any case, suffering under the weight of record budget deficits.

The buildup of strategic offensive weapons is an integral part of the plan to develop a first-strike potential in the hope of delivering it with impunity. The Reagan administration would like to secure this impunity by means of the "star wars" program, which envisages the creation of a large-scale ABM defense system with space-based components. The Pentagon's innermost dream is to prevent a retaliatory strike, to destroy or disable Soviet ICBM's within 2 minutes of launching, and to render any surviving missiles harmless in flight or during their approach to the target. This plan to create an "antimissile shield" over the United States -- a plan that is aggressive by its very nature -- represents an attempt to attain decisive military superiority over the USSR, this time via space.

Even the Americans themselves do not believe official Washington's story about the "defensive nature" of the "star wars" program. The U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment has prepared an analytical report which makes it clear that the large-scale ABM defense system with space-based components is aimed at U.S. preparations for nuclear war against the Soviet Union. The document has been prepared by people who are by no means amateurs: Taking part in its preparation were former Defense Secretary R. McNamara and former leader of the U.S. delegation to the SALT I treaty talks J. Smith. The report makes it clearly understood, THE WASHINGTON POST summed up, that "Reagan's goal is to secure a first strike against the Soviet Union without unnecessary risk." In other words, the newspaper emphasizes, the Office of Technology Assessment report presupposes that "Reagan wants to improve nuclear defense and afterward use it to blackmail the Russians in order to force them to dance to his tune or accept the possibility of an American nuclear strike which Moscow could not parry."

But the Soviet Union has never danced to anybody's tune, nor does it intend to do so! The USSR will not allow military superiority to be attained either on earth or in space. But White House stubbornness in implementing the "star wars" program can itself create almost insuperable obstacles in the way of reaching agreements on the entire complex of questions under discussion in Geneva.

Essentially, the question is as follows: Unless agreement is reached on the problems of nonmilitarization of space, it will be impossible to sign accords on limiting strategic arms and medium-range nuclear weapons. Speaking a few days ago to a House of Representatives Armed Services Subcommittee [as published], P. Scowcroft, a former assistant to the President for national security, and former Secretaries of Defense H. Brown and J. Schlesinger forewarned that, in any event, the USSR would take effective countermeasures and, in particular, would be forced to build up its arsenal of offensive nuclear weapons if the United States attempted to create an echeloned space defense in breach of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

Meanwhile, an agreement is not only necessary but, for the time being, still possible. This will not remain so forever. According to T. Sorensen, former special adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, who recently spoke at Columbia University, a number of U.S. Administration officials are beginning to realize that, unless the USSR and the United States reach a full and serious accord on arms limitation in the next 4-5 years, the development of arms will reach such a level as to render any effective control over them impossible and a nuclear confrontation, if not inevitable, at least probable.

Even if such a "realization" is emerging in Washington, the administration has so far failed to draw any practical conclusions from it. The unprecedented sum of \$322 billion has been requested for military preparations in the draft federal budget for fiscal 1986. The lion's share of these appropriations has been promised to military-industrial corporations with headquarters in California. For the sake of ensuring the profits of these corporations, which put the incumbent administration in power, the White House proposes that appropriations for socioeconomic needs and other U.S. domestic programs be cut by almost \$50 billion in fiscal 1986.

The U.S. people, no less than other peoples, are interested in diverting the administration from this pernicious path. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the "Public Agenda" research organization, the overwhelming majority of Americans -- 96 percent -- now believe that confrontation with the USSR is very dangerous in the nuclear age. Some 68 percent of Americans reject the concept of "victory" in a nuclear war, and 89 percent of all U.S. citizens are convinced that there can be no victors in a nuclear war.

The peoples demand that the brakes be put firmly on the arms race and expect mutually acceptable agreements on the basis of strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security.

17 March 'Observers Roundtable'

LD171800 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 17 Mar 85

["International Observers Roundtable" program chaired by All-Union Radio commentator on foreign affairs Boris Andrianov; with Dmitriy Antonovich Volskiy, member of the Editorial Board of NOVOYE VREMYA; and Vadim Nikolayevich Nekrasov, international observer of the journal KOMMUNIST]

[Excerpt] [Andrianov] Hello, comrades. Taking part in our roundtable discussion today are Dmitriy Antonovich Volskiy, member of the editorial board of the weekly NOVOYE VREMYA, and international observer of the journal KOMMUNIST, Vadim Nikolayevich Nekrasov.

[Nekrasov] Our country is a principled and consistent advocate of peaceful, mutually beneficial cooperation among all states on principles of equality, mutual respect, and noninterference in internal affairs; and that thought runs throughout the entire international section of the speech delivered at the extraordinary plenum of the CPSU Central Committee by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.

[Andrianov] Referring to relations with the capitalist states, Comrade Gorbachev said that we will firmly pursue the Leninist course of peace and peaceful coexistence. The Soviet Union will always answer goodwill with goodwill and trust with trust. But all must know that we will never forake the interests of our homeland or of its allies. The Land of the Soviets has never been a threat to anyone -- that is a truth of history. However, no one will ever succeed in dictating his will to us. The Soviet Union does not want the arms race. It is, after all, alien to the very nature of socialism, the ideal of which is peace. We are the most consistent adherents of a decisive curbing of the arms race, which has become a grave threat to peace and a heavy burden to the whole of the world economy. But we are not utopians. While a military threat exists in the world, we must guard as the apple of our eye the security of our country and of its

allies and friends. The Soviet Union will never allow anyone to have military superiority. In the present difficult international situation, it is particularly important to maintain our country's defense capability at a level so that potential aggressors are well aware that any infringement upon the security of the Land of the Soviets or its allies, upon the peaceful life of the Soviet people, will be met with a devastating retaliatory strike. At the same time, we are always willing to seek a solution to international problems by peaceful means, by negotiation, our main demand being that there should be strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security.

The experience of history irrefutably shows that peace based on a policy of force, which is the course that certain people in the West are preaching, is a bad, dangerous policy, and one that is moreover hopeless for those who create it. The lessons of history tell us that the struggle against war must be waged before it breaks out. The point is a particularly topical one now, for never before has such a terrible threat been hanging over mankind as there is today. Our party and state, therefore, make great and unrelenting efforts to improve the world political climate and bring about a change for the better in international affairs. How is this aim to be achieved? The answer to this question was given by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his speech at the plenum, when he stressed that the only sensible way out of the situation that has come about is for the sides in confrontation to agree on immediately ending the arms race, primarily nuclear arms, on earth and preventing it in space. Such an agreement, however, must be reached on an honest and equal basis, without attempts to outplay the other side and dictate one's own conditions to it; in other words, agreement that would help advance toward the desired aim of completely liquidating and banning nuclear weapons forever and completely eliminating the threat of nuclear war. We view things realistically, of course, and realize that there are difficulties on the path toward achieving that noble aim. Despite all the complexities, however, it is completely possible to overcome those difficulties. Here it will all depend on whether the sides have the desire, the political will, and the readiness to try to reach agreement on the basis of reasonable compromise. The Soviet Union has all of these.

[Volskiy] The statesmen of a whole number of Western countries with whom Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had talks this week had yet another opportunity to become convinced of this.

[Andrianov] But it goes further than that. During the talks between the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the French president, the exchange of opinions on a number of international questions confirmed that both countries favor a return to the policy of detente, a halting of the arms race and the maintaining of the balance of forces on the lowest possible level. During Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's talks with President Pertini of Italy, there was a confirmation of the mutual intention expressed during the recent Soviet-Italian talks in Rome to consistently expand bilateral cooperation, including political contacts, in order to promote the restoration of detente in Europe, a reduction in the level of military confrontation on the continent, and the growth of mutual trust between states. At the same time, the exchange of opinions showed the closeness of the Soviet and Italian positions on the urgent need for both Eastern and Western states to work toward eliminating the threat of nuclear war and strengthening peace. These can be viewed as definite, favorable factors capable of furthering the solution of international problems at the negotiating table. It is now important to use these factors to the full in the noble aim of strengthening peace and the security of peoples.

[Volskiy] In this connection, mention should be made of the enormous importance that all world public opinion attaches to the Soviet-U.S. talks on space and nuclear weapons which began, as you know, in Geneva on 12 March. Our country's approach to those talks is well known: The Soviet Union states with a feeling of profound responsibility that it is not striving to achieve unilateral advantages over the United States or the NATO countries, that it is not striving for military superiority over them. We sincerely want an end to the arms race, and we are therefore proposing that nuclear arsenals be frozen and that the further deployment of missiles be halted. We want a real and major reduction in the arms that have been stockpiled, and not the creation of more and more new weapons systems, be it in space or on earth.

The Soviet Union is right to express the wish that its positions be understood by the partners in the Geneva talks and that they respond in a reciprocal way. In that case, agreement would become possible and the peoples of the world would breathe a sigh of relief.

[Nekrasov] As the Western press reports, the American delegation came to the talks armed with instructions 12 pages long. When journalists in Washington asked about the contents of this lengthy document, Assistant Secretary of State Burt replied, quote, We are ready to show flexibility, unquote. In this connection, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR noted, and not without good grounds, quote, The most important thing is the degree of that flexibility, unquote. Well, the forthcoming period will probably answer the question of that American newspaper. The Soviet delegation's position of principle at Geneva, however, is well known, and the directives on it, as you know, were confirmed by our party Politburo and reported in the press. In the opinion of the Soviet side, the talks open up the possibility -- naturally, if both sides show mutual readiness -- of preventing the arms race from spreading into space and halting it on earth, thus taking a major step on the path toward solving that most important task of liquidating nuclear weapons completely and everywhere. Well, to date there have been two meetings in Geneva. The heads of the Soviet and U.S. delegations met on 12 March, and the plenary meeting was held on Thursday, 14 March. As the Western press reports, it appears that such meetings will be held twice a week. The attention of the whole world, quite obviously, is riveted on the talks, and great expectations are laid on them. In particular, as a commentator of the West German ARD television company noted, for the first time in the history of arms limitation talks there will be a discussion of a subject that is so urgent and of such importance to mankind such as preventing the militarization of space.

[Andrianov] One interesting thing is the arrival in Geneva of a highly impressive delegation from the U.S. Congress that includes both a group of senators and members of the House of Representatives. They have come to observe the course of the talks, and the delegation consists of emissaries from both the ruling Republican Party and the Democratic Party. The U.S. Congress apparently intends, as they say, to seriously exercise control over the course of the talks [po seryeznomu czyat khod peregovorov, kak govoritsya, pod svoym kontrol].

[Nekrasov] Yes, that's true, and on the subject the Paris LIBERATION writes that before, the U.S. position at such talks was based on recommendations from the Pentagon, the State Department, and the U.S. National Security Council. But now, the newspaper notes, the Washington administration will also have to take the opinion of legislators into account. Incidentally, the members of that congressional group that you spoke of, Boris Vasilyevich -- leading senators such as Edward Kennedy, Lugar, Dole and Nunn; in other words, both Republicans and Democrats -- issued a statement on the opening of the talks calling upon President Reagan, quote, to demonstrate a creative and flexible approach to the talks, unquote.

[Andrianov] Vadim Nikolayevich, is anything known about the atmosphere in which the talks began? It is obviously still too early to talk about any achievements, but a lot depends, doesn't it, on the atmosphere of the meeting, or rather the approach that the participants in the talks demonstrate from the outset?

[Nekrasov] Well, as you have obviously heard, it has been decided to hold the Geneva talks in secret, in other words, not to report them to the press, or in any case not to report on the course of the talks and their character before time. It is known about the start of the talks, as the British GUARDIAN reports, for example, that they opened, quote, with a mutual expression of goodwill, unquote.

The first meeting on 12 March lasted about 3 hours. Differences in the initial positions of the sides are inevitable, and the press has said quite a bit about these. But in this connection I would like to recall what was said recently by the Soviet parliamentary delegation in Washington when it was discussing questions relating to the Geneva talks. The Soviet delegation said that we cannot agree with those who are already now striving to accustom people to the thought that the talks will last for years, and that virtually decades will pass before a common approach is found to solving the problem of nuclear and space weapons. Behind such reasoning one can see a reluctance to work with sights set on achieving positive results.

CSO: 5200/1044

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

FURTHER COMMENTARIES ON PROSPECTS FOR TALKS

IZVESTIYA Editorial

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Mar 85 p 1

[Editorial: "The Eve of Geneva"]

[Text] On 12 March in Geneva, new Soviet-American talks begin with the aim of working out effective accords directed at averting the arms race in space and stopping it on earth, and limiting and reducing nuclear armaments. Ultimately, the forthcoming talks, like the efforts in the sphere of arms limitation and reduction generally, must lead to the total abolition of nuclear weapons everywhere.

It is exactly in those words that the participants of the Geneva talks outlined the range of questions and their significance. That is why one can say with full justification that what is on the agenda for Geneva is the future of our planet. Replying to the letter from American veterans of World War II, K.U. Chernenko stressed: "Soviet-American cooperation is vitally necessary today, when it is a question of whether there is to be life on earth." Yes, that is precisely the question -- to be or not to be. That is how the essence of Geneva is to be interpreted.

As is known, the USSR and United States agreed that all questions concerning space weapons and nuclear weapons will be considered and solved comprehensively and in connection with each other. This is absolutely essential for a successful outcome. And the problem of not permitting an arms race breakthrough into space is of decisive importance. Otherwise, the buildup of weapons of mass destruction will acquire a qualitatively new uncontrolled character in all directions. A sword of Damocles will be hanging over mankind in the literal sense. This must happen on no account. Such is the will of the peoples. Not for nothing did the last UN General Assembly session virtually unanimously adopt a resolution that the militarization of space must not be permitted.

Unfortunately, there are forces in the United States that dream of turning space into a weapons platform [boyevaya ploshchadka] in order to dictate their will from this platform to other states, primarily the Soviet Union. Our answer to such "dreamers" with their delirium about "star wars" is quite categorical: They will not succeed in implementing plans to achieve military superiority, either on earth or in space. The idea of hiding behind an antimissile shield to avoid retribution for aggression is illusory. So is it not better to seek honest and mutually acceptable agreements [dogovorennost] in order to put the brakes on the arms race? This is just the line the Soviet Union will take at the forthcoming talks in Geneva.

Our principled positions and intentions in this matter were set out with extreme precision and clarity in Comrade K.U. Chernenko's election speech to the assembly of the working people in the Kuybyshevskiy constituency of Moscow.

It was said: We are not striving to obtain any unilateral advantages over the United States and over the NATO countries, or for military superiority over them. We do not need this as we do not intend to threaten them or impose our will upon them, but want to live in peace with them and to maintain normal, good relations.

It was said: We want a halting of the arms race and not its continuation. That is precisely why the USSR is raising the question also of such preliminary steps as freezing the sides' nuclear arsenals, terminating further deployments of missiles, and so on. Utilizing the negotiations for opposite aims -- for justifying and camouflaging the further accumulation and deployment of means of mass destruction -- we consider to be an immoral and wanton pursuit, a deception of peoples and a crime before them.

It was said: We want a real reduction of the stockpiled armaments, and, as a beginning, destruction of a considerable part of them -- and not the creation of more and more new weapons system, whether in space or on earth, offensive or supposedly defensive. And our ultimate aim is the complete destruction of nuclear weapons everywhere on our planet, complete elimination of the threat of nuclear war.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo examined and passed the directives for the USSR delegation. It emphasized that the Soviet side will act vigorously and constructively at the talks.

Not everything, however, depends on the Soviet Union and its goodwill. If agreement is to be achieved and Geneva is to be a success, there must also be a similar willingness on the other side. And here it ought to be made absolutely clear that the international public cannot fail to be alerted by the maneuvers that Washington is undertaking on the eve of Geneva with the obvious intention of poisoning the atmosphere surrounding the talks from the very beginning and making it difficult to examine the problems on the agenda in a businesslike and constructive manner. It is enough to point to the Pentagon new draft budget, which envisages an unprecedented buildup of the American strategic arsenal, including allocations for the so-called "strategic defense initiative," i.e., if we dispense with the propaganda flourishes, for the militarization of space.

Moreover, efforts are being made to use the Geneva talks themselves as a sort of battering ram with which to push that budget through the U.S. Congress. It is no coincidence, for instance, that the vote on allocations for the new MX intercontinental ballistic missiles is to be held immediately after the start of the Geneva talks. As THE WASHINGTON POST writes, the administration is counting on "the light of Geneva" to "preserve the life of MX."

No, that is not what people expect from Geneva; they expect that weapons of mass destruction will not be kept alive, but rather that nuclear missile weapons will be destroyed. Therein lies the genuine light of Geneva.

The eve of Geneva is the eve of the 40th anniversary of victory over Hitlerite fascism... A simple coincidence of calendar dates might seem to assume a deep symbolic meaning. It reminds us both of the disastrous consequences of world wars and of the possibility of fruitful cooperation for the purpose of averting them. Of course, we harbor no illusions -- the talks will be difficult. However, we are also far from fatalistic despair. Our

country is willing to travel honestly its own part of the path toward mutually acceptable accords. We expect the same of the United States.

All mankind expects that the Geneva talks will succeed, and that the forces of peace and reason will be victorious.

PRAVDA Review 10 March

PM111419 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Mar 85 First Edition p 4

[Sergey Vishnevskiy "International Review"]

[Excerpt] Before Geneva

The Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms begin in Geneva the day after tomorrow. The world public will follow their progress with heightened interest, and that is only natural. The talks are, after all, to do with the most burning problem of today: Will it be possible to prevent the militarization of space and curb the arms race on earth?

This is the cardinal question of war and peace at the end of the 20th century. Special responsibility for settling it rests with the two great powers, which have the biggest military potentials.

The course and outcome of the Geneva talks will depend on the existence on both sides of political will and the readiness to reach agreement based on the principle of equality and identical security. The Soviet Union has this will and readiness.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo has examined and approved the directives for the USSR delegation to the talks. It was noted that the talks offer the opportunity, given mutual readiness by the two sides, to prevent the arms race from spreading to outer space and to stop it on earth, thereby taking a major step toward resolving the historical task of eliminating nuclear weapons totally, everywhere.

The Soviet side will act energetically and constructively at the talks based on the principle of equality and identical security and guided strictly by the 8 January 1985 accord to the effect that questions of nuclear and space arms must be examined and resolved in their interrelationship.

This comprehensive approach is absolutely necessary to the attainment of a mutually acceptable accord. In the current period the question of nuclear arms reduction cannot be examined in isolation from the problem of the nonmilitarization of space.

In his speech to voters, Comrade K.U. Chernenko clearly set forth the Soviet Union's intentions in connection with the forthcoming talks. First, the USSR does not seek to obtain any unilateral advantages over the United States and NATO. Second, our country wants an end to the arms race. Third, we want a real reduction in stockpiled armaments and, to begin with, the destruction of a significant proportion of them, not the creation of more and more new weapons systems, whether in space or on earth, offensive or supposedly defensive. Here our ultimate aim is the total destruction of nuclear weapons everywhere in the world and the total eliminate of the threat of nuclear war.

On the eve of the talks, the conversations and discussions in Washington between the delegation of Soviet parliamentarians headed by V.V. Shcherbitskiy, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, and American legislators were useful. The frank and, at times, pointed dialogue on the burning issues of war and peace lasted several days. How to remove the threat of nuclear catastrophe -- that was the main topic under discussion. The members of Congress heard at first hand, so to speak, the truth about the principled Soviet peace policy and the USSR's sincere desire to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement in Geneva. The weighty arguments about the futility of attempts to achieve military superiority over the USSR and the tremendous danger inherent in the "star wars" plans were brought to their attention. The main result of the meetings was that the USSR and U.S. parliamentarians reached a common conclusion on their lofty responsibility for the future of peace and for curbing the arms race. This works, of course, in favor of the creation of the necessary favorable atmosphere before the talks.

However, influential forces in that same U.S. capital are not stopping their actions of a completely opposite nature. It must be seen as alarming that high-ranking Washington figures, as if by collusion, are practicing their anti-Soviet rhetoric. Take, for instance, the statement at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Max Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation to the Geneva talks. After assuring the legislators that he will try not to turn the talks into a "political show," the diplomat promptly organized a propaganda show under the dome of the Capitol. He declared our country to be a "serious threat to U.S. security" and an "aggressive society" that cannot be trusted. Is that the way to approach the "serious task of seeking accord with the USSR" (his own words -- S.V.)? Do irresponsible exercises in anti-Soviet slander really promote the resolution of a truly serious task?

The insistent recommendation of many U.S. officials that a strong-arm approach be adopted toward their partner in the talks cannot really help to create a businesslike atmosphere in Geneva. Nobody is surprised when such formulas are used by Richard Perle, assistant U.S. defense secretary and Weinberger's right-hand man, who dins it into the senators: "The Soviet Union is a dangerous rival with whom we must deal from a position of strength." What can you expect from an indomitable Pentagon "hawk"? However, for some reason, professional diplomats, including Secretary of State G. Shultz, are permitting themselves similar calls for a "tough" line.

It is not only a question of verbal attacks. Washington observers note that the administration has deliberately (!) timed a major campaign for a further strategic offensive arms buildup to coincide with the start of the Geneva talks. The other day the U.S. President sent a report to Congress demanding appropriations for building the second consignment of 21 MX ICBM's. It has been publicly announced that the creation of the new consignment of first-strike strategic missiles is practically the most important part of the diplomatic baggage that the U.S. delegation will take to Geneva. The report actually says: "MX is a necessary component of the U.S. strategy in the arms control sphere."

At a meeting with Republican congressmen on 5 March the U.S. President put forward a strange thesis: "Unless we make a decision to build 100 MX missiles, the USSR will have no incentive to hold talks on substantial arms reductions." In that event the Soviet Union "would not have to do anything."

This is distorted logic. Can you seriously count on a reduction in military arsenals, which are already overfull, if from the very beginning of the talks more

and more new consignments of weapons are being placed on the table in the form of "strong cards" (the expression of L. Speakes, deputy press secretary at the White House)?

Sober-minded Americans are aware of the dangerous nature of this game. An ABC television observer asked Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, outright: "How useful can saber-rattling be to the talks?" The chief Washington "disarmer" could not give a sensible answer to this reasonable question.

As for incentives to achieve a mutual, reasonable accord, the methods of intimidation by military force cannot provide such incentives when there is equilibrium between the strategic forces of the USSR and the United States, which, incidentally, even the Pentagon's Perle admitted the other day.

The true incentive to seek a reasonable accord based on the principle of equality and identical security is, both for the Soviet Union and for the United States, the objective need to halt the unrestrained arms buildup, since otherwise the world will slide down the slippery slope of the arms race.

Another example of Washington's inverted logic is the attempts to prove that the "star wars" program is purely defensive and promotes strategic stability. The White House voiced a laughable paradox: "The strategic defense initiative (SDI) is arms control." Therefore, they say, it must be kept out of the talks. The U.S. President's press secretary stated that "the SDI will be on the table at Geneva for discussions, but not for its abandonment." Thus another artificial barrier on the path to the attainment of accord is obviously being prepared surreptitiously.

These symptoms on the Potomac show that the coming talks will obviously be difficult. All the same, an accord for the sake of the vital interests of the USSR and U.S. peoples and of all mankind is quite possible. To this end it is necessary to respect both sides' rights and legitimate security interests and not to seek the disruption of the established equilibrium of forces. Farsightedness and political realism can and must prevail over the recklessness of unrestrained militarism.

Zhukov PRAVDA Article

LD102349 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2145 GMT 10 Mar 85

[Quotation marks as received]

[Text] Moscow, 11th Mar (TASS) -- The following is the full text of PRAVDA political observer Yuriy Zhukov's article, published today under the heading "To Talk in Earnest."

"And so, tomorrow the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States will begin negotiations in Geneva on nuclear and space weapons. Tens and hundreds of millions of people all over the world will follow the course of these talks closely, especially the Soviet people and Americans, who are aware of the enormous importance that agreements on these issues would have for the future.

It goes without saying that the achievement of an accord on these issues is no easy thing, and it is perfectly clear that the talks will be difficult, but the Soviet side, setting out for the talks, is far from perceiving them as fatally hopeless.

If they are carried out strictly in accordance with the accords achieved as a result of the meeting of the leaders of both countries' foreign policy departments in Geneva on 7-8 January, it can and must be ensured that these negotiations move forward constructively. Let us recall once more these accords, which preclude all vagueness and misunderstanding.

"The subject of the talks beginning tomorrow: 'The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms -- both strategic and intermediate-range -- with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship.'

"The aim of the talks: "To work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability... The sides believe that ultimately the forthcoming negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere."

The fact that the achievement of these accords was no easy task is no secret. Initially the American side tried to prevent discussion of issues to do with the nonmilitarization of space and wished to keep space open to the arms race. But common sense finally gained the upper hand and the point of view firmly upheld by the Soviet side triumphed: That it is impossible to consider either the issue of strategic weapons, or the medium-range nuclear weapons issue without discussing the question of the nonmilitarization of space.

Thus came into being an accord embodying an important joint obligation, adopted by the USSR and the United States before the whole world. It was confirmed by both sides. In this way, the basis was created for conducting talks in a serious and purposeful manner. 'The point is, as Comrade K.U. Chernenko noted when replying to questions from a correspondent of the American CNN Television Company, honorably to observe the accord reached in Geneva, and in practice to uphold it strictly in all its parts.'

Uphold it in all its parts! This is the essence of the matter. Indeed, international agreements and accords are not a restaurant menu, from which one may choose what one likes and leave unattended that which is not to one's taste.

As for the Soviet side, it has of late repeatedly confirmed at the highest level that our delegation at the incipient talks will act in strict conformity with the joint accord, opening the way for agreement on all questions that are to be discussed in interrelation and expects the same of the American side. There is not and cannot be any other way to achieve successful results.

This should be recalled time and again, because on the eve of the talks statements were repeatedly being made in Washington, including at the highest level, that the United States does not intend to halt preparations for the militarization of outer space.

Furthermore, Paul Nitze, adviser to the U.S. secretary of state, took the liberty of declaring on 3 March at a session of the Los Angeles Council for International Affairs, that allegedly the so-called 'strategic defense initiative' of President R. Reagan, dubbed 'star wars,' 'will not be discussed at the talks table' at all.

At the same time it is precisely now, when they push especially hard through the Congress a colossal military budget for 1986, maintaining that it is necessary in order... to secure the success of the talks with the Soviet Union on limiting weapons.

"On Monday President Reagan directly connected the forthcoming Geneva talks with the deployment of the expensive intercontinental ballistic missiles 'MX', D. Rather, the TV company CBC news presenter reported. As he stated, Congress should approve the spending on this new weapon program. In his words, a negative vote in either house of Congress will undermine the U.S. position at the talks."

The talks beginning tomorrow will show the meaning of the propaganda campaign which was conducted with such heat during the last few weeks and ignored the Soviet-U.S. accord on the subject and the objective of the talks: Was it an attempt to create a psychological climate for bargaining in Geneva or was it a real rejection of this accord and a desire to achieve military superiority.

In both cases this would be an attempt by faulty methods. Soviet diplomacy has strong nerves. And as to designs for U.S. military superiority, they, as Comrade K.U. Chernenko stated in the speech to electorate, are doomed to failure [besperspektivny].

The conclusion: It is necessary to do business in Geneva. An agreement there, as considered by the USSR, is absolutely necessary and is quite possible, if the talks are based on the principle of equality and equal security, and if not only the Soviet but also the U.S. side will talk seriously.

10 March TV Talk Show

LD102050 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 10 Mar 85

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Radomir Georgiyevich Bogdanov, deputy director of the USA and Canada Institute; Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin, CPSU Central Committee consultant and political observer; and Vladimir Yakovlevich Tsvetov, central television and All-Union Radio political observer]

[Text] [Tsvetov] Hello there, comrades. The eyes of the entire world are focused on Geneva where the Soviet-American talks will start on 12 March with regard to preventing the militarization of space and halting the nuclear arms race on earth. Although two countries are participating in the talks -- the Soviet Union and the United States -- the problems they will be discussing apply to all countries, all peoples. In reality, the nuclear arms race launched by world imperialism's militarist circles concerns everyone throughout the world, since it influences the political, economic, and spiritual life of the people, making them alarmed for their future. The outcome of the Geneva talks will determine by and large, whether the arms race will decline or be intensified even further. Plans are being conceived in the United States to shift the arms race to space, which is fraught with increasing the danger of a nuclear war and, therefore, with a growing threat for humanity's very existence. The outcome of the Geneva talks depends to a considerable extent whether this threat is going to be removed or will assume an even larger scale. That is why now everyone in the world is anxious to see the outcome of the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva.

[Shishlin] Herein lies the most important question now: not only how the talks will proceed, which obviously is the main question, but what the sides have come with on the eve of these talks.

[Bogdanov] Nikolay Vladimirovich, you are posing a very essential, and I will even say, key question. All of us, and certainly our radio listeners, have witnessed during the past few months the way the American Administration at its highest level, has been preoccupied with creating an atmosphere of hopelessness around the talks. The notion was expressed quite unambiguously in a whole series of public statements by the most senior American leaders directly linked with the conduct of negotiations that things are altogether hopeless. If you add to that the publication of the so-called report on so-called breaches by the Soviet Union of all disarmament agreements, a report that will be familiar to you and is an utterly mendacious document containing nothing to support its assertions and for which there are no grounds for considering it the truth, then you may say and even ask why all this was done on the eve of talks to which, as you said, the eyes of the whole world are riveted; the interests of the whole world are now focused on the date 12 March 1985.

[Shishlin] Yes, Radomir Georgiyevich. That report apart, one cannot, of course, fail to lose sight of the American Administration's actions to whip up the arms race. Not a single military program has been halted and what is more, these program are being expanded. They are currently striving to push through allocations for the production of 21 MX missiles and with the same persistence are striving to improve the other components of their strategic triad. This is not to mention the so-called star wars plans, known by the term strategic defense initiative, which, of course, are fraught with the risk of the most serious destabilization of the entire military-strategic situation.

[Tsvetov] Without going into the program's technical military details, one can say with complete certainty that although the initiative is called defensive, it is in reality offensive. First, this is because the planned space weapons can be directed not only against missiles and satellites, but also against targets on the ground, in the air, and on water. In other words, the purpose of that system is to deal a nuclear first strike. Second, the military space systems that the Pentagon is planning are intended to prevent a retaliatory Soviet nuclear strike since the notion is that they will make it possible to destroy warheads a mere 5 or 6 minutes after launch.

[Boadanov] I would like to return to the beginning of our discussion before continuing with the so-called strategic defense initiative. A quite paradoxical situation is taking shape, the like of which the history of human reason has probably never seen before.

The arms race is escalating on the eve of talks that are of key importance for the fate of all mankind. Logic only suggests, as Nikolay Vladimirovich says, that on the contrary, it is necessary to create an appropriate atmosphere. You see, one must not forget that these talks, that the particular feature of these talks, is that they are beginning after a period of over 4 years during which the present American Administration has been persistently destroying all bases for Soviet-American relations. It would appear, as logic suggests, that an appropriate atmosphere is needed and second, if you like, it also signals that the other side seriously intends to work in this direction. You, Nikolay Vladimirovich, rightly noted that what is involved is not reduction, no; rather on the eve of the talks as it turns out, what is involved is that of an increase and escalation of the arms race. Under what pretext is all this being done? What is the argument that the administration is putting forward, twisting the arm of both the House of Representatives and Senate? It is in essence: The more money received for the arms race the more pliable the Soviet Union will be at the negotiation table. We will put more pressure on them and they will make concessions, is how their reasoning runs. Here, in this connection, it is certainly reasonable to pose another question. Imagine for a moment that the Soviet side would indeed act in such a way and would

approach 12 March along such a path. What chance would then be left for negotiations? Here, I believe, it would be quite logical to ask: What has the Soviet side done on the eve of these talks?

[Shishlin] Radomir Georgiyevich, I would like to add more about the United States' activity. Although, it may appear that the connection here is not too close, I believe it exists. Indeed, on the eve of the talks it is necessary to take care about the creation of the appropriate psychological and political atmosphere, to show a definite restraint. However as it transpires, we see absolutely no restraint from the American side as far as the conflict situation and crisis situations are concerned: There is the piratical policy towards Nicaragua, it cannot be termed anything else; the activity of the United States in southern Africa; the direct support of Israel's expansionist policy; and the United States' activity in connection with the situation in Afghanistan. Naturally the activities of the United States in all these crisis-ridden situations can only cast a dark shadow over Soviet-American relations and make the general state of these relations even bleaker on the eve of the Geneva talks. I will put it in this way: The United States has made fairly considerable efforts in order for the talks to begin with difficulties.

[Tsvetov] In this situation, the Soviet Union has put forward a quite precise, concrete, and constructive position with regard to the talks. It was expressed, let me remind our listeners, in Comrade Chernenko's speech on 22 February. I would like to cite some of Konstantin Ustinovich's words. He said: We are not striving to achieve any type of one-sided advantage over the United States or NATO countries, or military superiority over them. Comrade Chernenko then underlined: We want a cessation, not a continuation of the arms race.

He concluded by saying: We want a true reduction in the accumulated arms, the destruction of a considerable portion of them to begin with, and not the creation of further new offensive or defensive weapons systems in either space or on the earth.

[Bogdanov] Yes, this is a very clear-cut statement, which in essence sets the tone, atmosphere, and basis for the achievement of some type of real result at the Geneva talks. I believe Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko's statement that we are not striving for military superiority is of special importance. That is the key question. If we turn back to the history of Soviet-American relations over the last 4 years we can see that the Reagan administration's quite clear policy directed towards the attainment of military superiority was what poisoned the atmosphere, and made our relations tense and quite unacceptable for the Soviet side. I would like to add to what Vladimir Yakovlevich said with another important consideration. The CPSU Central Committee Politburo decision that has been published examined a broad circle of questions. It examined and confirmed the guidelines for the Soviet delegation that is starting talks in Geneva. It appears to me that one circumstance must be singled out in particular: specifically, that the Soviet delegation has been instructed to conduct the talks energetically and constructively. I believe that these are also key concepts. What does it mean energetically? We can observe an obvious American desire to drag out the talks, to drag them out for a year, or 2 or 3. The formulation "energetically" means that the Soviet side will not allow the talks to be dragged out. This is too serious a question and too much is at stake. The second part of the formulation, "constructively," what does "constructively" mean? This means that the Soviet side is coming with proposals, and as we consider them, acceptable ones, based on one very simple truth -- both sides' equality and equal security.

[Tsvetov] The third point of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo guidelines for our delegation is that the questions of nuclear and space weapons must be examined and tackled as mutually interlinked.

Esteemed listeners, in your letters, you very often dwell on this principle of the talks -- that questions dealing with nuclear and space armaments must be tackled on a mutually related basis.

[Shishlin] Many people pose the question in an even different way. If it proves possible to work out an accord on certain groups of armaments, why should this accord not be implemented without waiting for an accord in other areas? However, the very formula that stipulates that these issues must be discussed on a mutually related basis reflects the military and political reality in which we live. For example, with regard to strategic armaments and intermediate-range nuclear armaments, leaving space armaments to one side, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned intermediate-range nuclear armaments -- the Pershing II's and cruise missiles -- are weapons of a strategic nature. Thus, it is quite natural that we cannot divorce these armaments deployed by the Americans in Western Europe from the problem of strategic armaments. This applies in even greater measure to the questions of the militarization of space. If space is militarized, if the American Administration does not renounce its star wars plans and this notorious strategic defense initiative, what good is an accord on strategic armaments, or intermediate-range strategic weapons? Thus, this problems of interrelatedness is essentially one of the key ones as far as the approach to the talks is concerned. That is why this issue was discussed in Geneva as far back as January at Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko's meeting with Shultz and why this very point was registered in the joint Soviet-American accord as the common understanding of the approach to this problem.

[Tsvetov] There is another point to which I believe we must draw attention. We all remember the way in which the American military tried to provide justifications for the nuclear arms race after the Second World War. The assertion was made that nuclear weapons would supposedly make large armies unnecessary which would consequently automatically bring disarmament in the sphere of conventional weapons, and vast sums would be saved.

What happened in reality? The costly arms race spread to the sphere of nuclear weapons, and far from declining, the arms race increased even further in the conventional weapons sphere. The same thing will happen now. The militarization of space, which will begin to swallow colossal material and human resources, will not halt the nuclear arms race on earth but, on the contrary, make the race even more irrepressible and uncontrollable.

[Bogdanov] Please note that from the very outset, ever since Reagan's March 1983 speech, when it was declared publicly for the first time that the United States was entering the area of space wars, the talk was of a so-called defense initiative. The talk was that, allegedly, somewhere at the end of that long road flickered the greatest dream -- the realization of the greatest dream -- that humanity will dispense with nuclear weapons altogether. All American Administrations during the 30 postwar years have said without the slightest inhibition that nuclear weapons were strike weapons, offensive weapons that will bring all of America's enemies to their knees. Then, suddenly, they come up with defense. What is going on? I want to draw your attention to the following point. At the end of this February, the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, a paper you are very familiar with, published an interesting article analyzing the question as to why that administration is so

persistently talking of a defense initiative. The point is that in public opinion in America itself -- as indeed throughout the world -- there has been such a growth in revulsion for nuclear weapons as a means of destruction that the administration has been compelled to "sell," to use the American term, to "sell" this new weapons system under the guise, or packaging, of defensive weapons.

There is something else I would like to say. In America, as well as in some other countries, very authoritative groups of scientists have now been set up to study the prospects of this strategic defense. There are two groups of scientists. One serves the administration's interests, the interests of the military-industrial complex, and endeavors to prove by every manner of truth and untruth, including mathematics, the laws of physics, and so on, that the strategic defense initiative is possible.

The second group of scientists, which does not belong to those who govern America today and is not connected with the military-industrial complex, is proving the opposite; namely, that the strategic initiative is condemned to failure from the outset for a whole number of reasons. If we were to weigh the authority of the people in the groups supporting the administration and the military-industrial complex, and the authority of those who belong to the second camp, you would notice an interesting phenomenon. In the second camp, which is against the so-called defense initiative, without exaggeration, the best scientific minds and, incidentally, people who have been making nuclear weapons and creating strategic concepts for the use of these nuclear weapons are concentrated. They have come to the conclusion that it is impossible: impossible to shield the American towns and population from nuclear retributive strikes, retaliatory strikes. There are no such prospects.

In actual fact they are not even thinking about that. It is a question of a so-called space point defense [tochechnaya kosmicheskaya oborona] -- to shield the missiles -- the American missiles, and the control centers, in order to deliver strikes against the Soviet Union with impunity and be able to conduct a nuclear war against the Soviet Union.

[Tsvetov] THE NEW YORK TIMES openly writes with regard to this: At best, star wars amounts to a plan for defending ground-based missiles rather than people. Possibly, although this is not admitted, it is a plan to put America in a position where it can threaten a sudden attack and reap the fruits of nuclear blackmail.

[Shishlin] This has the following logic. Well, Country A -- let us assume the point of view that the realization of these star wars plans is possible -- and so, Country A opens an umbrella over its own territory and over its allies' territories to shield from a retributive strike. What does Country B, which knows that work to create space armaments systems is being conducted, do in this case? Country B in that case naturally will be striving to procure a sharper sword, an all-piercing sword. In turn Country B is not going to lose time in conducting analogous research to prevent upsetting the military-strategic parity. The result, as Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko said on more than one occasion, is an eruption of a new arms race, a launch of an arms race, moreover, in every direction and involving any class of armaments.

[Bogdanov] Here I would like to make an observation. We are again coming across -- and how many times has it already happened in the history of Soviet-American relations -- we are coming across a kind of technological, I would say arrogance on the American side, with, I would say, its stubborn belief that American technology

is so superior to everything else in the world that they can stay ahead of all opponents for a protracted period. The Soviet Union is seen as the leading opponent.

How many times has the United States already made a major miscalculation by perceiving our sincere interest in halting the arms race as a sign of weakness and thereby forcing new programs. There are some who presently treat the Soviet call for the nonmilitarization of space in a similar way. I believe it is high time for the United States to understand that the USSR comes out so keenly against spreading the arms race into space not because it will be unable to respond to Washington's plans. If we are forced to -- there are no secrets about this -- if we are forced to, we, as more than once in the past, will do everything necessary to protect our security and, of course, the security of our allies.

[Tsvetov] Everyone realizes that the negotiations will be complex and that time is needed to achieve solutions acceptable to both sides. However, the negotiations will not be conducted in a vacuum but in definite conditions of international life. Undoubtedly, the negotiating process will be greatly facilitated if the United States were to follow the example of the Soviet Union which is trying to ease the international situation through practical measures. I am thinking of the following: If the United States were to support the Soviet proposal to agree on norms of mutual relations between nuclear powers, and if the United States, like the Soviet Union, were to adopt a pledge not to use nuclear weapons first, this would have a beneficial effect upon the course of the forthcoming negotiations.

The course of the negotiations can also be positively affected by the positions of those countries not meeting in Geneva. As far as the socialist countries are concerned, they consistently defend the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence. The Soviet Union's constructive position, both prior to the Geneva talks and in their course, has been and will be a reflection of the ideas and feelings of all the countries of the socialist camp.

On the other hand, the United States will not be able to conduct the negotiations fully ignoring the views of its allies on the issues under consideration. Here the role of countries such as Britain, the FRG, France, and Italy may become highly important if, of course, they desire to make a worthy contribution to the cause of preventing nuclear war.

In connection with this, my attention was drawn by the following appeal by the West German Communists' newspaper UNSERE ZEIT to the FRG Government. There is a possibility at present to prevent an arms race in space, the paper said. We demand that the Federal Government reject the star wars plans and on no account take part in its realization.

The Federal Government should, the newspaper appealed, make a constructive contribution to creating a beneficial atmosphere for the Soviet-American talks in Geneva.

[Shishlin] Here of course, we can say that both inside and outside Europe both political circles and the public presently show a burning interest that the Soviet-American dialogue assume a constructive nature and indeed energetic nature. Of course, if speaking of the ruling circles, the spread of positions is quite large.

If we take the position of the West German leaders, and one of the closest to them is perhaps the British position, they are rather inclined to support the so-called strategic defense initiative, although they provide certain reasoning that what is meant is

only scientific research and a developmental work stage. If we attempt to look more closely at the Italian and French positions, we can notice certain nuances after all. Although, Craxi visited the United States quite recently, and it is depicted in such a way to make us believe that some sort of mutual understanding at least has been achieved there, I still believe it safe to conclude that the Italians and the present Italian Government treat these space militarization plans with a certain reserve. The French also have an absolutely definite reserve about it. I need not mention the neutral European countries which are extremely cool and treat all those American fancies in a negative way. All in all, the common denominator for the West European position is the fact that these plans as they are cause great alarm and a certain counteractive force. That is why I tend to attach great importance to those diplomatic contacts now being developed between both the Soviet Union and West European states, and between other socialist countries and our West European neighbors. With regard to world public as a whole and numerous sober-thinking political circles, they are now acting as a factor for a certain pressure on the American position to urge them to strive for an accord since the Soviet Union is truly ready to reach an agreement and is ready to look for a compromise taking into account to the same degree the security interests of the Soviet Union and our friends and allies. The Soviet Union is equally prepared to consider the security interests of the United States and its West European partners.

[Bogdanov] Naturally, analysis of what the United States has recently done does not allow for very optimistic conclusion and I believe we did the correct thing informing our radio listeners about the complexities, and about those stumbling blocks that the United States has placed on the path of the Geneva talks. Does that mean the talks are irrevocably doomed? Certainly not. Everything we have said means that the struggle is necessary. Relaxation at the mere thought that the talks are to begin is unacceptable. We can say with pride that on the eve of these most important talks the Soviet side has done its utmost to create an appropriate atmosphere.

[Tsvetov] Thus, to summarize I want to emphasize that the Soviet Union is heading for Geneva, is going for talks with the conviction that an accord on the problems to be discussed is badly needed, since life on earth will become even more dangerous without one. The Soviet Union is going to the talks convinced that an accord is possible if the American side will respect the Soviet Union's rights and legitimate interests in preserving its security and will not attempt to break the existing balance of forces. This confidence is proof of the Soviet foreign policy's realistic nature and the Soviet Union's lofty feeling of responsibility for peace for the whole humanity. This is proof of our country's goodwill. We will now say good-bye to you, dear listeners. Best wishes to you.

Nikonov on Prospects

PM081530 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Mar 85 First Edition p 4

[A. Nikonov article: "On an Integrated and Interconnected Basis"]

[Text] Soviet-U.S. talks will begin in Geneva on 12 March. All who value the cause of peace are awaiting them with attention and hope. This is understandable, for the questions that will be discussed and resolved during the upcoming talks have to do with cardinal problems of the present day and concern the vital interests of mankind.

The Soviet-U.S. joint statement records that a package of questions relating to the nonmilitarization of space and the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms, strategic and medium-range, will be the subject of the talks. The aim of the talks is to prevent an arms race in space and end it on earth. In his speech addressed to voters, Comrade K.U. Chernenko pointed specially to the fact that the USSR and the United States "have agreed to examine and resolve questions of space and nuclear arms on an integrated and interconnected basis, which is absolutely essential for the success of the matter. This is the chief purport of the Geneva accord."

Of course, it is not an easy matter to discuss and resolve such complex questions simultaneously, in close coordination with each other, but the contemporary situation provides no other possibilities, and the accord that was reached must be strictly fulfilled. The structure of the talks proposed by the Soviet Union and accepted by the U.S. side is in full accordance with this.

The need for a comprehensive approach to resolving questions of nuclear arms and the nonmilitarization of space has been occasioned not by considerations of expediency or for subjective reasons but by the real changes that have been taking place in the world strategic situation in recent years. The responsibility for this situation lies with those U.S. forces that switched their country's political course from the path of detente to the path of confrontation in the late 1970's and early 1980's and subordinated their policy to the desire to upset the established strategic equilibrium and achieve U.S. and NATO military superiority over the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries as a whole.

To this end the United States began implementing programs aimed at trying to overtake the Soviet Union in the sphere of strategic nuclear arms and, at the same time, gradually shifting the arms race into space.

The deployment, which began at the end of 1983, of 572 American Pershing II and cruise missiles in West Europe in addition to the medium-range nuclear means already there, has seriously destabilized the strategic situation by undermining the accords reached earlier. Since these new means are capable of making nuclear strikes against targets on the territory of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, their appearance on the European Continent signifies an actual increase in American strategic arms. The appearance of new American nuclear means in West Europe upsets strategic stability on not only a regional but also a global level.

The USSR repeatedly warned that the deployment of new American medium-range nuclear means in West Europe would lead to a serious change in the strategic situation and make it impossible to continue the Soviet-U.S. talks that were being held at the time. The American side ignored those warnings. Thus, it bears all the responsibility for the failure of the previous talks. The circumstances connected with the deployment of American medium-range nuclear means in Europe cannot be disregarded at the new talks.

It is impossible now to limit or, still less, reduce nuclear arms without taking effective measures to prevent an arms race in space. However, as the start of the talks draws nearer, U.S. statesmen have been making more frequent and insistent statements that the American Administration, contrary to that principled accord, would like to detach or even altogether remove space arms from the context of the talks.

Statements by many American officials, who follow the U.S. President's lead in bluntly declaring that, regardless of the course and outcome of the Soviet-U.S. talks, the

planned military space programs will be fulfilled at an accelerated pace, are couched in the same negative spirit.

Moreover, it has to be stated that the matter is not limited to statements alone. Work on the practical realization of military space programs is being developed on a growing scale in the United States. Major scientific centers and industrial corporations are involved in implementing the plans for space militarization. Some \$26 billion has been allocated for these purposes. All in all, the United States is preparing to spend \$1 trillion on the "star wars" program. The fact that special organs of the military space command have been set up and begun functioning also says a great deal.

In direct contradiction with the termless 1972 Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems, work is in full swing in the United States to create mobile ABM radar stations, Minuteman missiles are being tested to give them the qualities of antimissile missiles, multiple warheads are being created for antimissile missiles, and Pave Paws radar stations are being deployed to provide ABM defense radar cover over the greater part of U.S. territory.

It is no coincidence that the Western press points out that Washington not only does not wish to abandon the planned programs but is seeking to make them irreversible and to foist the policy of militarism and of a race for space-based strike weapons and other arms on future generations. If events continue to develop in the same direction, they will enter into obvious conflict with the accord reached in Geneva on the aim of the talks: to prevent an arms race in space and end it on earth.

The Soviet Union's warning that U.S. violation of that accord would entail very grave consequences indicates how seriously it treats the accord.

The Soviet Union's firm position, which rules out any misinterpretation [krivotolki], has been dictated by a profound understanding of the tremendous danger that would be posed to all mankind by the creation and deployment of strike space weapons systems. The USSR has proceeded and continues to proceed from the premise that mankind must be delivered from the prospect of "star wars." This means that no weapons of any kind, conventional, nuclear, laser, beam, or any others, must be put into space or deployed in space, whether on manned or unmanned systems.

Under contemporary conditions the closest and most immediate threat stems from attempts to create a comprehensive ABM defense system with space-based elements within the framework of the so-called "strategic defense initiative" proclaimed in the United States. The Soviet side has officially stated that if the American Administration did not have plans to create such a system, the question of bringing space into the upcoming talks would not have arisen.

The plans to create such a system have nothing to do with defense. They are of an aggressive nature, and their true purpose is to enable the United States, under cover of a "space shield," to acquire the ability to make a nuclear first strike and deprive the other side of the possibility of responding adequately.

Account must also be taken of the fact that the very adoption of programs to create a large-scale ABM system, not to mention practice measures to implement them, has a very destabilizing effect on the world's situation, threatening to give a new boost to the arms race, moreover in the sphere not only of space arms but also of other types of arms, including offensive strategic nuclear missile arms. Indeed, an interconnection has always existed objectively between defensive and offensive weapons systems, and it

is not hard to foresee that the efforts of one side to create a comprehensive ABM system with space-based elements, upsetting the military equilibrium, would force the other side to strengthen its strategic potential.

The introduction of a new destabilizing element into the equalization of the world strategic balance would have consequences for many countries, which would find themselves in the sights of American space systems. Those figures in NATO countries who believe that Washington's military space plans are directed only against the Soviet Union and its friends and allies and that therefore they should not only approve the ambitions of their transatlantic ally but also join in realizing them are profoundly mistaken.

Such a position is shortsighted, to say the least. It ignores the fact that shifting the arms race into space will create a threat of a global nature and affect the vital interests of the peoples of all countries and continents. If not prevented, it could undermine the entire system of international security and cause dangerous new elements of unpredictability and uncertainty to appear in the world military-political situation.

This cannot be permitted. The peoples of the world have a right to hope that everything necessary will be done at the upcoming Soviet-U.S. talks to prevent an arms race in space and end it on earth, and this will clear the way to the genuine limitation and reduction of nuclear arms and then to their total liquidation.

The sides' differences of opinion over the questions to be discussed at the upcoming Geneva talks are great. Yet, as Comrade K.U. Chernenko pointed out, "an accord is perfectly possible, since for this it is necessary only to respect the rights and the legitimate security interests of both sides and not seek to upset the established equilibrium of forces."

For the success of the talks each side must display the political will to conduct the talks honestly, to resolve the questions in close interconnection, and to display sincere readiness for sensible compromises on the basis of equality and identical security. This is precisely how the Soviet Union has acted and will continue to act. If the United States acts in the same way, the talks will be able to justify the hopes pinned on them by the world's peoples.

Reagan Attitude Hit

PM081011 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Mar 85 Morning Edition p 5

[Political observer V. Matveyev article: "Abide by What Has Been Signed!"]

[Text] In the U.S. political arena there has never been a shortage of figures not just opposing all agreements and accords with socialist countries but resisting negotiations with these countries in general.

Anything that in one way or another could hamper the arms race or -- worse still from their viewpoint -- lead to coordinated collective steps toward reducing the most destructive weapons arouses these circles' particular displeasure.

The following statement by R. Perle, assistant secretary of defense, in a recent interview reflects this way of thinking. He declared that "everything went very

smoothly when there were no talks." If these people regard talks as an obstacle to plans to deploy new arms, you can imagine how much they oppose any agreements aimed at curbing the arms race!

The following piece of evidence from THE WASHINGTON POST is worth noting. On 21 January 1984 it recalled: During the 1980 presidential campaign, Reagan insisted that a charge that the Soviet Union was violating the provisions of the two treaties on strategic arms limitation -- SALT I and SALT II -- signed between the USSR and the United States, be included in the Republican Party platform. The newspaper specified that concern for the observance of the said treaties was the last thing the then presidential hopeful had on his mind. Quite the reverse: It was precisely because "Reagan had always regarded the process of strategic arms limitation with suspicion" that this kind of pseudo-accusation against the Soviet Union was needed to mount an attack against these treaties.

The Republican administration, which came to power in the United States in 1981, did not confine itself to verbal attacks on the agreements which had been concluded between the USSR and the United States. Washington unilaterally broke off talks with our country on a general and complete nuclear weapons tests ban, on the Indian Ocean, on anti-satellite systems, and others. U.S. observers pointed out with good reason that the current administration established a unique kind of record during its first term in office: Compared with preceding U.S. administrations in power in the sixties and seventies it alone achieved no new agreements with the Soviet Union.

The mass deployment of sea-and ground-launched cruise missiles by the Pentagon in recent years was at variance with what was enshrined in the protocol to the SALT II treaty. It is worthwhile once again to refer to what R. Reagan had to say about cruise missiles before he became U.S. President. At the beginning of June 1976 in an interview for ASSOCIATED PRESS he described cruise missiles "as the most promising set of weapons" and claimed that the United States would gain great advantages "if it appeared on the scene with a new system of weapons..."

Despite the fact that for the aforesaid reason the SALT II provision relating to cruise missiles has lapsed [otpalol], the sides proceed from the premise that what remains of the constructive provisions of SALT II should stay in force. This positive interpretation was recently noted by A.A. Gromyko.

It is characteristic that last June the Senate, where the Republicans have the majority, called on the U.S. President to continue to observe the provisions of the SALT II treaty, which was not ratified through the fault of the United States. And it was as a result of a very indicative vote: 82 votes for and only 17 against. Commenting on the results of the voting, THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote: "Nonetheless, Reagan continues to view anything that might restrict potential U.S. participation in the arms race with great skepticism."

The newspaper put it relatively mildly. In actual fact, the campaign of attacks against SALT II from various quarters goes on unabated across the ocean. And since -- because of broad public support for the treaty -- its opponents do not dare oppose it directly, they resort to subterfuge. The means most frequently used involves fabrications about alleged "violations of its provisions by the Soviet Union," which Washington again resorted to recently.

Simultaneously, the same circles are trying to sow doubt about the usefulness of the upcoming Soviet-American talks in Geneva and to poison the talks' atmosphere in advance. As we can see, they are trying to attack on a broad front, but their zeal is clearly not based on reason.

"Accusing people of violating commitments under treaties which you yourself refuse to ratify is a dangerous matter," the Federation of U.S. Scientists emphasized last March. Valuing highly everything that serves the strengthening of the norms of international law and consequently contributes to the strengthening of the foundations of world peace, the Soviet Union was and is for the strict observance by states of international treaty commitments which they have assumed. Proceeding from these positions, the Soviet side has on more than one occasion drawn the attention of the United States to the latter's actions in the sphere of arms limitation. A substantial memorandum on this question was handed to the U.S. State Department at the end of January 1984.

Recently, the USSR Embassy in Washington made representations to the State Department in connection with the slander campaign unleashed in the United States around the administration's latest "report" to Congress on alleged "violations" of international commitment by our country. Fabrications of this kind have nothing in common with real facts.

The now visible U.S. Government line aimed at undermining the 1972 treaty of unlimited duration on ABM defense, which authoritative U.S. experts have described as the most important agreement between the two countries for the continuation of the process of strategic arms limitation; a whole series of U.S. measures and steps in the military strategic sphere, including the siting of new nuclear missile weapons in West Europe, aimed at disrupting the military equilibrium and gaining a first-strike capability, which are in fundamental contradiction with the letter and spirit of SALT-I and SALT II, which remain in force; the U.S. refusal to ratify the 1974 treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapons tests; Washington's course toward the accelerated development of chemical weapons and consequently toward sabotaging accords for banning these weapons: What is all this if not an attempt to give primacy to militarist objectives which pursue the aim of achieving superiority in the military sphere and thus undermining and bringing down the whole international law structure created over the past 2 decades! This formed the basis for successful action to reduce the threat of a nuclear conflict and limit the most destructive arms!

The initiators of these steps must take into account that in trying to challenge the Soviet Union in this sphere and setting too much store by their technological and other resources, they will also come into conflict with broad circles of the public and realistically minded politicians inside their own country and in countries which are their allies. They are essentially advocating a "philosophy of hopelessness," an interminable race in a vicious circle of increasingly devastating and destabilizing arms.

Mankind rejects this defective approach of denying the value and importance of the observance of international commitments.

This is why the Soviet Union attaches such serious importance to this issue.

Lomeyko Interview

LD072340 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 2000 GMT 7 Mar 85

[Interview given by Soviet foreign affairs spokesman Vladimir Lomeyko to Budapest radio correspondent Jozsef Havel; date, place not specified; presenter not identified -- no video available]

[Excerpts] Good evening. For all of us it was a reassuring announcement after the latest Geneva meeting between Andrey Gromyko and George Shultz that the negotiating delegations of the USSR and the United States would begin in the Swiss conference city a completely new series of discussions on Tuesday, 12 March -- that is, 5 days from today.

What are Moscow's expectations as it looks ahead to the series of discussions due to begin on Tuesday? Are rapid results to be expected? I put this question to Jozsef Havel, Hungarian radio correspondent:

[Havel] I think that in the Soviet capital nobody expects quick results from the Geneva talks. The path will be long and difficult. Everybody in Moscow says and professes this. Gromyko and Shultz may, it is true, have agreed on certain basic principles, and these basic principles really do offer a possibility and hope for progress, but now we have come to a very difficult phase of the discussions: These same basic principles have to be changed into practical deeds. But I think that Vladimir Lomeyko, Soviet foreign affairs spokesman, can speak more creditably about this:

[Begin recording] [Lomeyko, in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation] The Soviet Union begins the discussions from the point that their topic will be the entire sphere of issues of space and nuclear weapons. All these issues must be examined and solved in all their details and in connection with one another. The two foreign ministers agreed on precisely this in Geneva. This is a very important agreement. The topic of the examination must be not a few chosen issues but, I repeat, the whole complex of issues, both the issue of space weapons and that of nuclear weapons, including the issues of strategic and medium-range nuclear missiles. At the discussions, the Soviet Union will strive to achieve mutually acceptable agreements, the essence of which is very simple: The militarization of outer space must not be permitted; thus, a space arms race should not begin. That has to be forestalled here on earth.

As has been stressed already on numerous occasions by Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko and Foreign Minister Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, too, the Soviet Union wishes to have serious, professional discussions in which the sides will not try to outwit one another, where they will not expect unilateral concessions from the other, but will hold discussions on a coordinated basis. It is encouraging that such a basis does exist, and where they do not violate the principle of equality and equal security. [as heard]

[Havel] If on the issue of space the United States is unbending and continues the experiments it has started in this direction, what then will be the Soviet stand?

[Lomeyko] We cannot believe any kind of explanations to the effect that this is only an initiative with a defensive objective and that only scientific research has been set in motion. We believe that the scientific research itself is already the first step on the path of creating a space weapon. According to the lessons of history, new weapons are created so that they might also be put to use. Someone who buries millions of dollars

in this will hardly stop in midstream. To your question (?we) could reply: We have warned the Americans that one cannot on the one hand negotiate and on the other hand create new types of weapons.

And if they pursue such a policy, they will shake the bases of the discussions. I have warned them about this as severely as possible. I would also like to say here that the Americans themselves say the following: Your conceptions, according to which it is a question merely of the creation of a space shield that would completely defend the territory of the United States from missile attacks, that not a single missile should reach there, and that it does not in any way want to gain superiority. Well, these pronouncements are refuted by facts. [as heard] Only a few days ago THE NEW YORK TIMES and the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE reported that at present the U.S. Air Force is realizing its own work program, the objective of which is the creation of new exceptionally refined missiles with changing trajectory. These missiles are intended to break through an eventual Soviet space shield insofar as the Soviet Union would create one, too. What is this all about, in other words? They do not only want a space shield for themselves; they would not only like to retain their nuclear missiles. At the same time, they also hold talks so that they might create missiles suited to breaking through our eventual space shield.

[Havel] What mutual concessions do you consider to be possible in the issues of strategic and medium-range weapons?

[Lomeyko] For the Soviet Union, medium-range Pershing II and cruise missiles are also strategic weapons. Why? We have talked about this on numerous occasions. Because they can reach the Soviet Union. Thus, they are capable of inflicting a blow on our political and military centers, on the sites of our strategic missiles. For that reason there is the closest possible reciprocal effect here between the two spheres of issues. Space weapons, even if Mr Reagan calls them defensive, are directly connected to nuclear armament since the shield he wants to create -- under cover of which shelter would be provided from Soviet missiles -- would create the possibility for American missiles to inflict a blow on us from behind this shield. For this reason, Minister Gromyko warned the American side that it should not nourish illusions and should not expect to be able to agree separately on just the strategic or the nuclear weapons, putting aside the matter of space weapons. Only by examining all weapons in their interconnections can power relations be evolved that do not contradict the principle of equality and equal security.

[Havel] What is your opinion of a mutually coordinated moratorium, a freeze?

[Lomeyko] As is well known, the Soviet Union has for a long time been proposing to the United States a freeze on the existing nuclear potential so that later it might become possible to reduce it. Unfortunately, the U.S. Government has not yet responded to our proposal, although it seems that our standpoint is very understandable and natural. For us to be able to reduce nuclear armaments, we must first curb its proliferation, the emergence of newer types of weapons. An automobile cannot be put in reverse while it is speeding ahead; first it has to be brought to a halt. In the same way, we would first have to stop the growth of armaments if we want to reduce and limit them. This halting is the essence of a freeze. The level of armaments is roughly equal. If either side jumps ahead or presses forward, the other will definitely be pursued. There is now an approximate military strategic balance, and in this there is a possibility which we must not let slip away. Armaments must be frozen now, while the balance will not be upset; then can follow equal reductions, right up to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. [end recording]

Bovin Interviewed

AU131742 Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech 11 Mar 85 p 3

["Abbreviated part" of interview given by Aleksandr Bovin, IZVESTIYA political commentator, to Ing Bohumil Horak on the Czechoslovak radio: "Very Restrained Optimism; A. Bovin Prior to the USSR-U.S. Negotiations in Geneva"]

[Text] This Saturday and Sunday [9 and 10 Mar] the Czechoslovak radio broadcast in its "Studio 7" program a talk between Ing Bohumil Horak, chief editor of the Main Editorial Office of INTERNATIONAL LIFE, and Aleksandr Bovin, outstanding Soviet political commentator of the daily IZVESTIYA. From that extensive talk we have selected an abbreviated part, devoted to the problems of Soviet-American relations.

[Horak] The Soviet-American negotiations on the complex of nuclear and space arms -- the most comprehensive negotiations that will be ever conducted on these issues between the USSR and the United States -- will begin on Tuesday 12 March in Geneva. How do you appraise the prospects of these talks, Comrade Bovin?

[Bovin] Here we have one of the most significant events of the last few years. The very fact that the talks are taking place has great political weight. As regards their prospects, the talks will be very [preceding word published in widspace] -- I stress the word "very" -- difficult. They will be difficult for many reasons: both because the military-political problems that will be the subject of negotiations are very complicated, and also because they concern the very essence of the security of the participating countries and because each of them will be defending its interests and its idea of security.

Another reason is that our American partners, in my opinion, are not yet sufficiently prepared for a compromise. In this kind of negotiation, none of the sides can insist on 100-percent satisfaction of its demands. It is necessary to search for points where interests coincide [prolinaji], for the sphere in which it is possible to reach an agreement and to draw mutual stands closer to each other. If I look on the current development from this viewpoint, I must state that the U.S. stands, or at least the stands it has been maintaining to date, could scarcely aid the success of the coming Geneva negotiations.

[Horak] Many of our listeners are interested in what will happen if -- as you have just said -- the United States blocks the Geneva negotiations by its inconstructive approach?

[Bovin] In practical terms this will mean a continuation of feverish armament. The USSR will never tolerate a violation of the balance of strategic forces that has been created; it will not tolerate unilateral U.S. supremacy. That is why we will naturally continue to maintain the current equilibrium and, deplorably, we will be forced to do so on an increasingly higher level.

[Horak] This, of course, would have the most negative impact not only on Soviet-American relations, but also on the general international situation...

[Bovin] Understandably so. Of course, I believe that, in the long-term perspective, there exists no alternative to detente. The understanding of the fact that nuclear war is suicidal, feverish armament catastrophic, and that the world would increasingly

approach the edge of the abyss from which we would not be able to emerge, will sooner or later force the Americans to start constructive negotiations with us.

[Horak] The current visit of the Soviet parliamentary delegation to the United States and the reception of Comrade Shcherbitskiy, head of this delegation, by President Reagan indicate that, despite the divergent stands, realistic possibilities do not exist for improving Soviet-American relations.

[Bovin] You are right. At the present moment it would be incorrect to assess USSR-U.S. relations in an exclusively one-sided way. Of course, they are on the whole rather bad. However, the very fact that negotiations in Geneva are taking place, the visit of our parliamentary delegation to the United States, as well as the recent visit of the U.S. secretary of commerce to Moscow and the Soviet-American consultations on the Mideast problems recently held in Vienna indicates that a certain movement and certain elements do exist. It is not to be excluded that their gradual accumulation will effect qualitative changes. We would greatly wish this. However, I personally am not convinced that the present American Administration will agree to such a radical change of its stands. We will see...

Burlatskiy Comments

PM141113 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Mar 85 p 9

[Fedor Burlatskiy "Political Notes:" "To End Nuclear Games!"]

[Text] So, the Soviet-American talks on space and nuclear arms have begun in Geneva.

All people in the East and West who are concerned about the fate of peace thirst for positive, practical results from these talks. They want results that accord with the aims proclaimed by both sides: to achieve an end to the arms race on earth and prevent its development in space, to reduce existing arms, and ultimately to eliminate nuclear weapons.

However, probably, seldom has so much depended on first steps, on the start made at talks. These steps will determine which way the matter goes: Whether a constructive approach based on the real desire of both sides to end the arms race finally triumphs.

Speaking about the USSR's approach to the Geneva talks in his speech at the 11 March 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, emphasized: "...We do not seek to achieve unilateral advantages over the United States and the NATO countries or strive for military superiority over them; we want to end, not continue the arms race. Therefore, we propose to freeze nuclear arsenals and end the further deployment of missiles; we want a real and major reduction in stockpiled arms, not the creation of more and more new weapons, either in space or on earth."

The nuclear contest begun by the United States has been going in for 40 years. Unprecedented material and intellectual resources and trillions of dollars, rubles, pounds sterling, francs, and yuan have been expended.

What has happened? This contest has mercilessly destroyed the security in which people would be living without nuclear weapons. Fear of an apocalypse has become the lifelong companion of people on earth. - This contest has become the chief source of the tension that has put the whole world in a fever. Enough! The nuclear game must be ended! This is the first demand that all people address to Geneva -- we are sure of this.

The 2 months that have elapsed since the accord on the talks have been filled with tempestuous polemics. As readers know, the "star wars" problem found itself at the center of the discussion. The White House is in a hurry to take actions that would render irreversible the process of implementing the so-called research into antimissile weapons with space-based elements at a cost of \$26 billion. This has aroused heated protests in West Europe, and also in the United States itself.

A fundamental question relating to the historical long term is being resolved right now. The point is that the new technological revolution has opened up immense possibilities for creating previously unknown types of arms and modernizing existing types: nuclear, missile, conventional -- in short, absolutely all spheres of military competition. The American program for the creation of ABM systems alone will cost at least \$400 billion. If we speak of the entire modernization program, designed to cover a period of 15-20 years, it will probably cost two or three times as much. All this spending can only lead to a still greater increase in the threat of nuclear war.

Many American experts are understanding about this problem. The LOS ANGELES TIMES writes: "The arms control talks that have begun in Geneva this week signify the start of a new chapter in Soviet-American relations marked by the fear that the deadly rivalry might be transferred to space and that new weapons systems, capable of upsetting the fragile equilibrium which for 40 years has been the basis for nuclear peace, will be developed."

At a meeting in the White House with provincial newspaper editors U.S. President R. Reagan declared: "Our delegation is ready to put forward specific and constructive proposals. It will in turn respond to Soviet proposals put forward in a spirit of goodwill by displaying flexibility and active interest." At the same time the President emphasized that the United States intends to "increase reliance on defensive systems." In other words, the President continues to champion his "star wars" program. How is it possible to seriously plan on reducing arms on earth and at the same time deploying them in space?

President R. Reagan dislikes the word "freeze," although it came into being in America and is supported by the overwhelming majority of that country's public opinion. OK, let him find another word, but leave the essence: the ending of nuclear games, which are costly and lead to the madness of worldwide catastrophe. Do the American Administration and its representatives in Geneva have this resolve? This is the fundamental question, and this is probably what will come to light at the initial stage of the talks.

U.S. Approach Assailed

LD131936 Moscow TASS in English 1918 GMT 13 Mar 85

["Futile Hopes"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 13 Mar (TASS)--TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

The Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons which began in Geneva are evoking much interest all over the world. The Soviet Union came to the talks with a sincere desire to achieve concrete results.

The constructive progress of the talks can be ensured if they are conducted strictly in accord with the agreement reached by the leaders of the diplomatic communities of the two countries in Geneva on January 7-8, the agreement defining the subject matter and objectives of the talks. The USSR is prepared to follow that agreement consistently and in full.

And what about the USA? American newspapers, quoting "sources close to the U.S. delegation," cast some light on the instructions given to the U.S. negotiators in Washington. The following circumstances cause already now particular worry to all those who would like the talks to follow a positive course.

First, Washington does not want any discussion or solution of the questions concerning the non-militarisation of space and the limitation and reduction of strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons in their entirety, in their close interrelationship -- which is contrary to the Soviet-American agreement. Washington's intention is to separate all those issues from one another and to tackle them individually.

Second, the U.S. Administration is going to detach altogether the question of ending the arms race in space from the context of the talks. As THE NEW YORK TIMES points out President Reagan would like first to cut back offensive weapons and then to reach "accord" on the phased deployment of ABM systems with space-based components. This intention also is contrary to the preliminary agreement on working out an accord to prevent the arms race in space. What Washington would like to discuss is "rules" for this race.

These "instructions" belie the unwillingness to seek positive results. Indeed, the need for a comprehensive approach to reductions of nuclear armaments and the non-militarisation of space is prompted not by any time-serving considerations but by the actual world strategic situation. If Washington did not have plans to develop ABM systems with space-based components, the question of including space in the agenda of the talks would not have arisen. But the USA, far from renouncing those plans, seeks to "legalise" them on an international scale, to make them irreversible and to hand down the race in space and other armaments to the succeeding generations.

This approach also disregards the warnings of many U.S. arms control experts to the effect that the fulfilment of the plans for ABM defences could lead to an extremely explosive and unstable strategic situation fraught with nuclear conflict.

Third, the U.S. Administration is cynically trying to exploit the talks on nuclear and space weapons to justify the buildup of the U.S. strategic potential. Openly insulting

logic and common sense, the U.S. President claims that the development of new first-strike weapons is an essential component of U.S. arms control strategy, one which allegedly would increase the chances for accord with the Soviet Union.

Following this line, the U.S. Administration has during the past few days increased pressure on Congress, demanding approval of appropriations to build another group out of the total 21 inter-continental ballistic missiles MX under the budget for the current fiscal year and "linking" that question to the Geneva talks.

All this shows that Washington has set out to outpace the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear armaments and simultaneously surreptitiously to spread the arms race into space. This course provokes doubts of the true intentions of the U.S. side in having agreed to the Geneva talks. What can be said on this score, Mikhail Gorbachev said in his election speech on February 21, 1985. It can only be said that such hopes are futile and the approach itself unacceptable if we talk about reaching agreements. The world public expects from Washington a constructive approach to the talks on the basis of strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security.

CSO: 5200/1032

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

REPORTAGE ON OPENING OF U.S.-SOVIET TALKS

Delegation Arrival; Karpov Statement

LD101225 Moscow TASS in English 1220 GMT 10 Mar 85

[Text] Geneva March 10 TASS -- The USSR's delegation arrived here today for talks with the U.S. delegation on nuclear and space arms.

The leader of the Soviet delegation, Viktor Karpov, said in a statement upon the delegation's arrival in the airport that the basis for these negotiations is the agreement as to their subject and objectives reached at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in January 1985, which calls for the consideration and solution of a complex of questions concerning nuclear and space arms in their inter-relationship. It affords an opportunity for productive work and reaching solutions aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability.

Agreement on and implementation of far-reaching measures in these areas would be an important step towards attaining a truly historic goal -- that of ultimately eliminating nuclear arms completely and everywhere.

It is this course that the USSR delegation is going to follow at the negotiations on nuclear and space arms. The USSR delegation has been instructed by the Soviet leadership to negotiate in a businesslike and constructive manner seeking effective solutions to the questions to be discussed at the negotiations. In doing so, this delegation will be consistently guided by the principle of equality and equal security, which precludes either party to the negotiations from gaining unilateral advantages.

In conclusion the head of the Soviet delegation expressed gratitude to the Swiss Government and the authorities of the Canton and the City of Geneva for their hospitality.

Talks Begin

LD121524 Moscow TASS in English 1511 GMT 12 Mar 85

[Text] Geneva, 12 Mar (TASS)---Correspondent Yevgeniy Korzhev reporting:

Negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. on nuclear and space arms began here today with a meeting of heads of delegations.

As agreed during the Soviet-U.S. meeting at Geneva last January, the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms -- both strategic and intermediate range -- with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. It was also agreed at that time that the objective of the negotiations will be to work out agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. If steps are agreed and taken along these lines they can ensure real progress along the road of terminating the arms race, removing the threat of nuclear war and ultimately eliminating nuclear arms completely.

The delegation of the U.S.S.R. is led by Ambassador Viktor Karpov who will at the same time represent the Soviet side in the group on strategic arms. Two other Soviet groups -- on space arms and intermediate nuclear systems will be headed by Ambassadors Yuliy Kvitsinskiy and Alexey Obukhov respectively.

Max Kampelman was appointed head of the U.S. delegation. He will also lead the U.S. side in the group on space weapons. Senator John Tower will be chief U.S. negotiator in the group on strategic arms, and Maynard Glitman -- the group on intermediate-range nuclear systems.

In the period ahead the delegations will hold plenary meetings twice a week in turn on the territory of the Soviet and U.S. missions. The next meeting will be held Thursday in the U.S. mission.

Plenary Meeting 14 March

LD141322 Moscow TASS in English 1315 GMT 14 Mar 85

[Text] Geneva, 14 Mar (TASS)--A plenary meeting of the delegations of the USSR and the U.S.A. at the talks on nuclear and space weapons has been held here today.

TV Report on Plenary Session

LD150230 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2021 GMT 14 Mar 85

[From the "World Today" program presented by F. Seyful-Mulyukov]

[Text] We have already reported that a plenary session of the Soviet and American delegations took place today in Geneva within the framework of the nuclear and space weapons talks. This dialogue, which was confidential under an accord reached by both sides, lasted approximately 2 hours, foreign correspondents report from Geneva.

Following the conclusion of the meeting, USSR delegation head Comrade Karpov told journalists that this was the beginning. A new meeting will take place next Tuesday.

The peace-loving forces expect positive results from the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva.

The Soviet Union is not seeking to achieve advantages over the United States and the NATO countries, BERLINER ZEITUNG stresses today. The USSR proposes a freeze on nuclear arsenals and a cessation of a further deployment of missiles. The main question is not to permit the militarization of space.

However, Washington is seeking to utilize the "star wars" program as its trump card at the Geneva talks. The United States is increasing its pressure on its allies for these purposes, intending to draw them into the implementation of plans for space armaments. General Abrahamson, the director of the so-called strategic defense initiative, will leave on a tour of Europe in the near future, during which he will explain to the allies the talks that Washington is setting for them in this sphere. A large group of high-ranking State Department and Pentagon officials is already intensively working on the West Europeans.

Congressional Delegation Noted

LD141937 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1545 GMT 14 Mar 85

[From the "World Today" program presented by political observer Farid Seyful-Mulyukov]

[Text] A plenary session of the Soviet and U.S. delegations to the negotiations on nuclear and space weapons took place in Geneva today. The whole world is following these negotiations with close attention. In particular, a large group of observers consisting of members of the U.S. Senate is in Geneva. The U.S. delegation, whose work will be monitored by the representatives of Congress, has found itself in quite a ticklish situation, notes LA LIBERATION of Paris. Previously, the paper points out, Washington's position at the talks on arms limitation was based on the recommendations of the Pentagon, the State Department, and the National Security Council. Now the administration will be compelled to take account of the views of the congressmen as well.

Many prominent U.S. figures of state are demanding that the White House renounce the star wars program and make no attempt to use the so-called strategic defense initiative as a lever at the Geneva talks.

Meanwhile, the Reagan administration is making efforts to build up its offensive weapon potential. Addressing a group of businessmen in the White House, President Reagan again insisted on the speediest possible endorsement by Congress of a military draft budget drawn up by the administration for more than \$300 billion.

In particular, he demanded the allocation of funds for the production of the MX missile asserting that it was vitally necessary in order to ensure progress at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on nuclear and space weapons.

And those congressmen who are justifiably worried about the unpredictable consequences of a new spiral in the arms race in space and on earth, and are demanding a reduction in military spending, were accused by the head of the White House -- listen to this -- of attempts to prevent success being achieved in Geneva.

The same arguments were also repeated by U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger in the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He upheld the MX program and President Reagan's star wars.

Plenary Meeting 19 March

LD191458 Moscow TASS in English 1458 GMT 19 Mar 85

[Text] Geneva, 19 Mar (TASS)--The Soviet and U.S. delegations to talks on nuclear and space arms had a plenary meeting here today.

CSO: 5200/1039

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

COMMENTS ON TALKS DURING DUMAS VISIT TO MOSCOW

Talks With Gromyko

PM121105 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Mar 85 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Soviet-French Talks"]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 11 Mar (TASS)--Talks were held on 11 March between Andrey Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and minister of foreign affairs of the USSR and Minister of External Relations of France Roland Dumas, who arrived in the USSR for a visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

Pointing out the special danger of the U.S. plans to spread the arms race to outer space, Andrey Gromyko set forth the Soviet Union's approach to the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons which open in Geneva on 12 March. He stressed the idea that these problems should be analyzed and solved in their interrelation. The USSR does not seek unilateral advantages, it strives to stop, not continue the arms race, and to achieve a genuine reduction of the accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons, up to their complete elimination.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva will act in this constructive way. We have the right to expect the same from the U.S.

Roland Dumas welcomed the beginning of the talks between the USSR and the U.S. and expressed hope that the sides would manage to work out decisions at the talks which would prevent the arms race in outer space and result in the reduction of nuclear weapons. He also went on record in favor of the balance of forces at the lowest possible level.

During the exchange of views on the conference in Stockholm, the Soviet side noted the need of finding decisions that would reasonably combine political measures to enhance European security with measures in the military sphere conducive to the buildup of mutual trust. The French side in general came out in favor of arriving at agreements in Stockholm.

The talks continued in the afternoon.

Gromyko Speaks at Luncheon

PM121147 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Mar 85 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "A. A. Gromyko Speech"; given at 11 March luncheon in honor of French External Relations Minister Roland Dumas]

[Excerpts] At the moment no task is more important for mankind than to stop the continuing slide towards the brink of a nuclear abyss. This threat is not at all exaggerated, and people feel it keenly. Science honestly warns people about it.

Sharing these feelings, Soviet people believe that the full realization of the dangers hanging over the world should not veil the prospects of a better future. The possibility exists to do away with the war threat. The duty of all responsible state figures, political parties, and social forces is to do their utmost to make the hopes of nations for a peaceful future come true. This is a source of energy aimed not at military rivalry, but at wiping out wars from the life of people once and for all, and at the reduction and elimination of armaments, primarily nuclear ones.

In what real way can the Soviet Union and France promote the implementation of this historic task? This is the question that is raised today as well.

Your arrival in Moscow coincided with the beginning of the new Soviet-American talks in Geneva on nuclear and space weapons. I should like to underline in this connection that we favor the most drastic reductions of nuclear armaments, both strategic and intermediate-range, and support the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons completely and everywhere. However, in order to stop the arms race on earth, it is necessary to block it in outer space. Otherwise, the arsenals of nuclear weapons will continue to grow.

In the past the only danger that could come from the starry sky which from time immemorial has attracted people's eyes as well as their dreams, was that of a meteorite's fall. Not long ago Washington started drawing up plans to wage a war from earth against other people via outer space. With the present level of weapon systems some time remains for evaluating the situation and preventing the irretrievable, while a war described as a "star war," by those who love striking phrases in military vocabulary, could break out virtually with the speed of light. Everyone can imagine what it would mean.

The Soviet Union and France have accumulated some cooperation experience in the peaceful exploration of outer space. The Soviet and French cosmonauts looked at the earth from the same viewpoint. We can well imagine what enormous potentials are contained in the peaceful utilization of outer space and how important it is to keep it weapon-free. We have noticed the statement of President F. Mitterrand on the danger of the militarization of outer space. Our present talks have confirmed that there is much in common between the stands of the USSR and France on this problem. We like to hope that this resemblance would be preserved in the future and, if possible, expanded.

The Soviet leadership has stated repeatedly and very clearly: We are prepared for constructive and mutually acceptable agreements on the entire complex of space and nuclear arms. Now it is up to the other side to display readiness for decisions

in good faith, and for giving up repetition of attempts to press for unilateral advantages. The success of the negotiations would be in the interests of all people, including the Soviet, American, and, to be sure, the French people. France as a nuclear power could make its own contribution to the efforts to find such positive decisions that would come in line with the task of maintaining the nuclear missile equilibrium at the lowest possible level.

The conference in Stockholm should serve building confidence and security in Europe. Unfortunately, there has been no headway so far. There is no denying that problems under discussion are complex and, as the phrase goes, sensitive to all participating states. However, in our view, success can be achieved there, also, if one does not forget that only trust in politics gives rise to trust in the military field. By showing the necessary will, the Soviet Union and France could promote the elaboration of big political measures, meaning first of all to breathe new life into the obligation on nonuse of military force. As is known, the Soviet Union is also prepared to work out and take practical measures in the field of military detente itself. Measures that would be based on the Helsinki conference's Final Act and would follow in its wake. So, at the conference in Stockholm, there is field for more fruitful cooperation between the USSR and France.

Dumas Speaks

PM121412 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Mar 85 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "R. Dumas' Speech"; given at 11 March luncheon in honor of French External Relations Minister Roland Dumas]

[Excerpts] The French Government, the minister continued, attaches special importance to the problem of disarmament. The conditions under which France would be ready to join in the negotiations on nuclear arms are well known. The French president spoke about this in Moscow. On the other hand, France would reject all attempts at infringing on its independence. As for outer space, it is in the interests of everyone that its uses remain peaceful, in the same way that cooperation between our countries constitutes a fine example of peaceful uses of outer space. Before it is too late, turning the cosmos into a new arena of competition in the arms race should be prevented.

That was indeed the thrust of the proposals put forward in the June 1984 memorandum, proposals which, we think, are realistic and not contrary to the interests of the powers in question.

Tomorrow the USSR and the United States begin bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms. This is good. We express the wish that, despite the inevitable difficulties and those already manifest, the negotiations progress rapidly and be crowned with success.

However, the preservation of peace cannot be a result of only two states' actions, no matter how mighty. The entire international community is interested in peace, and should also play its role. France attaches no lesser importance to other aspects of arms control that are not considered in the Soviet-U.S. negotiations but are currently being discussed within the framework of multilateral forums, be it the Stockholm conference or the Geneva talks on questions of chemical weapons.

CSO: 5200/1041

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

COMMENTATORS VIEW OUTLOOK FOR TALKS

Bovin Interview

LD142336 Prague Domestic Service in Czech and Slovak 1342 GMT 9 Mar 85

[From the "Studio 7" program]

[Text] Aleksandr Bovin is a notable personality of Soviet foreign-political journalism. He is the political observer for IZVESTIYA, and his articles are frequently quoted by mass media all over the world. During his stay in Prague, we took the opportunity and put to him several questions concerning the current international situation. Today you will hear the first part of the interview given by Aleksandr Bovin to Bohumil Horak -- an interview devoted to questions of Soviet--American relations.

[Begin recording] [Horak] On 12 March Soviet-American negotiations on the questions of nuclear and space weapons will open in Geneva; these will be the fullest negotiations ever held on these questions between the USSR and the United States. Comrade Bovin, how do you assess the long-term prospects for these negotiations?

[Bovin in Russian with superimposed Czech translation] It is one of the most important events of the last few years. One thing is certain: The fact that talks are taking place is of great political significance. But you asked about their long-term prospects. These talks will be very -- and I underline "very" -- difficult. They will be difficult for various reasons.

One thing is that the military-political questions which will be on the agenda of the negotiations are very complex, and another is that they concern the very substance of the security of the countries concerned. Also, each country will defend its interests and its concept of security. Another reason is that our American counterparts are not, in my view, sufficiently prepared to compromise. At negotiations of this sort neither side should insist on receiving 100-percent satisfaction of its demands. It is necessary to look for points on which interests are intermingled and spheres where it is possible to reach an agreement and bring each other's views closer. When I look at the current development in this light I am forced to note that the extreme standpoints of the United States, or at least those it has pursued so far, would hardly contribute to the success of the forthcoming Geneva talks.

Let me start with the most important point. The U.S. Administration starts from the premise that the USSR has a strategic superiority over the United States, that we have overtaken the Americans and that the Americans have started lagging behind us. This logic in turn leads to the assertion that any reduction must be asymmetric, i.e. that the Soviet Union must accept a greater reduction than the United States because of its alleged superiority.

This stance is totally unacceptable to us, for the USSR has no such superiority. In talking about strategic parity, we mean a term which can in no way be understood as an absolute mathematical equation. For example, the Americans tell us: You have a great many more land-based ballistic missiles; these missiles carry more warheads than we have got, and their carrying capacity is also greater. This is true. Of course, strategic parity does not concern only one type of nuclear weapons. Let us take submarines: There we see substantial U.S. superiority. Let us take the air force which must carry nuclear bombs over great distances: There again we see great American superiority. The term strategic parity or equality as we use it means the sum of inequalities of the individual concrete types of weapons, and it is only in the context of such a package that one gets the right idea about parity.

There is the other side, also a matter of principle. The Americans behave in a very contradictory manner. We hear from them that they are in favor of disarmament and good relations with USSR; in favor of reducing the threat of war. They repeat this every day but at the same time all the programs for modernizing strategic nuclear arms, started by the Reagan administration at the beginning of the eighties, are fully under way. In this way a paradoxical situation arises: We talk with the Americans about disarmament but at the same time the U.S. military potential is being enlarged. In order to avoid this sort of a variant we have proposed that the Americans freeze all military armaments, halt the development of new arms systems and the modernization of our existing systems, and hold talks on how to reduce the existing levels. However, the Americans have rejected this: allegedly because of our superiority. They say that if they agree to a freeze they would be freezing our superiority. This, then, is their so-called logic.

And finally the third aspect -- that which has been called the star war program. We maintain, and I think it is hard to argue with this, that if the so-called star wars program is developed, it will lead to a new round of the senseless arms race. This, in variance with the statements made by the U.S. leadership, would lead not to improved security but to destabilizing the existing strategic equilibrium and creating a still more dangerous situation.

In summing up the three spheres of questions I have mentioned, I conclude that the forthcoming talks will be difficult, complex, and protracted. I would describe my view as very, very guarded optimism.

[Horak] Many of our listeners would like to know what will happen if the United States, through its unconstructive attitude, obstructs the Geneva negotiations. You have just said that the statements coming from Washington are none too encouraging in this respect.

[Bovin] In practical terms it would mean continuing the intensive arms buildup. The USSR will not allow any violation of the existing equilibrium of strategic forces; it will not allow a unilateral U.S. superiority. Therefore, we will, naturally, maintain the existing equilibrium and, unfortunately, we will have to do it at an ever higher level.

[Horak] Of course, this would have a very negative effect not only on Soviet-American relations, but also on the entire international situation.

[Bovin] Of course, naturally. But I think that if we want to achieve detente there is no alternative. The comprehension of the suicidal nature of nuclear war, the catastro-

phic consequences of an intensive arms buildup, and the fact that the world would thus move closer and closer to the precipice of abyss from which we would never escape. will all force the Americans to start constructive talks with us.

[Horak] The current visit of a Soviet parliamentary delegation to the United States and the fact that its leader, Comrade Shcherbitskiy, was received by President Reagan suggests that despite the different standpoints there exist realistic opportunities

[Bovin] Yes, at the moment it would not be correct to assess Soviet-U.S. relations too one-sidedly. However, on the whole they are rather poor. But the very fact that the Geneva talks will take place, or that there are such things as the visit by our parliamentary delegation to the United States, the recent visit of the U.S. minister of trade to Moscow, and the Soviet-U.S. consultations on Near East questions recently held in Vienna all suggest that there is a certain movement, certain positive elements, and it is possible that their gradual accumulation will bring about qualitative changes. We want that very much. However, I am personally not too convinced that the current U.S. Administration will accept such a radical change of standpoint. Let us see how relations develop. Let us see.[end recording]

General Chervov Interview

AU140825 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 12 Mar 85 p 6

[Soviet Col Gen Chervov interview to NOVOSTI's Col V. Morozov: "In Favor of a Constructive Approach" -- time and place of interview not given; initial paragraph is introduction]

[Text] NOVOSTI commentator Colonel V. Morozov has asked Soviet military expert Colonel General N. Chervov for a comment on some questions connected with the upcoming Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons.

[Morozov] The Soviet-American negotiations will begin in Geneva on Tuesday, 12 March. What is new in them?

[Chervov] Yes, these will be truly new negotiations. The Soviet-American joint statement published on 9 January 1985 says that "on the talks agenda will be a complex of questions concerning nuclear and space weapons -- strategic weapons and also intermediate-range weapons -- while all these questions will be discussed and solved in their interrelationship. The objective of the talks will be to elaborate effective agreements oriented toward averting the feverish arms buildup and halting the arms buildup on earth and toward limiting and reducing the number of nuclear weapons and reinforcing strategic stability."

From the aforementioned statements it arises that it is a question of totally new negotiations, and not the resumption of the former negotiations on limiting strategic weapons and limiting nuclear weapons in Europe, that is, negotiations that had been thwarted by the United States. The essence of the newness of the upcoming negotiations is in the fact that the problem of the nonmilitarization of outer space, the problem of the interrelationship of nuclear and space weapons, has been put sharply in the foreground now. This interrelation is particularly discernible now, when the United States has practically started setting up a broadly based system of antimissile defense with elements deployed in outer space.

[Morozov] Why has the problem of the interrelation of nuclear and space weapons acquired such importance now?

[Chervov] To this one must, at least briefly, recall the history of the negotiations on strategic weapons between the USSR and the United States (These negotiations began in November 1969). At that time, the sides immediately struck difficulties on resolving the question of limiting strategic offensive weapons, because already in that period the United States began creating its limited system of antimissile defense. In order to overcome these difficulties, the sides agreed that in the first place they will concentrate on preparing an agreement on limiting the antimissile defense systems, because only then would it be possible to agree on measures in the sphere of limiting strategic offensive weapons.

It was no coincidence that 26 May 1972 saw the signing at the same time of the open-ended treaty on the limitation of antimissile defense systems and the temporary agreement on some measures aimed at limiting strategic offensive weapons (SALT I).

The main principle of the treaty on antimissile systems was that the sides renounce creating systems of antimissile defense on their territory. Both sides have the right to cover with the antimissile defense system only a single region (the USSR has chosen Moscow, the United States the Grand Fox intercontinental ballistic missiles base).

The treaty states that the antimissile defense systems must be located on the ground and must be stationary. It forbids creating, testing, and deploying systems and components of antimissile defense on the sea, in the air, in outer space, or ground mobile systems.

The objective of all basic stipulations of the treaty on antimissile systems is to forbid the creation of effective defense against ballistic missiles, a matter that objectively limits the growth of strategic nuclear arsenals and provides stimuli for agreements on their reduction.

It is not difficult to grasp that Washington's "initiative" in the sphere of so-called "strategic defense" pursues the creation of a multistrata system of antimissile defense -- on earth, in the atmosphere, and in outer space. This is undermining the agreement on antimissile systems.

Now one cannot solve the problem of strategic weapons separately from the ban on offensive space weapons (including antisatellite and antimissile weapons). A comprehensive approach toward discussing space and nuclear weapons is dictated by the necessity of speedily adopting measures which would prevent the start of new rounds of the arms race.

[Morozov] What can be said about the American approach to the negotiations?

[Chervov] It is known that Washington tried to bypass the outer space problem. But in the end it has agreed to discuss the questions of nuclear and space weapons in their interrelation. The fact that it has agreed to solve these questions in indivisible unity is, above all, to the great credit of the Soviet Union, of its principled stance on the questions of war and peace. If the United States sticks to a similar approach, then one can hopefully expect positive results from the negotiations, regardless of their complexity.

But the devil's hoof is that the Pentagon is particularly interested in outer space. It has been trying at any price to "crawl to the heavens" in a space suit. Therefore, it is no coincidence that certain statements by responsible Washington officials produce alarm. On the one hand, they stress that the United States agrees with negotiations on nonmilitarizing outer space; on the other, they incessantly affirm the continuation of the pilot program of creating an extensive antimissile defense system with elements deployed in outer space. They are trying to present the matter as if the upcoming negotiations and the U.S. military space program were two different things. The formulation contained in the joint statement allegedly does not apply to work connected with tests pertaining to the creation of a space antimissile system, because these programs are allegedly pursuing not the militarization of outer space, but the creation of purely defensive systems.

This entire juggling with concepts is being exploited by American officials to obscure the essence of the problem and to deceive the public, to try to place the "star wars" beyond the framework of the negotiations. But by doing that, they clearly expose themselves: Precisely here is the weakest and most vulnerable spot in the U.S. approach to the negotiations.

The world public sincerely welcomes the upcoming negotiations on the complex of the interconnected questions of space and nuclear weapons and expects that agreements aimed at halting the arms race will be reached.

The Soviet Union, its representatives stress, will launch an effort in this respect and approach the negotiations constructively and pragmatically, observing strictly and in all respects those agreements that have been worked out on the subject and objective of the negotiations in Geneva. The result of the negotiations will depend on whether the American side will apply an analogous approach.

'Politico-Diplomatic Solution' Urged

PM131300 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 10, 10 Mar 85 p 6

[Gennadiy Gerasimov article: "Geneva Equation"]

[Text] The Soviet Union and the United States have agreed that at the talks due to start on March 12 in Geneva all issues relating to space and nuclear weapons will be examined and solved in their interconnection.

Some queer interconnection is implied in the American so-called "strategic defense initiative" intended to eliminate the "snowball effect." This expression was coined by Kenneth Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It amounts to a vicious circle into which the arms race gets "when defensive efforts impel the other side towards developing an even greater amount of offensive weapons."

Even the Pentagon experts pointed out that the projected antiballistic missile defence (ABM) would remain penetrable by Soviet weapons unless it is coupled with an agreement on offensive arms limitation. Thereby these experts (for instance, Richard D. Delauer, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering), indirectly admitted the non-existence of a purely technical reply to the problem of defence against the nuclear threat, suggesting that it should be augmented with diplomatic measures.

Thus, in line with the logic of this reasoning, there is a need for Soviet participation in the American scheme for bringing down the level of offensive nuclear arms when developing and building up defensive weapons.

But if the proclaimed aim, according to President Ronald Reagan, is to make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete", there can be a simpler, more understandable and cheaper way to it: by lowering the level of nuclear confrontation right up to the elimination of nuclear arms.

Let me give you an example to explain my point. If the sides agree to cut nuclear arms by a thousand units and also agree on the mutual development of an antiballistic missile defence system with possibilities of intercepting another thousand units of nuclear weapons, would it not just be simpler to agree to cut these weapons by two thousand units at once?

In line with the logic of the proclaimed aim (afore-mentioned) Reagan spoke about the possibility of sharing the technical secrets of missile interception with the USSR. However, the actual decision will be taken by the next president, whereas practice has shown that successors in the White House do not consider themselves bound by the word or even sometimes by the signatures of their predecessors.

The main point, however, is different. The American "initiative" does not seem good news to us at all. In a similar way the United States does not see anything good in the supposition concerning the Soviet pre-emptive successes in the field of antiballistic missile defence.

The space version of the "Soviet threat" thesis has of late been insistently put forward in justification of the American efforts. "Insurance against Soviet defensive technology program" --- such is the title of a section on the White House's official booklet "President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative".

It turns out that the abstractly feasible, tentative Soviet efforts in the ABM sphere are seen as threatening, while it is proposed that everyone should hail the USA's actual efforts as a delivery from a nuclear nightmare. In other words, the American side proceeds from the presumption of evil Soviet plans and American good intentions.

It is all the more naive to wait till the United States shares with the other side, which it treats with accentuated suspicion, its possible achievements and discoveries, for which it is going to spend 26 billion dollars to begin with.

From the Soviet end the American "star wars" plans do not seem like a dream to rid mankind of a nuclear threat, but as a new attempt to outpace the rival in the nuclear arms race. As has already been the case, the Soviet side will be compelled to take counter-measures to maintain the strategic parity.

This is where the interconnection of space and nuclear weapons which, in the words of Andrey Gromyko, expresses the "crux of the matter" with mathematical precision, surfaces. If the "star wars" plans are discarded, a possibility will be created for agreement on nuclear arms reductions. Otherwise action will cause counteraction and the arms race will rise to a new dangerous level. Moreover, as it is pointed out in the report of the American Union of Concerned Scientists on space-based ABM, the Soviet reply will be cheaper, much more reliable, and will always be at hand while the USA develops its own defences.

Even those who believe in the good intentions of the U.S. must clearly realize that the attempt to develop antiballistic missile defence is a wrong path, which will stimulate the arms race.

The problem of eliminating the nuclear threat has no military technical solution, inasmuch as the arms race is a never-ending contest of "draws" in a situation of nuclear "stalemate." There can only be a politico-diplomatic solution to the problem: to agree on nuclear disarmament. Actually, both the Soviet Union and the United States agreed that this should be the end result of their joint efforts in the talks in Geneva.

CSO: 5200/1045

9 April 1985

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

COMMENTARY URGES POSITIVITY IN GENEVA TALKS

OW091249 Beijing in Russian to the USSR 1800 GMT 8 Mar 85

[Station commentator (Hung Bo) article: "On the Eve of Geneva Talks"]

[Text] As 12 March, the date for the beginning of the arms control talks between the Soviet Union and the United States draws closer, their argument concerning the issue of space weapons becomes more and more intense. Simultaneously, they are actively seeking support for their positions from West European countries.

Everybody knows that Reagan's strategic defense program, or the so-called Star Wars plan, is the focal point of the U.S.-Soviet dispute.

After the foreign ministers of the two countries, in January this year in Geneva, reached agreement on the resumption of arms control talks, the divergence of views of the two sides on this issue has become more acute.

The United States has said repeatedly that it will, under no circumstances, give up the Star Wars plan, and it has held discussions on the subject with many of its allies in Europe, and has not only asked that they support the plan, but also expects that they will participate in research work connected with the plan, and give every possible help.

It is precisely for this purpose that U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger made recent visits to Britain and the FRG.

The Soviet Union thinks that, by developing space weapons, the United States is trying to achieve military superiority, and because of that, it is very concerned over the U.S. Star Wars plan.

Concerning the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Geneva, Gromyko, in his television interview, stressed that it is not possible to constructively examine the issues of strategic and intermediate nuclear weapons without examining the issue of space. If, in the course of the talks, the U.S. violates the extant agreement on space, continued Gromyko, the talks will collapse. He advocates discussion at the coming talks on the issues of space, strategic, and intermediate nuclear weapons, as a complex issue, and the reaching of an agreement, which is simultaneous and interrelated in all aspects.

To blunt Reagan's strategic defense program, Gromyko, Soviet foreign minister, at the end of last, and the beginning of the current, month, paid visits to Italy and Spain, in order to persuade their leaders to reject the Star Wars plan. During these trips, Gromyko often stated that rejection of the Star Wars plan would make it possible to greatly reduce the number of strategic and intermediate nuclear weapons, through consultations.

On 4 March, in Moscow, during discussions with visiting FRG Foreign Minister Genscher on the question of Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva, Gromyko once more criticized the FRG Government for supporting the U.S. plan for developing space weapons, and stated that it can contribute to the achievement of success in the field of intermediate missiles at the coming Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear weapons only by stopping deployment of U.S. missiles in its territory.

It has been reported that the Soviet Union has proposed that France discuss the issue of space. West European countries have reacted differently to the U.S. strategic defense program. The FRG and Britain are for it, and France and other countries against it in the main. Reagan's strategic defense program is just one of the aspects of the space arms race, and in this field, generally speaking, and the West European countries have similar or identical views, which have found expression in all these countries being against the militarization of space and the space arms race between the two superpowers, demanding the United States and the Soviet Union have a serious attitude to the coming Geneva arms control talks, and placing high hopes on them.

This position of West European countries on the issue of space weapons, reflects the desire to reduce tension between East and West, defend security in Europe, and peace in the entire world.

Soviet-U.S. arms control talks will begin in Geneva soon. Confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States has made people notice the great differences existing between them, which will undoubtedly cast a shadow on the talks. Complex talks on the issues of strategic, intermediate nuclear, and space weapons, are themselves the result of a compromise between the United States and the Soviet Union, because the United States maintains superiority in some fields, and the Soviet Union in others.

If, at the talks, the sides insist on their views, and concede nothing to the other, the talks will not advance from deadlock. But, if the sides realize that the nuclear arms race will lead to useless expenditure of effort and funds, and will undermine peace, and start with a sincere desire to stop the arms race, they will have to considerably reduce existing nuclear arsenals, stop the arms race in space, and carry out its demilitarization. Only in this way will the talks move forward.

The United States and the Soviet Union must not forget that the peoples of the entire world, including their peoples, wish to see effective completion of talks, and are against their conducting an arms race under cover of the talks.

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

COMMENTARIES, ANALYSIS VIEW GENEVA ARMS TALKS

RENMIN RIBAO Commentary

HK090800 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 9 Mar 85 p 7

[Commentary by Fang Min: "On the Eve of the U.S.-Soviet Package Disarmament Talks"]

[Text] New U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks are to open in Geneva on 12 March. World public opinion welcomes the fact that, 15 months after the nuclear arms talks were broken off, the two countries will sit down at the table to talk again. Contrary to the previous single-topic disarmament talks held by the two countries, these new package disarmament talks will deal with three categories of weapons: They will discuss the space weapons issue and also discuss the question of strategic nuclear weapons and medium-range nuclear weapons. Under the general control of the two delegations, the talks will be conducted by three groups, and there will also be "mutual linkage." It is evident that these new talks will cover broader fields and more complex issues than the previous ones, and they will also encounter more difficulties and involve more arduous tasks.

In the past 2 months, the two countries have engaged in a great deal of diplomatic activity centered around the talks issue; and they have also waged an extensive propaganda war. Each side has sought ways to win over public opinion and put pressure on the other, in a bid to get the talks onto the track it desires. The United States has worked hard to explain its thinking on the strategic defense initiative, claiming that strategic stability between the two sides can be promoted by relying on this system. In order to gain the support of its Western European allies, at the beginning of this year the White House announced President Reagan's "strategic defense initiative," and gave explanations on this to the leaders of the allies on many occasions. Not long ago, U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger and others paid a special visit to Munich to attend an international defense studies meeting, in which 150 well-known Western figures participated, to further eliminate the misgivings of the Western European allies regarding this plan. For its part, the Soviet Union has criticized in every respect the American "star wars" plan (that is, the strategic defense initiative), charging that this defense system can only destroy parity and is an offensive and aggressive plan that will lead to extension of the arms race into space; hence, the Soviet Union has stressed that it is currently particularly important to discuss space weapons. The Soviet leaders have used various opportunities to expound on this proposal to the United States. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko recently visited Italy and other countries and also held talks in Moscow with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher, in a bid to take

advantage of misgivings among the Western European countries over the "star wars" plan to sow discord between the United States and Europe and force Washington to abandon this plan.

Judging by the public statements of the United States and the Soviet Union during this period, although the two sides are about to open talks, each is sticking to its stand and their views are a long way apart; there are serious differences between them on many important issues. First is the space issue; this has already become a crucial point in the dispute between the two, and will inevitably turn into a thorny issue at these talks.

However, the Americans hold that the strategic defense initiative proposed by President Reagan on 23 March 1983 is a research plan aimed at ensuring that "ballistic missiles cannot operate" above the earth "and will turn into scrap"; it is aimed at "seeking a way of reducing the danger of nuclear war," and not at "seeking to gain military superiority." Hence the Americans hold that this research plan should not turn into a bargaining chip at the talks; the most urgent thing, they say, is to give priority to discussing how to bring about a big reduction in offensive nuclear weapons. For its part, the Soviet Union insists that it is essential to first discuss the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and if this problem is not discussed, "then it is impossible to discuss the question of strategic nuclear weapons, and it is impossible to discuss the question of medium-range nuclear weapons." That each sticks to its own argument precisely reflects their different stands and intentions on the disarmament question.

Since the beginning of the 1980's, the U.S.-Soviet arms race has started to shift from great increases in nuclear weaponry to the introduction of new generations of nuclear weapons and rivalry for superiority in space. The United States is interested in greatly reducing nuclear weapons while modernizing its nuclear weapons, and, in particular, reducing land-based missiles, in which the Soviet Union is superior; and at the same time, it wants to use the slightly superior American technology to leave a way out for research into its strategic defense system. The Soviet Union for its part hopes to curb the momentum of development of U.S. space technology and force the United States to abandon its strategic defense initiative so as to gain time and at the same time continue to contend with the United States on the nuclear weapons issue. Hence, although one side demands a big reduction in nuclear arms, while the other demands the prevention of the militarization of space, and on the surface the excuses are very high-sounding, in fact each seeks to curb the nuclear superiority of the other.

With regard to the question of "mutual linkage" produced by the package disarmament talks, this is another point of dispute between the two sides. The Soviet Union has particularly stressed that the basic meaning of the agreement signed at Geneva by the foreign ministers of the two countries on 8 January was that of "comprehensive and mutual links in discussing and solving the questions of weapons in space and nuclear weapons," and has regarded the question of whether agreement can be reached on weapons in space as the premise for talking about and discussing nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has stressed that one group cannot ignore the other two groups and independently reach agreement; it is necessary to reach simultaneous agreement in the three respects on mutual linkage. The United States for its part regards the question of whether or not the Soviet Union is willing to make concessions on the nuclear weapons issue as a precondition for discussing the space issue, and hence it has stressed that there is no reason for saying that separate, independent agreements cannot be reached. If the two sides had been sincere, this problem would not have been hard to solve, and the package talks might be able to break the deadlock and make progress. However, the

two sides are now haggling over the question of "linkage," which shows that although they want to hold the talks, they have still not changed their hostile attitude, and this cannot but add to the difficulties for the talks. As a Japanese weekly put it: "Linking space weapons and nuclear weapons together played a role in stimulating the holding of the package talks, but on the other hand, it might hamper the progress of the nuclear disarmament talks."

Disarmament and peace are a major topic today, and the people of all countries are demanding that progress be made in this respect. The stands reflected by the United States and the Soviet Union before the Geneva talks open are obviously incompatible with the desires of the people of the world. U.S. and Soviet leaders have proclaimed that the two countries will make every effort to hold serious and earnest talks. However people are closely watching their moves to see if they can live up to their promises.

XINHUA Commentary

OW101510 Beijing XINHUA in English 1430 GMT 10 Mar 85

["Commentary: Washington's Position in Geneva Talks -- Strength, Patience, Unity (by Chen Si)" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, March 10 (XINHUA) -- "Patience, strength and unity" are U.S. President Ronald Reagan's instructions on Friday to his arms negotiators for the resumed Geneva talks with the Soviet Union. To some extent, this can be regarded as an outline of Washington's position to be taken in the forthcoming talks.

Upon sending his arms negotiators off to Geneva, Reagan said the Americans know "that our differences with the Soviet Union are great. Patience, strength and unity -- Western unity -- will be required if we are to have a successful outcome."

Washington often says that the only language Moscow could understand is "strength." U.S. officials have repeatedly said that it is the U.S. rebuildup of military strength that has forced Moscow to return to the negotiation table. They claimed that during the period of negotiations, U.S. military modernization programs should not be abandoned. To maintain its military strength, Washington, despite its huge deficit of about 200 billion dollars, has to further cut social welfares and to increase military spending.

Before the start of the Geneva talks, the Reagan administration launched a campaign to prevent the Congress from cutting the military budget. The President invited congressmen from both houses to the White House in a bid to gain their support. At the same time, he sent his Cabinet officials to the Congress to explain the administration's disarmament policy. It is reported that Reagan's efforts have produced some result.

However, "strength" is not the sole weapon of Washington for a successful outcome of the Geneva talks. As Western Europe is uneasy about the superpowers' military buildup and the militarization of space, and Moscow is making use of such uneasiness to undermine U.S. relations with its European allies, Reagan has to attach importance to Western unity.

To fulfill their own schemes, the two superpowers have been engaged in a war of diplomacy in the last few months. President Reagan invited Federal German, British

and Italian leaders to the White House for talks, to obtain the allies' support for his negotiation policy and "the star wars" system, and press them to implement the NATO's plan for the deployment of U.S. missiles in Western Europe. It seems that the U.S. scheme has partially succeeded.

Meanwhile, Moscow also launched its diplomatic offensive in Western Europe. During his visit to Italy and Spain, and his talks with foreign ministers of West European countries in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko tried hard to persuade U.S. allies to abandon the missile deployment plan and reject the U.S. "star wars" program.

The Soviet Union warned that West European countries must bear the responsibilities for the deterioration of the international situation unless they accept the Soviet advice. But Moscow's campaign seemed to have got nowhere.

Reagan has acknowledged that the talks will be "long and difficult" because of the complexity of issues at stake and the sharp differences dividing the superpowers. That's why he thought that "patience" is necessary in the talks. Max Kampelman, U.S. chief negotiator, said: "We must be prepared to stay at the negotiation table one day longer than the Soviets." The statement shows that Washington will not make concessions easily in the talks and is prepared to fight a drawn-out battle with Moscow in Geneva while holding the banner of "negotiations."

But, no matter what the two superpowers have claimed, the world people hope that both Washington and Moscow show sincerity in arms control. However, to the disappointment of the world people, there are signs to indicate that the two superpowers, while holding talks in Geneva, are trying to step up their paces of the nuclear arms race and the arms race in the outer space.

XINHUA Analysis

OW110859 Beijing XINHUA in English 0836 GMT 11 Mar 85

["News Analysis: Is Miracle To Emerge at Geneva? (by Wang Ziyang)" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, March 11 (XINHUA) -- Statements by Soviet and U.S. leaders on the eve of the Geneva disarmament negotiations herald a new arduous and prolonged course toward nuclear disarmament.

Both sides have expressed their "good will" and "sincerity" toward the negotiations since agreement to hold talks was reached on January 8, but their stands remain as apart as ever.

Each side has launched a tense diplomatic and propaganda offensive in the past two months to exert pressure on the other in order to strengthen their respective bargaining positions in the talks.

Apart from coordinating the stances of the Warsaw Pact nations, Moscow focused its effort to work on West European countries to a set of moves in its diplomatic offensive. Shortly after the visit to Moscow by Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko visited Italy and Spain and played host to Federal German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas.

Just before the start of the Geneva talks, a delegation from the Supreme Soviet arrived in the United States to expound the Soviet stance on arms limitation and reduction.

To counter the Soviet offensive, the United States is working hard to harmonize its posture with that of the Western allies in a show of "unity." It has sent high-ranking government officials to sell the "star wars" strategy. It invited British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi and French Foreign Minister Dumas to Washington to enlist their backing for the strategy.

A propaganda war is also going on between the two superpowers with each accusing the other of "lacking sincerity." They gave different versions of the January 8 agreement. The Soviets maintained that the issues of space weapons, strategic arsenals and medium-range nuclear missiles cannot be separated and should be solved simultaneously, adding that no agreement could be expected on a single issue.

The United States contended that the agreement did not embody such "linkage." It said that "if results are achieved in one area they should not be held hostage to progress in others."

A U.S. report blamed the Soviet Union for violating the 1972 treaty on limiting anti-ballistic missile defenses, the 1979 SALT II treaty and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Meanwhile the Soviet Union countered by accusing the U.S. of launching a slander drive which it described as an "infamous practice" to poison the atmosphere and create obstacles to the talks.

The focus of the wrangle is the U.S. "star wars" plan proposed by President Ronald Reagan. The Soviet Union has repeatedly warned that if the U.S. does not abandon this plan, no nuclear arms reduction is likely to come about, let alone the destruction of nuclear weaponry. It also threatened to take counter measures to prevent a possible U.S. superiority in space weaponry.

The United States, on the one hand, termed the "stars wars" plan defensive and "of a research nature." On the other hand, it adopted a hard line by saying that it would not give up the plan but would instead speed up the experiment at an early date. Meanwhile, some allies will be invited to join the undertaking.

Reagan told reporters last month that the U.S. would not abandon the research work even if the Soviets agreed to cut or eliminate their nuclear weapons. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger also made it clear that the "star wars" plan does not fall into the category to be discussed at the talks.

Just before the start of the talks, the Soviet Politburo instructed the Soviet delegation to adopt "forceful and constructive actions." Reagan also ordered the American negotiators to explore any possible means that would promise progress.

However, both sides admitted that their differences are so great that it would be stupid to hope to bury them overnight.

Against such a backdrop, it seems impossible to expect great miracles to come up at the talks so long as the two parties continue their efforts to scramble for military predominance. It is quite likely that a marathon-style negotiation lies ahead.

CSO: 5200/4004

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

FURTHER ON U.S.-USSR ARMS TALKS IN GENEVA

XINHUA Commentary

HK121430 Beijing XINHUA Hong Kong Service in Chinese 1234 GMT 12 Mar 85

["Short commentary" by XINHUA reporter Mei Zhenmin: "Don't Go Against the People's Will"--XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, 12 Mar (XINHUA)--The U.S.-USSR talks on controlling strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range nuclear weapons, and space weapons finally reopen today. Although big differences remain between the two sides and the prospects for the talks are not bright, the resumption of the talks is still a good thing. It provides an opportunity for relaxing East-West relations and reducing the threat of nuclear war. People generally hope that the new round of the talks will achieve positive results, which are in the interest of world peace.

The superpowers' nuclear arms race, which is becoming more and more intense, has added superior killing power to their nuclear weapons. At present the nuclear weapons posses by the United States and the Soviet Union can destroy either side dozens of times over. Through their research over a long time and on the basis of computer calculations, some American scientists have drawn this conclusion: If one-fourth of the nuclear weapons possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union explode, the dust stirred up by these explosions, and the smoke caused by the flames of the explosions, would heavily cover the earth and prevent sunlight from reaching the surface of the earth. This layer of smoke and dust, which might last for months, would make the atmospheric temperature drop sharply and thus bring about a "nuclear winter." This shows that the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race will not only subject themselves and their allies to the threat of a nuclear catastrophe, but will also bring this threat to all mankind.

What is even more serious is that now their arms race is intensifying extremely dangerously. The United States is implementing the "star wars" research plan that President Reagan put forth the year before last, and plans to establish a multi-layer defense screen installed with a combination of space-based directional energy weapons and antisatellite weapons carried by airplanes. The Soviet Union is also researching and developing similar weapons systems. If we cannot stop the expansion of the arms race between the superpowers into this

new area, then in the near future there will be space fleets and military bases in outer space, which will become a fourth battlefield in addition to land, sea, and sky. There are some indications that in order to penetrate this kind of defense screen that the other side may establish, both of them will greatly increase their offensive nuclear weapons.

In the face of this situation, stopping the militarization of outer space, reducing and destroying nuclear weapons, and eliminating the threat of nuclear war have become issues about which the human race is most greatly concerned, and have become an urgent demand of the human race at present. The international community has time and again expressed this strong desire in UN assemblies and meetings of the nonaligned countries, as well as on many other occasions.

The Geneva talks that are being held under this situation are a test as well as an opportunity for the United States and the Soviet Union. True, the wide scope of the talks makes the talks more complicated, but it also increased their maneuvering room for mutual compromise.

The great differences in their views and stand are not unsurmountable obstacles. As long as both sides are sincere and as long as they conduct the talks with mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, just as their representatives said when they arrived in Geneva, it will be possible to reach some valuable agreements in order to build a "bridge that leads to a world with peace and without terror or the threat of nuclear destruction," and in order to take "an important step forward on the way to entirely and widely eliminating nuclear weapons." The international community ardently hopes that they will make progress in their talks, stop the arms race, lower the level of nuclear confrontation, and reduce the threat of nuclear war.

RENMIN RIBAO Supports Geneva Talks

HK190249 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 13 Mar 85 p 7

["Random Notes" by Zhou Xiangguang {0719 6272 0342}: "A Talk Regarding 'Cosmic Rescue'"]

[Text] Just as there is no God in heaven, there is no savior in the sky. However, as a result of the tremendous scientific and technological progress, we now have in the sky real "saviors" which have already benefitted mankind.

According to a report by TASS, a "cosmic rescue system" comprising three Soviet telecommunications satellites, a U.S. telecommunications satellite, and a network of tracker stations on the ground and at sea has rescued more than 350 people in danger through finding wrecked ships and crashed aircraft since its inauguration in 1982. Are not these four Soviet and U.S. "cosmic rescue" satellites virtual "saviors" for those people saved?

This event tells us that if the Soviet Union and United States, as space technology powers, use their enormous technological resources for peaceful purpose and engage in cooperation, they will be able to achieve something beneficial to both sides and to make contributions to mankind.

However, it is a pity that the efforts both the countries have made in pursuit of peace are absolutely negligible compared with their investment in military competition in space.

In the wake of the escalation of the nuclear arms race between them, the United States and the Soviet Union have stockpiled a great deal of nuclear arms, powerful enough to destroy the earth. This situation is threatening the whole world all the time. And scientists have predicted the miserable scene of "nuclear winter" that might emerge after a nuclear war. However, both the United States and the Soviet Union are now planning to apply such new technological achievements as lasers, cluster particles, and microwave beams to the development of space offensive and interceptor weapons and are making preparations for future space war. Even an accident in the experiments to develop these techniques may cause tremendous disaster to the earth, not to mention the result of a real space war.

Therefore, the earth on which mankind lives is faced with a serious threat today. Now that the United States and the Soviet Union have cooperated in their common efforts to rescue people in danger by running the "cosmic rescue system," why can they not then stop pursuit of nuclear superiority and join their efforts to make the forthcoming arms control talks a success, in their common interests of peace and coexistence? May they join together to save the earth just as they have done in running the "cosmic rescue system"?

CSO: 5200/4001

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

FURTHER COVERAGE VIEWS GENEVA ARMS TALKS

XINHUA Commentary

OW121054 Beijing XINHUA in English 1043 GMT 12 Mar 85

["Commentary: The Geneva Talks Hold Promise (By Mei Zhenmin)" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, March 12 (XINHUA) -- The three sets of nuclear talks between the United States and the Soviet Union opening in Geneva today offer a desired chance to bring about a relaxation in East-West relations and to reduce the danger of nuclear war.

The world today is faced with the grim reality that the nuclear arms race conducted by the two superpowers is dangerously escalating into outer space, with the United States already researching a "stars wars" program and with a similar project underway in the Soviet Union. If this escalation of the arms race is not arrested, then a new battlefront will be opened with fleets of spacecraft and celestial military bases pitted against each other in space.

Under such circumstances, the ongoing talks in Geneva are at once a chance and a trial. The wide-ranging contents of the talks, though giving rise to complexity, also offer a greater maneuvering space for both sides to come up with concessions. The deep differences setting the two countries apart do not necessarily constitute insurmountable obstacles.

Given sincerity and mutual concessions from both countries, it is likely that accords of some value will be reached at the talks to "build a world bridge leading to peace, free from fear and the menace of a nuclear catastrophe," as pointed out by the delegates on their arrival in Geneva. It is the earnest hope of the international community that progress will be made toward an end to the nuclear arms race and a reduction of the threat of nuclear war.

Talks To Start on Schedule

OW111451 Beijing XINHUA in English 1429 GMT 11 Mar 85

[Text] Geneva, March 11 (XINHUA) -- The U.S.-Soviet arms control talks in Geneva will start tomorrow as planned despite the death of Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko, according to a U.S. delegation spokesman.

The spokesman, who made the announcement shortly after the Soviet news media confirmed Chernenko's death, said that officials of both sides made the decision to open the talks

tomorrow as scheduled at a meeting in Geneva this morning. Earlier, U.S. and Soviet officials began their arrangements for the opening of the talks although there were wide-spread reports of the Soviet leader's death.

Chief U.S. negotiator Max Kampelman and the other two U.S. negotiators, John Tower and Maynard Glitman, left here today as planned for Brussels, where they will brief a NATO meeting on the U.S. position at the forthcoming talks. They are to return to Geneva this afternoon.

European Hopes Assessed

HKJ20501 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 10 Mar 85 p 6

["Roundup" by Wei Wei: "Europe on the Eve of the U.S.-Soviet Talks"]

[Text] On 12 March, the United States and the Soviet Union will return to the negotiating table in Geneva to hold formal negotiations on strategic weapons, medium-range nuclear weapons, and space weapons.

The countries which will show the greatest concern for the negotiations are the European countries. The governments, the public, and various factions of political forces in East and West European countries are all watching with greatest interest the negotiations which will be reopened between the two big nuclear countries. Why? (Rangyimali Kaluo) [6245 0001 7456 6849 0595 5012], president of the Assembly of the Western European Union says: The U.S.-Soviet negotiations will "mainly touch upon the safety of Europe". His remark has hit the nail on the head. Some people in Europe believe that Europe may possibly be the most direct and biggest beneficiary of the negotiations, but if not, may also possibly become a victim of the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union.

For this reason, the European countries still entertain hopes for the U.S.-Soviet talks, while casting doubts on them.

The European countries hope that the talks are "a good sign" and "may begin to ease the tension between East and West". They also hope the talks will make specific achievements so as to create conditions to ease the tension between East and West and the tension caused by the military confrontation in Europe. For example, French President Mitterrand hopes that "the U.S.-Soviet talks will really start the process of disarmament"; West German President Kohl also hopes that the talks will make a positive impact on the dialogue between East Germany and West Germany. Belgium entertains even greater hopes for the talks, because the talks may possibly cancel the original plan to deploy 48 U.S. cruise missiles in Belgium.

At the same time, the Europeans have also cast doubt on the U.S.-Soviet talks. First of all, they are worried about how much the European interests will be respected in the talks. Second, according to past experience, "when a new agreement is signed, increased motivation will be given to the development of new technology aimed at destroying the agreement," so the Europeans fear that the upcoming negotiations to control the arms race will again cause the acceleration of the arms race in the end. Finally, they fear that European interests and safety will not be strengthened and respected in the U.S.-Soviet negotiations, but on the contrary, will be weakened, and as result Europe will face a greater threat.

In fact, the U.S.-Soviet contention on the question of medium-range missiles in Europe has brought a sense of crisis to Europe. At the end of 1983, after the United States

deployed the Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, the Soviet Union immediately walked out of the U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic nuclear weapons and the talks on medium-range nuclear weapons. On the pretext of the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles in Western Europe, the Soviet Union increased its SS-20 missile bases and deployed short-range missiles in Eastern Europe. The arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union has intensified the situation in Europe. In spite of the sharp confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the West European countries have exchanged more visits with East European countries to look for ways to ease the tension in Europe, and have time and again urged the United States and the Soviet Union to resume their negotiations. Now that the U.S.-Soviet talks are beginning again, the Europeans are worried that the two superpowers have different purposes in the negotiations. If they concentrate their efforts on space weapons, they will certainly ignore the question of reducing the number of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The Soviet Union is superior in this respect. So the West European countries are facing the nuclear threat from the East.

Of course, the up-coming Geneva talks will discuss three kinds of weapons, namely, space weapons, strategic nuclear weapons, and medium-range nuclear weapons. Although space weapons will only "be discussed on paper", they have enabled the United States and the Soviet Union to resume their talks and are also an important aspect in the talks. However the Europeans have cast doubt on whether the "strategic defense initiative" proposed by the United States will be able to guarantee the safety of Europe. The worries expressed by most European member states of NATO are that once the United States has built an "unbreakable defense" in space, she will enter the "American fortress" and abandon her European allies.

What is more, if the Soviet Union builds a similar "unbreakable defense," the consequences will be dreadful to contemplate: On the one hand, the nuclear deterrent built by France and Britain with painstaking efforts over the past decades will become "outdated and worthless". On the other hand, NATO's "flexible response strategy" which the West European countries basically rely on in countering the Warsaw Treaty Organization's superiority in conventional weapons actually depends on nuclear weapons. Now that the nuclear weapons have lost their superiority and the conventional weapons cannot match the superiority of the other side, what will they do? Therefore the possibility that a limited war will break out in Europe is increasing. Europe will either be at the mercy of others or undergo a disastrous war.

Apart from expressing hopes and worries, the Europeans have also put forward specific suggestions. For example, although some governments have expressed their support for the American "star wars plan," they have reservations on the actual measures and hope that the United States will discuss the question in the Geneva talks. On behalf of France and the Federal Republic of Germany, British Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher has suggested to the United States that if a good arms control plan is reached with the Soviet Union, the United States should be happy to abandon the "star wars plan." And Romanian President Ceausescu thinks that both the United States and the Soviet Union should stop deploying nuclear weapons in Europe and remove those missiles that have been deployed in Europe and also stop militarizing space.

The United States and the Soviet Union have attached great importance to the opinions of the Europeans, because both sides know clearly that in the upcoming negotiations, neither side can completely ignore those opinions. At present, the two countries are actively engaged in winning over the European countries. Knowing that the West European coun-

tries and the United States have different opinions on the "strategic defense initiative," the Soviet Union has mainly adopted the method of "sowing discord" to expand the contradiction between them so as to draw the West European countries to its side. During his visit to Italy, Spain and other countries at the beginning of this month, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko said: "Once the star wars plan is abandoned, there will be a possibility of reaching an agreement which will reduce or perhaps greatly reduce strategic weapons, medium-range, and long-range nuclear missiles." It should be admitted that his remark has been very attractive to all the countries in Europe. The United States has adopted the method of "fence mending". To counter the fears of its allies, the United States has repeatedly stressed that the safety of Western Europe is "its own safety" and assured that the "strategic defense initiative" will never weaken the nuclear deterrent strategy, and has also encouraged West European countries to participate in research for the initiative. Although the United States and the Soviet Union have adopted different methods, their purposes are the same: to strengthen the bargaining power needed at the Geneva talks.

At present, it is still not known whether the opinions of the Europeans will be respected or not, whether their hopes will prove illusory or not, and whether their worries will unfortunately prove to be true or not. If the United States and the Soviet Union can really consider the wishes of the Europeans, compromise with each other in the upcoming negotiations, and achieve practical achievements in arms control, the Europeans will be very lucky, and such a move will surely be welcomed by the people of the whole world.

Asia, Pacific Leaders Comment

OW112353 Beijing XINHUA in English 1552 GMT 11 Mar 85

[Text] Beijing, March 11 (XINHUA) -- Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi will attend Soviet President Konstantin Chernenko's funeral and other Asian-Pacific countries expressed their condolences on Chernenko's death, according to reports reaching here today.

The Soviet president died at 19:20 Moscow time Sunday. His funeral is scheduled for March 13.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja today expressed sorrow at the Soviet leader's death, adding that he hoped it "will not affect the good relations" between Jakarta and Moscow.

The Thai Foreign Ministry issued a statement lamenting the death of Chernenko, "especially at a time when the Soviet Union and the United States are about to begin important negotiations on the reduction of arms."

In Wellington, New Zealand, Prime Minister David Lange said: "While not unexpected, President Chernenko's death leaves further uncertainty in the Soviet leadership at a time when strength and purpose are required in both Moscow and Washington as the super-powers start on the threshold of crucial negotiations that will affect the prospects for the peace of the world."

Meanwhile, Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke sent a message of sympathy to the Soviet Government, saying Chernenko's time as president had seen an improvement in relations between Moscow and Washington.

SPACE ARMS

COMMENTARIES ASSAIL SDI

U.S. Plans Described

PM271030 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 8, Feb 85 pp 25-27

[Interview with Soviet expert Aleksey Karinin by Dmitriy Pogorzhel'skiy: "The Star Wars Menace"]

[Text] Question: By commencing its plans to militarize outer space, the United States is striving for military superiority at the expense of other countries' security. Is this aim attainable?

Answer: As far as we know, the tendency towards militarizing outer space has manifested itself in the United States from the very beginning of the space age. The United States objected to Soviet proposals made at the United Nations in the second half of the 1950's and designed to prevent the arms race from spreading to outer space. These proposals were not realized precisely because of the negative stand taken by the West.

This striving to exploit scientific and technological progress for militarist purposes is very typical of American policy. It is enough to recall the history of the harnessing of nuclear energy. First the atomic bomb was made and only then were atomic power plants started. As soon as it got hold of the terrible atomic weapons, Washington set about whipping up international tension and pursuing power politics.

These are all signs of an old syndrome--the yearning for military superiority. Now that rough military-strategic parity exists between the USSR and the United States, the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO countries, certain circles in the United States are pinning their hopes of upsetting this balance on outer space in particular. They are banking on the scientific and technological potential of the United States, on its economic capabilities.

But whoever harbours such plans would do well to remember that all this is a repeat of history. There were plans to prevent the Soviet Union recovering from the Nazi aggression, to achieve decisive superiority over it on the basis of Washington's temporary atomic monopoly. By their heroic work the Soviet people foiled these plans. Then there were plans to achieve superiority by deploying

bombers on a mass scale, and when the missile era set in, hopes were pinned on land- and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. But Washington did not achieve what it wanted. So the next move was to fit missiles with MIRV warheads (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) in the 1960's, and after that there began the deployment of a new lethal strategic offensive weapon—the long-range cruise missile (1970's). The USSR has taken measures to counter the increased threat to its security.

Now Washington is turning its eyes to outer space in the hope that the road to superiority lies there. But history offers convincing evidence of the unattainability of such hopes. The very idea of superiority is unfeasible and essentially untenable. On the other hand, the balance of forces is a reliable guarantee of peace in present-day conditions. And the USSR will not allow anyone to upset this balance. The necessary weapons will be developed to counter the American space strike weapons.

But the USSR is totally against any continuation of the arms race. All its proposals are directed at putting an end to military rivalry and preventing the militarization of outer space. That such a danger exists is evidenced by the American plans for creating a large-scale ABM system.

Question: How do the American strategists visualize this system in practice?

Answer: The "theory" is presented in the United States as follows: Several ABM layers are created, and each hits a certain percentage of the ballistic missiles trying to reach targets, thereby eliminating the hypothetical enemy's nuclear potential.

Basically, there can be three main ABM layers: the first deals with missiles as they are launched; the second while they are in mid-flight, and the third when they reach the final stage of their trajectory.

Research and practical work to develop new technology for use in a large-scale ABM system are in full swing in the United States. Special hopes are pinned on the so-called directed energy weapons. These can be termed beam weapons because they hit targets with a laser beam, or a stream of high energy particles of atomic hydrogen, deuterium or tritium, or a microwave beam. The ABM beam systems are to be used in outer space where they are particularly effective.

As we can see, this is an exceptionally sophisticated and costly system.

Question: What is the military-political purport of the project?

Answer: U.S. propaganda is trying hard to prove the "peaceful" nature of the programme. It is said that a space-based ABM system will strengthen "deterrence," that is, defence. In reality, the large-scale ABM system is conceived as a supplement to offensive strategic arms, as a means of ensuring that the first nuclear strike is delivered with impunity. Under cover of a space based ABM system it is intended to deprive the other side of the possibility to retaliate.

Hence the huge destabilizing potential of the American "strategic defense initiative." By placing a large-scale ABM system in outer space, Washington hopes to get an instrument of blackmail against other nations. That is why, as it develops its ABM programme in a hurry, Washington continues to deploy new MX intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range cruise missiles of all types of basing, to build new strategic bombers and to rearm its fleet of missile-carrying submarines.

Question: Will the creation of the above-mentioned systems be a violation of the 1972 Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of ABM systems?

Answer: Yes, it will. U.S. Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger has publicly declared that in order to implement its programme the United States is prepared to revise or even renounce the ABM treaty. Similar statements have also come from the well-known exponent of the "strategic defence initiative" in the United States, Colin Gray, an adviser at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

However, even the statement of the intention to establish a large-scale ABM system with some of its elements based in space--and such a statement has been made by President Reagan--directly contradicts the letter and spirit of the treaty itself and the provisions of Article 1, under which each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for defence of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defence. There would be a flagrant violation of another important limitation contained in the treaty's Article 5--not to develop, test or deploy space-based ABM systems or components.

So a large-scale ABM system with elements of space basing can be deployed only at the price of renouncing the 1972 treaty. This is added evidence of Washington's flippant attitude towards the commitments it assumes under international agreements.

Question: It is possible to stop this process, to prevent the arms race from spreading to outer space?

Answer: This can be done and it must be done. That is how the Soviet side views the issue.

A practical possibility of adopting effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space and stop it on earth is afforded by the Soviet-American talks due to open in Geneva on 12 March. In the present circumstances these talks offer the only possible hope of solving the problem of nuclear and space arms. Today it is impossible to limit, and still less to reduce, nuclear arms without taking effective measures to prevent the militarization of space. This interconnection is clearly recorded in the joint Soviet-American statement on the results of the Gromyko-Shultz meeting in Geneva.

What is needed now is honest adherence to this agreement, adherence in practice to all its components. And, of course, any steps obstructing constructive talks are impermissible.

As for the Soviet Union, it is entirely in favour of this. "A positive outcome of the new Soviet-American talks on nuclear and spare arms," President Chernenko stressed, "would favourably influence the world situation, would greatly contribute to solving the cardinal problems of today.

"The Soviet Union will work in this direction, will seek meaningful and definite results in Geneva."

The Soviet side expects the United States to take the same stand.

Reagan Arguments Refuted

PM250926 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 22 Feb 85 First Edition p 5

[Article by Aleksey Arbatov, doctor of historical sciences and expert of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat: "Reflections Before Geneva; The Mirages of 'Strategic Defense'"]

[Text] For 40 years now the danger of nuclear annihilation has hung over mankind like a terrible curse. Total catastrophe can occur not only as a result of deliberate, preplanned aggression, but also as a result of a crisis situation in one of the many flash points on the planet getting out of control, or owing to a strategic miscalculation on the part of staffs, unsanctioned actions by operators at the missile control console, or computer error at the command post.

People are tired of living under the oppression of the nuclear threat. The human mind cannot reconcile itself to the thought that everything that we have created and love could, in a matter of minutes, turn into scorched ruins and nuclear ashes. This is the reason for the unprecedentedly broad antinuclear and antimissile movement which has encompassed the whole world in recent years.

But at the same time people whose aims have nothing in common with delivering mankind from the nuclear threat are trying in a most cynical manner, to exploit man's natural desire to finally find a refuge from the boundless destructive force and reach of nuclear weapons. I am referring to the so-called U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative," first mentioned in President Reagan's 23 March 1983 speech. In this speech plans were announced for the creation of a large-scale antimissile (ABM) defense including space-based laser emitters.

Well, despite all the doubts about the technical and strategic aspects of these plans, the psychological calculation of the president and his aides was simple and very precise. It cannot be bad, surely, to obtain security not by means of offensive nuclear weapons but rather through systems which provide a reliable defense against them. It would appear so much humane to spend money on means to destroy missiles in flight rather than on means to kill people and destroy material assets. If ABM defense systems make nuclear missile weapons ineffective, this will, as it were, make it easier to scrap offensive means. However, even if that does not happen, and nuclear war should break out, then the antimissile systems will prevent total destruction.

At first glance these arguments look attractive. The problem is, however, that they are as far from the truth as the Hollywood adventure film "Star Wars" which has provided the label for the Reagan administration's "defense initiative" is removed from real life. There is direct evidence that this is a perfectly plain falsification, a deliberate attempt on the part of the president, or those who advise him, to mislead the public.

Strenuous attempts are being made to impress on people that it is possible to obtain protection against nuclear weapons by spending money on the development of increasingly exotic types of arms (at the initial stage 26 billion is being requested for research and development—which in itself exceeds the cost of, for instance, the entire "MX" or "Trident" programs--and in the longer term the expenditure for the multiechelon antimissile system could top 1 trillion dollars!) Essentially, the advocates of the ABM defense system put forward the idea that, rather than by means of a consistent struggle for peace and patient negotiations, security can be achieved through the development and deployment of fundamentally new and increasingly sophisticated types of arms. And this is probably the biggest deception of the nuclear age.

The point is that even in purely theoretical terms there is no, nor can there be, a weapon that is 100 percent reliable and effective. Strategic planners have learned to adapt to these circumstances in one way or another. But matters take a completely new turn when it comes to antimissile defense.

In view of the colossal destructive force of even a relatively small quantity of nuclear weapons, an antimissile system to protect the population must either be 100 percent reliable or it becomes completely meaningless. The technical side of possible future antimissile systems, and especially of their fundamentally new orbital laser versions, is at the moment extremely vague. But even if a partially effective system proved feasible in the end, its consequences would be completely different from those promised by U.S. administration spokesmen.

The development and deployment of ABM defense systems would, above all, encourage a sharp buildup of offensive nuclear arms and the development of means to counter ABM defense systems. Existing arms limitation agreements would collapse and the adoption of future accords on these questions would inevitably be thwarted. The threat of war would sharply increase. Explaining the essence of the U.S. "defense initiative," K. U. Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, pointed out in his replies to questions from the U.S. CNN television company: "The use of the term 'defense' is juggling with words. In its essence this concept is offensive, or rather aggressive.... The objective is to acquire the possibility of delivering a nuclear strike in the hope of impunity, sheltering from retribution behind an antimissile 'shield'."

The U.S. military-industrial complex' programs, and in particular the "Star Wars" projects, have been widely denounced by the world public and criticized by realistically minded bourgeois politicians. Studies by authoritative experts from the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat and also by their U.S. colleagues from the League of Concerned

Scientists, the Congress scientific and technical assessment board, and the Federation of U.S. Scientists have demonstrated on the basis of facts and figures the flimsiness and dangerous nature of plans to crank up the antimissile arms race.

This explains why the pioneers of the "defense initiative" have changed their tactics of late. In order to clarify the limits of the effectiveness of ABM defense systems they propose, for the time being, to conduct intensive research and development work. And if it proves that only a partially effective ABM system is feasible, they are proposing that it be built for ... the defense of U.S. strategic means against the mythical threat of a "disarming strike." But even this new reasoning proves flawed on closer examination.

The whole world knows that there is no such thing as a "Soviet threat." The USSR has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, while the United States and NATO stubbornly refuse to follow suit. But even if warped strategic minds in Washington conceive a nuclear attack on the United States as likely, the construction of ABM defense systems cannot be justified by reasons of a retaliatory strike. After all, one of the three components of the U.S. nuclear triad alone, the naval missile forces, now have some 6,000 nuclear warheads deployed, more than half of which are constantly in a state of operational readiness on the oceans. These means are in any case not subject to strategic missile strikes and cannot be shielded by antimissile defense.

The ABM defense system which is being proposed now is by no means needed by the United States to deliver a retaliatory strike but rather as potential for unleashing "limited or protracted" nuclear war and is intended to shield the means necessary to conduct precisely this kind of operation using "MX" and "Midgetman" missiles, B-1 and "Stealth" bombers, antisatellite systems, and a sophisticated system to control all these weapons.

It emerges that even according to the new version the antimissile programs are based on by no means benevolent considerations. The doctrine of "limited or protracted" nuclear war guarantees an endless defensive and offensive arms race and the further exacerbation of the danger of a nuclear conflict being unleashed.

And finally, it must not be forgotten that the ABM defense options which are currently being put forward in the United States would remove all restraints imposed by the ABM Defense Treaty and would thus wreck the main agreement on which the whole existing system and process of strategic arms limitation is based. The last restraining factor on the nuclear missile race would be removed.

The advocates of ABM defense are playing a dishonest game with words, continually "juggling" arguments and facts. Even more dangerous are the practical measures being developed behind this screen aimed in effect at anything but ensuring security. The path to security leads in a completely different direction, it is of a different order. It is outlined in the Soviet-American accord reached in Geneva on talks which will begin 12 March. This accord, K. U. Chernenko pointed out, "contains the correct and, I would say, the only possible way in present conditions of resolving problems pertaining to nuclear and space weapons." An increasing number of people throughout the world and in the United States itself are becoming aware of this truth despite the tricks of the Washington schemers.

SPACE ARMS

FURTHER COMMENTARIES CRITICIZING SDI

U.S. Arguments Contested

PM111530 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Mar 85 Second Edition p 3

[Captain 2d Class V. Kuzar "Military-Political Review": "The Threat From Space: On the Eve of the Geneva Talks; Washington Recruiting 'Star Wars' Proponents; Stopping Dangerous Plans"]

[Excerpts] The attention of the world's public is fixed on Geneva. Soviet-U.S. talks will start here the day after tomorrow. Is it worth stressing the hopes and aspirations that the world's peoples are pinning on these talks. They see a positive outcome to the talks as a real way of resolving the cardinal problems of the day, mainly removing the threat of nuclear war.

How have the sides approached the forthcoming dialogue? As far as the USSR is concerned, it has a clear and well defined position that has been set in a principled and authoritative way in recent speeches by Soviet leaders. Our country believes that despite the considerable difficulties that exist there are objective conditions for serious and fruitful discussion on the subject matter of the talks -- naturally, given the presence on both sides of goodwill, readiness to make sensible compromises, and understanding of the need to strictly observe the principle of equality and identical security.

Unfortunately, it must be stated that the United States has not yet taken the same approach to the talks or shown its goodwill. Washington continues to follow a course of dangerous confrontation, achieving strategic supremacy, and increasing its nuclear first-strike potential. The U.S. Administration is striving with particular stubbornness to implement its new aggressive program aimed at waging war in and from space. As a ranking official Pentagon spokesman stated the other day, President Reagan's proposal to develop an ABM system with space-based elements is "not a reserve program but the central question in U.S. military planning right up to the start of the next century."

Currently one often encounters warnings in the Western press, including the U.S. press, that the Geneva talks are hardly likely to be fruitful if the United States continues its line of preparing for "star wars." However, the Washington administration does not want to heed these sober voices. More and more of the Pentagon's practical actions in preparing to use space for military purposes are becoming known. Thus, the USAF intends to purchase 10 improved Titan 34D7 rockets for launching military satellites into space. THE WASHINGTON POST reports that development is progressing successfully on longwave an

infrared target detection and identification systems and on superpowerful computers intended for immediate calculations when guiding space weapons to targets. And in general, the newspaper stresses, the Pentagon strategists are now more concerned by the question of how many orbiting combat stations the United States needs to have sufficient might to inflict strikes on all Soviet missile ranges at any time.

In planning "star wars," Washington is striving to include its NATO allies and Japan in the implementation of these dangerous plans. This desire is undoubtedly dictated by a wish to win political support in the international arena and present its program for the militarization of space as the bloc's common platform. The United States is also not averse to sharing the burden of material spending with its partners and exploiting their scientific and technical potential. There is another reason for involving West Europe in the "strategic defense initiative." It is hidden and not spoken of openly in Washington. But it is obvious nonetheless. Overseas they have not renounced the idea of waging a "limited" nuclear war on the European Continent. Siting its first-strike nuclear weapons in West Europe and creating a space ABM system with its allies' help, the Pentagon might resort to such a war in practice.

The most active efforts have been made to work on the allies in this connection. Lies, disinformation, and deceit have been brought into play. Washington has dispatched envoys to conclude advantageous contracts and has started to exert undisguised pressure. The "brainwashing" campaign has involved Defense Secretary Weinberger; Keyworth, presidential adviser on scientific questions; Lieutenant General Abrahamson, leader of the organization for implementing the "Strategic Defense Initiative"; and other Washington officials. Even on the very eve of the talks, THE TIMES reported, members of the U.S. delegation en route for Geneva will stop over in Brussels and deliver "explanations" of U.S. strategy at NATO headquarters.

Just what "arguments" are the apologists of star wars putting forward in recruiting assistants from among the NATO allies? This is well known: They are trying to convince the population of the West European countries, like all mankind, that the Reagan "initiative" is purely a "research" effort and that if a space ABM system were created, it would save the world from the nuclear threat and West Europeans could count on a U.S. "space shield."

All these claims are nothing but sophisticated propaganda manipulations. The statements that it is purely a question of "research work" do not stand up to any criticism. Practice shows -- and repeatedly has done -- that the appearance of a new type of weapon is always preceded at first by the research stage. In particular, that was the way the creation of Pershing II and cruise missiles began. It would be naive to believe in the "defensive" nature of space weapons, which their supporters are so zealously proclaiming. Space-based laser, particle beam, and missile weapons can be used both against enemy missiles and against targets on earth. Even the U.S. "hawks" make no secret of that. For instance, USAF Chief of Staff General Gabriel has stated: "Space is ultimately the most advantageous position." So the notorious "space shield" is in fact turning into a space sword.

As far as the "space shield" for Western Europe is concerned, its illusoriness is obvious even to the untrained eye. The creation of an "absolutely impenetrable shield," which the Pentagon is trying to make the West Europeans believe in, has been proved to be impossible. The West German newspaper FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU has rightly written in this regard: "First, in human history the development of offensive weapons has always outstripped the development of corresponding defensive means. Even if space

defense is really created, an enemy could sharply increase the number of cruise missiles...or create a new type of missile with a low flight trajectory...." In other words the "space shield" will not strengthen, but, on the contrary, will weaken the West European countries' security, will create an additional threat to them, and will hitch them even more strongly to Washington's militarist harness.

Preparation, Research Discussed

PM081914 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Mar 85 Second Edition p 5

[TASS-attributed article by F. Aleksandrov: "How the 'Star Wars' Are Being Prepared"]

[Text] White House representatives and official U.S. propaganda are making efforts to present the "star wars" preparation measures being conducted in the United States as innocuous research whose results will not be used at least until some time in the distant future. However, no tricks can hide from the public the fact that the United States has begun intensive preparation for the creation of an echeloned ABM system.

All branches of the Armed Forces, the Pentagon's long-term Military Research Directorate, the Energy Department, military-industrial concerns, numerous scientific-research laboratories, and America's top academic institutions are taking part in it. The best representatives of the country's scientific and technical potential have been diverted into creating the very latest means of combat -- controlled energy weapons (laser and particle beam weapons), magnetic guns, antisatellite complexes, and satellites armed with missiles, and developing a comprehensive monitoring system to include the earth's surface and space that is to detect missile launches, calculate missile trajectories, recognize the track warheads, and assign systems to destroy them.

It is the Pentagon's generals' cherished dream to prevent retaliation and to destroy or incapacitate Soviet ICBM's within 2-5 minutes of firing, that is, while they are still over USSR territory. Each intact missile, U.S. specialists say, puts into ballistic trajectory up to 10 nuclear warheads and 100 dummy warheads and other devices for deceiving the enemy ABM system. The more missiles that penetrate the first echelon, the less chance there will be of neutralizing a Soviet retaliatory strike.

Laser weapons are assigned the role of the main destruction system. According to the Western press information, intensive work is being done in the sphere of high-energy chemical, excimer, and X-ray lasers and free-electron lasers. Chemical lasers are already beginning to take shape as space weapons. A number of firms have been working for several years now on the "Triad" program, which envisages the creation of a chemical laser with an average continuous radiation capacity as high as 2 million watts (it is subsequently planned to increase that to 10 million watts) and an optical system for focusing the laser beam and a guidance system for directing it toward the target. This, taken in its entirety, is a prototype of a military space laser station. The Washington hawks' scheme is that about 100 of these stations with high-powered chemical lasers are to "settle scores" with Soviet missiles in the initial phase of their trajectory.

Work is in full swing in the sphere of X-ray lasers using the energy of a nuclear explosion. The feasibility of creating such a weapon was demonstrated during recent underground tests at the Nevada test range. In one test the nuclear explosion generated an X-ray laser beam. The military space station equipped with these lasers is conceived as a nuclear installation with 50 lasers deployed around it at the same time, which automatically home in on missiles as they are launched. They are triggered by the pulse emitted during the explosion of a nuclear charge.

As well as orbiting stations, it is planned to create powerful ground-based laser devices. Their deadly beams are designed to reach their targets thousands of kilometers away via a system of space mirrors. G. Keyworth, scientific adviser to the President on military questions, recently said that U.S. scientists have already managed to "overcome the great obstacle to the use of ground-based lasers against objects in space... and have been successful in compensating for the scattering of the laser beams in the atmosphere."

Space-based magnetic guns are also regarded in the Pentagon as a promising weapon. Several firms are working on their development. According to experts' estimates, they are capable of imparting to munitions speeds of up to several tens of kilometers per second. As to the energy density created on the surface of the target, they exceed powerful lasers.

The Western press has also reported that transatlantic experts have defined ways to resolve the problem of identifying nuclear warheads in the midcourse phase among a multitude of other objects launched by a missile. One of these is based on the fact that the speed and temperature of objects under the impact of an identical laser impulse varies according to their mass.

It is planned to use surface-to-air guided missiles with nuclear and conventional warheads to intercept warheads before they re-enter the atmosphere and in the upper and middle layers of the atmosphere. They are to be used to protect installations such as ICBM launchpads and control centers.

An ICBM warhead component was successfully intercepted at an altitude of 160 km over the central Pacific in June 1984. Lockheed, which manufactured the equipment for the experiment, declared its readiness to deploy a system consisting of 1,000 missiles each carrying 3 interceptors in the early 1990's.

In the view of U.S. experts, the interception technology tested over the Pacific could also be used to intercept missiles and warheads in the initial and midcourse phases of their flight. For this reason military space laser stations have not as yet been created, because their place in ABM defense could be taken by satellites carrying interceptor-missiles. According to one project, it is planned to launch 432 satellites into earth orbit, each carrying 40-50 missiles, and according to another project 100 satellites would be launched, but this time with 150 missiles each. Program director General Abrahamson declared that the United States will begin to deploy weapons in space in as little as 2 years' time.

Since R. Reagan's "star wars" speech in March 1983, prominent scientists have proved incontrovertibly that the "doctrine of guaranteed survival" which he proclaimed is unfounded and that it is impossible to create a totally impenetrable ABM shield. Nonetheless, the Washington administration continues to accelerate the pace of space militarization. Many foreign military experts attribute this to the dual nature of space weapons. It is a question of offensive rather than defensive weapons that can be used not only against missiles and other space targets but also against air, ground, and sea targets. These weapons are to become a component of a nuclear first-strike capability, designed to disarm the Soviet Union and to deprive it of the opportunity to deliver a retaliatory strike against an aggressor. Essentially, the United States is starting up a new, unprecedented round in the arms race.

This is why the militarist U.S. plans are meeting with such decisive opposition from the world's peace-loving forces, which demand that the U.S. imperialists stop chasing

the specter of military-strategic superiority and get down to talks aimed at ending the nuclear marathon.

As for the Soviet Union's stance, it is clear and understandable: The hope of sheltering from retribution for aggression behind an ABM shield is illusory. The USSR will not allow anybody to gain military superiority over it, either on earth or in space. It advocates a quest for honest and mutually acceptable accords with the aim of applying the brakes firmly to the arms race in all spheres.

System Described

LD080012 Moscow TASS in English 2227 GMT 7 Mar 85

[Text] Moscow March 8 TASS -- TASS commentator Fedor Aleksandrov writes:

White House officials and U.S. propaganda are making efforts to present the steps taken by the USA to prepare for "star wars" as innocuous research, the results of which will be used in the remote future, if ever. But no tricks can conceal from the public the fact that the United States has launched intensive preparations for the development of a sophisticated system of anti-missile defenses.

It is a cherished dream of the Pentagon generals to avoid retaliation, to destroy or decapitate Soviet IBM's within two-five minutes of launch, that is, over Soviet territory.

It is laser weapons that are assigned the role of the chief striking force. According to the Western press, intensive research is being carried out into high-energy, chemical, excimer, [as received] X-ray and free-electron lasers. Work into X-ray lasers using the energy of nuclear explosion is going ahead full steam.

It is also planned to use surface-to-air guided missiles with nuclear and conventional warheads to intercept incoming warheads before they enter the atmosphere and in the upper and middle atmospheric layers. They are going to be used to shield such targets as control centres and IBM launchers.

U.S. specialists believe that the interception methods tested over the Pacific can be used to counter missiles and warheads also in the initial and middle phases of the trajectory of their flight. Satellites carrying interceptor missiles can do the job until strike space-based laser stations are developed.

Since Reagan unveiled his "star wars" program in March 1983, notable scientists have forcefully demonstrated the fallacy of his "doctrine of assured survival" and the impossibility of the development of an absolute anti-missile shield. Yet the Washington administration continues to speed up the militarization of space. Many foreign military experts explain this drive by the dual character of space weapons. To all appearances, they will be not so much defensive as offensive weapons which can be used not only against missiles and other space objects but also against aerial, ground and sea targets. They are to become a component of the first nuclear strike potential intended to disarm the Soviet Union and to deny it the possibility to retaliate against the aggressor. The United States is actually embarking on a new, unprecedented round of the arms race.

As for the Soviet Union's position, it is clear and understandable: The hope to take cover behind an anti-missile shield from retaliation against aggression is illusory. The USSR will not permit anyone to achieve military superiority over itself either on earth or in space. It stands for a search for honest and mutually acceptable agreements to put firm brakes on the arms race in every field.

CSO: 5200/1034

SPACE ARMS

'UNENVIABLE' IMPACT OF SDI ON WEST EUROPE ALLEGED

PM031418 Moscow TRUD in Russian 1 Mar 85 p 3

[Report by own correspondent V. Boykov: "Eliminating the Nuclear Threat;
All the Brussels Peace Forum"]

[Excerpts] Brussels, 28 Feb -- An international public forum for peace and security in Europe opened in Brussels today. Taking part in its work are delegations from approximately 30 states whose leaders signed the Final Act of the All-European Conference. Our country's public is represented by scientists, journalists, and emissaries of trade unions, the peace movement, the Committee of Soviet Women, and the Russian Orthodox Church. The Soviet delegation is headed by S.A. Shalayev, member of the CPSU Central Committee, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and chairman of the AUCCTU.

The harsh truth of the present international situation is such that the nuclear threat is unfortunately great, Soviet delegation leader S.A. Shalayev noted in his address. You cannot hide from it. Is it possible to eliminate this threat, strengthen trust in international relations, and halt the arms race? Soviet public and official circles answer this in the affirmative.

The 40 years of peace in Europe and the successful overcoming of the dangerous period of the cold war convincingly confirm the possibility of peaceful coexistence and the effectiveness and farsightedness of the accords on the foundations of the peaceful postwar system in Europe, which were confirmed in the Final Act of the All-European Conference in Helsinki. For this reason, the speaker stressed, the appeals certain rash Western politicians are making today to reject these accords seems highly dangerous to us. Nor do the attempts to upset the established military parity and to exert military, political, and economic pressure on the socialist countries help the cause of peace and international security. The Soviet Union is not deploying a single missile or a single nuclear warhead in excess of what is necessary to maintain parity. Nor will it permit the other side to secure military superiority, the pursuit of which is increasingly accelerating the arms race.

Soviet people see one of the main reasons for the complication of the situation, S.A. Shalayev continued, in the start of deployment of U.S. first-strike missiles in certain West European countries in November 1983. Another source of concern for us is the plan to militarize space. If the realization of these plans is not blocked, all hopes of reducing and completely destroying nuclear weapons in Europe

and throughout the world will be vain. For this reason the Soviet Union categorically opposes any measures connected with the production, testing, and deployment of space weapons.

No one should be deluded, the speaker stressed, by the "defensive" terminology or other arguments designed to camouflage the "star wars" plans.

Their essence consists in possessing the potential to direct nuclear missiles against the other side -- the Soviet Union -- from behind a shield protecting the United States from a counterstrike. Western Europe is allotted an unenviable fate in all these plans. If the militarization of space is not avoided, the problem of European security may assume a completely different character.

Explaining the USSR's stance on the forthcoming Geneva talks, S.A. Shalayev noted that the Soviet Union is not striving to obtain any unilateral advantages over the United States and the other NATO countries. We want to stop, not continue the arms race, he said. We want to actually reduce stockpiled weapons, destroy a considerable part of them as a start, and not create ever new weapons systems, whether in space or on earth. The head of the Soviet delegation warned that the reluctance to secure an agreement on space, as is evidenced by a whole range of statements by Washington administration spokesmen, risks making an agreement on both strategic arms and medium-range arms impossible. All these questions are interrelated and must be resolved comprehensively.

The speaker reminded the forum participants that in order to emerge from the present dangerous situation and create a climate of trust in Europe and the world as a whole, the Soviet Union has advanced an all-embracing complex of peace initiatives. In particular they envisage concluding a treaty on the mutual nonuse of military force; freezing the sides' nuclear arsenals and gradually liquidating them; creating nuclear- and chemical-free zones in Europe; and reaching an agreement to halt all nuclear weapons tests

For this reason, S.A. Shalayev said in conclusion, we actively support all initiatives aimed at putting an end to the senseless arms race. We believe that the struggle to achieve lasting peace is the affair of all peoples and all countries, both large and small. Holding constructive dialogue, continuing cooperation, and stepping up the struggle against danger of war is the true path toward achieving success for all supporters of peace and disarmament in Europe.

CSO: 5200/1036

SPACE ARMS

INSTITUTE OFFICIALS INTERVIEWED ON SDI

DW121105 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 11 Mar 85 pp 138-148

[Interview with Andrey Kokoshin, deputy director of the United States of America and Canada Institute in Moscow; Aleksey Arbatov, department chief at the World Economics and International Relations Institute (IMEMO) in Moscow; and Aleksey Vasilyev, department chief of the United States of America and Canada Institute, by DER SPIEGEL editors Siegesmund von Ilse and Andreas Lorenz in Moscow; date not given]

[Text] SPIEGEL: U.S. President Reagan recently stated that he wanted to implement his space plans in any event. That ought to be a reason for you to be happy.

Kokoshin: Are you serious?

SPIEGEL: Yes, because you state in your study on U.S. space weapons that a missile defense umbrella in space would cost up to \$2 trillion. Thus it would be so expensive that it would place a heavy burden on the economy of your ideological adversary, the United States.

Kokoshin: We have never maintained that the worse off the other side is, the better for us. We believe that these enormous expenditures must be paid for by the American people, by the working people. That is no reason for us to be jubilant.

SPIEGEL: That much concern for your ideological adversary is touching.

Kokoshin: (Laughs)

SPIEGEL: Is that proletarian internationalism?

Kokoshin: Correct. However, you must separate the ideological dispute from the arms race. It was never our aim to let the United States go bankrupt through the arms race.

Arbatov: You understand, we do not favor an enormous economic crisis breaking out in the capitalist world. Under such a crisis, the workers would be the main ones to suffer. A new spiral in the arms race would most of all be a tax burden for the working people.

SPIEGEL: Can the USSR stand such a race?

Kokoshin: We are against burdening the economy through an arms race and, therefore, we have submitted arms control proposals to cut military expenditures. The aim of

our military expenditures was always to achieve parity, not superiority. Fewer weapons improve the prerequisites for the development of socialism in our country.

SPIEGEL: In the United States some people want to achieve the opposite.

Kokoshin: Naturally, we know that the United States wants to weaken us in an arms race. However, the United States will not achieve its aim of ransacking our country. Our political and economic system permits us to distribute the means more effectively and rationally because we are not interested in gains, in contrast to the private U.S. arms industry.

SPIEGEL: Do you believe that a system of space weapons such as that proposed by Reagan could ever work?

Vasilyev: In our report we have come to the conclusion that there will never be a total protection against offensive missiles. However, the mere attempt to establish an even imperfectly functioning defense system will heat up the arms race again. In our view, however, the means to destroy a U.S. space-based weapons system are much cheaper than the system itself.

SPIEGEL: Edward Teller, one of the chief initiators of Reagan's star wars programs, now is convinced that the opposite is correct. He thinks that a defense shield is cheaper than the means to penetrate it.

Vasilyev: What is cheaper, bringing these huge space weapons stations into orbit or releasing a cloud of splinters aimed at collision in outer space, which inevitably destroys such sensitive installations at high speed? In the first case, it is a billion-dollar project; project No 2 costs millions at least.

SPIEGEL: According to your calculations, Moscow would only have to spend one or two percent of the U.S. space weapons budget to destroy such a defense shield, in other words, to turn the superweapons into space scrap. Then why does your government make so much fuss about weapons that are absolutely useless?

Kokoshin: Our worries are of a political and strategical nature. In assessing the other side's military preparations on the whole, we think that a partially functioning defense system is as threatening for us as a totally effective system. An impenetrable protection shield could be used for warding off a first strike as well as for preventing a strategic counterstrike, whereas a partially effective space missile defense system can only be used for warding off the counterstrike of missiles after these have been reduced in a first strike.

SPIEGEL: What does this mean, in your view, for U.S. strategy?

Kokoshin: It increases the incentive for American strategists to risk a nuclear first strike under the protection of such a defense shield, however imperfect. It sounds paradoxical, however there are many paradoxes in the strategic field. Strategic stability would be upset. This is the main reason for our concern; it is not a question of how effective such space weapons will be in reality.

SPIEGEL: Reagan, however, stated that he wants to turn the now valid strategic principle of "mutually guaranteed destruction" into "mutually guaranteed security" with the help of his space-based defense. Don't you consider this plan enticing?

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SPIEGEL: Reagan, however, stated that he wants to turn the now valid strategic principle of "mutually guaranteed destruction" into "mutually guaranteed security" with the help of his space-based defense. Don't you consider this plan enticing?

Arbatov: You cannot use 20-year-old quotations to argue a point today. This naturally also applies to the equally old allegation by U.S. military representatives that the Soviet missile defense system was the main threat for the United States.

SPIEGEL: This is what you are blaming the United States for now because of its space plans.

Arbatov: At the time Kosygin made his remark, there was neither strategic parity nor the principle of mutually guaranteed destruction. There was no missile defense system or any agreement on the limitation of strategic arms. Things are quite different today, and this changed situation is being endangered by the American space weapons system. Even more so, it threatens us and the entire world with the risk of nuclear war. Second only to the foregoing is our concern about the scientific, technical, and economic effects of the U.S. plans.

SPIEGEL: The political, military, and technological development will not come to a standstill. Hasn't President Reagan shown an interesting way out also for you in the face of these almost inevitable changes? He even wants to share American space know-how with the Soviet Union later on.

Arbatov: I have great doubt that the Americans will really be ready to share their know-how with us, since they are already trying today to conceal their knowledge about simple things, such as ball bearings, from us.

SPIEGEL: In the view of your government, a nuclear first strike is the aim of American space armament. Does this realization originate from American sources?

Kokoshin: It is absolutely clear, after all, that the United States does not lay its strategic aims openly on the table. However, the suspicion seems to be justified that a first strike is being prepared with the help of space armaments if one, in connection with space armaments, takes a look at the plans for the development of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons or if one recalls the remarks by government representatives and even by the secretary of defense, who above all in the early years of the Reagan administration often spoke about how to win a nuclear war. What must be added is that other possibilities of using space weapons are being discussed in the United States, such as how they may serve as a means for blackmail.

SPIEGEL: In what way?

Arbatov: Many experts agree that the stockpiling of more and more nuclear weapons is senseless. Today, some 50,000 nuclear warheads are lying in arsenals worldwide. This is out of all proportion regarding the number of targets in our countries and all over the world. The American programs reaching up to the end of this millenium can be viewed rather clearly. They do not provide for a reduction in strategic weapons. This is the reason for our distrust of the claim that space armament serves defense.

SPIEGEL: The Soviet Union has renounced the first use of nuclear weapons. In your study, you even write that Soviet troops therefore would be trained in a different way and that they would be regrouped. What do you mean by this?

Kokoshin: The commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is not only of political significance, but it also brings its influence to bear on the everyday training of our troops.

SPIEGEL: How has it changed?

Arbatov: As our defense minister plainly stated in the summer of 1982, in the training of Soviet Armed Forces, increased attention is being drawn to preventing an armed conflict from turning into nuclear war. This is why stricter standards are being applied to the training of troops and staffs. In addition, control measures are being intensified, so as to prevent an unauthorized use of nuclear weapons -- be they tactical or strategic.

SPIEGEL: You oppose a U.S. space-based defense. However unlike the Americans, the Soviets since late in the sixties are maintaining a missile defense system near Moscow which is now even modernized. Does Moscow claim a monopoly in this field?

Kokoshin: Well, what the Soviet Union possesses is fully in line with the ABM treaty of 1972 and its supplementary protocols. At the time we made a very realistic approach to the limitation of missile defense. Our opposition to an extensive missile defense system does not contradict this.

SPIEGEL: Moscow is yelling with disgust because Washington plans to set up a missile defense system like that which you already have. You must explain this contradiction to us.

Kokoshin: In the United States, a decisive new step is involved at the moment. We have only a very limited missile defense complex. It is only a part of what has been discussed in the sixties. The Americans also have many elements of such a system. As far as we know, they can very quickly further activate these defense missiles. Moreover, they do not only pursue research work, they also test new weapons. Facts demonstrate that the statement that the Soviet Union is more active than the United States in this field in the framework of the ABM treaty are completely unfounded.

Vasilyev: Since the 1972 agreement, the United States has spent some billion of dollars to perfect its antimissile weapons; the Army had and still has its own ABM programs. This has been confirmed by the Americans.

SPIEGEL: The United States justifies its space plans with the reproach that Moscow violates the ABM treaty. It mentions a huge radar apparatus near Krasnoyarsk and new anti-aircraft missiles which are said to have been tested also as antimissile weapons. Moreover, the Soviet Union is said to have pursued far-reaching military laser research work that could also be preparation for star wars. Does Washington have the same fears as Moscow?

Kokoshin: For me it is amazing that a considerable part of the people in the West still fail to see through the tricks of the Americans. How often have the advocates of a new arms race thought up new Soviet bombers and talked of a Soviet lead in missiles. I am convinced that this is also happening at the moment in connection with the alleged Soviet violations of the ABM treaty.

SPIEGEL: We beg you to produce evidence.

Kokoshin: It is said that we are ahead of the United States with regard to an anti-missile system. Such statements are of the same character as the earlier campaigns. The public is deluged with falsifications. I am convinced that some time in the future, high-ranking Pentagon officials or high military officials will admit in their

articles or memoirs: "In the early eighties, we exaggerated the potential of the Soviet Union."

SPIEGEL: Undoubtedly, it is unlikely that in your country, here in the Soviet Union, memoirs will be published demonstrating that the Americans did not invent their accusations. What about the radar near Krasnoyarsk?

Kokoshin: The Soviet Union takes all necessary precautions to safeguard its defense ability. However, in doing this, it never violates its contractual commitments. I just want to point out to you that U.S. activities contradicting the ABM treaty remain unmentioned. For example, intensified work is presently being done in the United States in connection with the development of mobile ABM missiles. Moreover, inter-continental ballistic missiles of the "Minuteman" type are being tested as antimissiles, and so on.

SPIEGEL: We will gladly ask the Americans about this. From you, we would prefer to learn what the radar apparatus near Krasnoyarsk is really for.

Kokoshin: Modern radar technology permits many functions of a civilian as well as a military character. However, those people in the United States who want to undermine the ABM treaty repeatedly try to insinuate that we pursue activities that are banned according to the treaty.

Arbatov: Your questions do not always seem to be in accordance with the state of discussions. This can probably be explained by the fact that the Americans change their arguments constantly. They want to implement the space program with all means and, therefore, they change their arguments according to the situation. For example: In the beginning, Washington stated that its space umbrella serves the protection of the whole world. According to statements of some U.S. Administration representatives, however, it is now said that only the silos of intercontinental missiles and other important military installations will be protected. It means that the protection of the population cannot be guaranteed.

SPIEGEL: Is the American offer to place Europe under also the umbrella a confusing tactic?

Vasilyev: Yes. Just keep in mind that according to American ideas, the enemy missile is in the respective effective radius of the antimissile system. The flying times of intermediate-range missile that could reach Europe...

SPIEGEL: ...such as the Soviet SS-20 missile...

Vasilyev: ...are much shorter than those of intercontinental missiles. Therefore, Europe cannot be protected by the space umbrella as well as the United States. Europe would be really protected only if it were freed of all nuclear weapons. This is what the Soviet Union supports...

SPIEGEL: ...while continuing to deploy nuclear missiles aimed at Europe. But let us return to star wars: The star wars concept is a matter of the future. At what point in its development do you see the Soviet Union's security endangered?

Kokoshin: There are elements of an antimissile system in space that are not only just a threat in the distant future, but that can be implemented in the next few years on the basis of existing technology, as some strategists maintain. We must not ignore

that. Already in this connection, the U.S. Administration's statements that only research oriented at the distant future is involved are misleading.

SPIEGEL: Do you maintain that the ABM treaty is being violated just by research work?

Arbatov: Many things, among them the extension of research and development work, indicate that the United States wants to undermine the temporally unlimited ABM treaty.

SPIEGEL: The world hopes that in Geneva, a space arms race will be prevented. Assuming that an agreement is achieved there, could it be verified at all?

Kokoshin: The ban to create absolutely new weapons is much easier to verify than the limitation of already developed weapons. National control means can be very well used for that.

SPIEGEL: What if satellites, electronic monitoring apparatuses and similar mutually accepted means of spying do not suffice?

Kokoshin: Our leadership has stated more than once that the Soviet Union is prepared to apply other forms of control, presupposing that one will agree on a satisfactory, comprehensive agreement. Then inspections in the proper place will be possible.

SPIEGEL: Shall Soviet scientists go as controllers to the United States to inspect weaponry firms there and -- vice versa -- shall American scientists inspect what is being done in Soviet laboratories?

Kokoshin: Well, in the ideal case -- if we concluded, for example, an agreement on general and complete disarmament -- such a situation is feasible. An important remark in this connection was recently made by Foreign Minister Gromyko. He said that if research work were carried out in a room, it would not be so easy to test it. However, it is often true that a test area is used for this purpose is located next to a laboratory.

SPIEGEL: What prospects does Geneva offer, once Reagan has stressed that he wants to stick with his space research plans in any event, even if both sides agreed on a considerable dismantling of nuclear aggressive weapons?

Kokoshin: The Soviet Union wants most of all to prevent an arms race in space. That is also an important factor for the limitation of strategic weapons. In accordance with the Geneva agreement, the USSR insists that these problems must be viewed in context. It is clear that the talks will be very complicated. However, if both sides handle the matter constructively, constructive results could be very well achieved.

SPIEGEL: We thank you for this talk.

CSO: 5200/1033

SPACE ARMS

L'UNITA ARTICLE PREDICTS WORSENING U.S.-USSR TIES

PM121537 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 10 Mar 85 p 4

[Article by Giuseppe Nardulli, lecturer in statistical mechanics at Bari University: "Realtions Between the Superpowers Will Worsen"]

[Text] Space weapons: from mutual assured destruction to invulnerability. This is the reassuring message launched by Reagan in his "star wars" speech 23 March 1983, which was subsequently named the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI]. In the article which opened this debate, Guido Bimbi seems to lend the U.S. proposal for a "new concept of deterrence" based on mutual invulnerability some credibility when he defines it as a "political fact" and not pure rhetoric. Even Amintore Fanfani calls for flexibility in his article. However, the debate which has gone on for the past 2 years ought to have clearly shown that invulnerability is beyond the scope of existing technologies. For example, it would take a shield which was 99.99 percent efficient to ensure that no more than 1 of the 10,000 or so Soviet nuclear warheads hit its target. In the words of R. DeLauer, U.S. under secretary of state for defense in charge of reporting to Congress on the SDI, "the Defense department has concluded that defensive technologies could provide the capacity to increase deterrence and to help prevent nuclear war by reducing the military usefulness of Soviet preemptive attacks," which, according to current military strategies, would be directed primarily at ICBM silos. This position emerged even more clearly from the speech delivered on behalf of U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger 10 February at the NATO meeting in Monaco: The "star wars" defense program would not be perfect but it would make the Soviet Union have less faith in the success of a preemptive attack on the U.S. nuclear forces. The aim, therefore, would be to deter a disarming first strike by the USSR.

The strong point of the Defense Department's analysis lies in the alleged vulnerability of the U.S. bases to a Soviet first strike and in the ability of the space defense system to protect them, but both are deliberating overemphasized. With regard to the existence of a "window of vulnerability" for the ICBM bases, various estimates show that a Soviet surprise attack would leave around 50 percent of U.S. ground-launched missiles intact because of probable system errors, the fratricidal effects (nuclear explosions on adjacent silos would cause a chain reaction), and so forth. This estimate might be erroneous, but the possibility that a large number of missiles might survive a first strike cannot be disregarded and thus discourages any adventure. Second, the emphasis on the vulnerability of the ICBM's deliberately conceals the fact that the bulk of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is not ground-launched but on submarines, which are virtually invulnerable. Even in the hypothesis of a Soviet surprise attack, a large number of the 35 U.S. submarines, would be out of port. If you consider that each submarine can launch between 160 and 190 nuclear warheads, it can reasonably be supposed that the United States would have several

thousand warheads at its disposal for reprisals. To these should be added those on the bombers which succeeded in taking off before the arrival of the enemy missiles. Therefore the U.S. nuclear forces are not vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. The Scowcroft commission, a U.S. presidential commission, reached the same conclusion in April 1983. However, the alleged vulnerability of the ICBM's is still, as we have seen, one of the arguments used to justify space weapons.

Let us now turn to an aspect of space defense which is often ignored, in other words their vulnerability. Whatever technical solution is chosen for achieving a "layered" defense of the American bases, it is inevitable that a large number of components would be based in space (spy satellites, space stations equipped with small interceptor missiles, mirrors for lasers...) and these space defense systems could be put out of action by radio-controlled space mines or by missiles with nuclear warheads launched in sufficient numbers for at least one to hit the target.

It is this vulnerability which makes space weapons futile: futile and nonetheless dangerous. Bimbi appropriately referred to the debate which preceded the 1972 treaty on the limitation of ABM activity and to the USSR's different position at the end of the sixties, when it was in favor of developing ABM activity. However, it would have been appropriate to recall that Soviet defense activity was one of the things which prompted then Defense Secretary Robert McNamara to approve the development of the MIRVed Minuteman missiles to increase the U.S. offensive capability. The terms of the problem have not changed since then and it is easy to imagine the new offensive arms race which the implementation of the SDI would launch.

But if this analysis is correct, if the vulnerability of the ICBM's has been exaggerated, and if on the other hand space defenses themselves are vulnerable, then the Soviet flexibility is understandable. The Soviets interpret the SDI program as part of a U.S. offensive strategy based on the first strike. The space defense would be useless against a Soviet preemptive strike because they could be neutralized first, but after a U.S. first strike they would have some success in countering the Soviet reprisals, which would necessarily be weak, disorganized, and inaccurate. It is now fairly irrelevant to ask whether the first strike strategy is an option which the Reagan administration is really taking into consideration: The point is that the Soviet Union sees the "star wars" plan in this light and links it with the other American military choices (MX program, Phantom bombers and so forth). I do not think, therefore, that there is any possibility that the SDI program will have beneficial effects on relations between the superpowers (exchanges of technology or other effects), as Bimbi hypothesizes. I think, instead, that it will bring about a further deterioration in the atmosphere between the United States and the USSR because of its destabilizing nature. If both superpowers were to have a space shield, as some people hope, the incentive to strike first, neutralizing the enemy defenses would be really irresistible.

CSO: 5200/2522

SPACE ARMS

FORMER PRIME MINISTER COLOMBO JOINS SDI DEBATE

PM110850 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 7 Mar 85

[Article by former Prime Minister Emilio Colombo: "But the USSR Has Bargaining Power"]

[Text] The analysis with which Guido Bimbi opened the debate on the topical issue of research into new defense systems against ICBM's presents an objective and balanced view of the most important aspects of the matter.

It seems to me that Bimbi's analysis makes an important point, namely that when, at the end of the sixties, the Americans and Soviets started the first strategic nuclear arms limitation negotiations it was the Soviets and not the Americans who argued the virtues of defensive systems. At his meeting with Johnson, Kosygin stressed categorically that the Soviet Union could never forego protecting its population as far as possible from the effects of a nuclear conflict. Moscow's subsequent signing of the ABM and SALT treaties in 1972 overshadowed the importance that the Soviets always attached to the defensive component of their military apparatus and created the widespread impression that the USSR had accepted as the basis of strategic balance the principle of mutual assured destruction. This was not in fact the case. An objective assessment of the Soviet stance seems to indicate, rather, that the USSR signed the ABM treaty to avert developments whereby technological superiority could benefit the Americans, but without abandoning its defense option.

So it is correct to say that the Soviet Union has not been taken by surprise on the theoretical and practical level by the U.S. decision to reopen the chapter of anti-missile defense, albeit limited to the area of research. In fact, it would probably be more correct to say that Geneva will see an encounter between Soviet negotiators with a well defined and consolidated strategy behind them and U.S. negotiators who, on the other hand, will be presenting a strategic approach that is largely new and still being defined and which, in my opinion, is therefore able to assimilate any Soviet anxieties regarding security that may seem legitimate to Washington. In other words, leaving aside the rhetoric that inevitably accompanies the respective stances and intentions, the situation from which the negotiations proceed is not necessarily without constructive openings.

In my opinion, it is possible to imagine the Soviet Union at some point recognizing the advisability of abandoning its demands for a ban on the U.S. research programs -- above all, it is impossible to see how such a ban could be implemented and monitored -- deciding to set its sights on a compromise solution which might not involve the burden

of a space arms race, however limited or controlled. Indeed, there is a tendency to underestimate the advantage deriving to the Soviet Union from the political asymmetry that characterizes the two countries' political systems. The deployment of a land-based defense system capable of protecting the whole of the USSR's territory -- a system based on technologies in practice already available to the USSR -- would pose the Soviet Government no insurmountable political or ecological problems, even though there would certainly be no lack of repercussions on the economic plane.

The same can be said with regard to the multiplication of offensive nuclear weapons that would be necessary to neutralize such a defense system deployed by the United States. The same, however, does not apply to the United States. If the U.S. Government were to decide to pursue this path it would have to cope -- in connection with the deployment of interceptor missiles, still more to a multiplication of offensive weapons -- with very strong opposition from Congress and with innumerable appeals from pacifist or environmental groups to the judiciary.

Obviously there are several ways in which the Soviet Union could use this bargaining strength. It could stubbornly demand U.S. abandonment of the Strategic Defense Initiative, in which case the negotiations will grind to a halt.

Alternatively the USSR could make use of the Americans' oft repeated willingness to honor the ABM treaty and to pursue a cooperative approach to the management and development of the results of research activities and shift the negotiating dialogue from the latter to the former.

In that case the prospects for an agreement would increase considerably. It would be further strengthened if, in the meantime, nuclear arms reduction agreements were reached and if there were that redefinition of the overall relations between the United States and the USSR aimed at restoring the necessary levels of mutual trust which is an integral part of the approach described by Reagan at the United Nations and by Shultz at the Geneva meeting last January and the logical and necessary basis of such a radical review of the foundations of strategic balance as the one which has just been proposed by the Americans.

It is obvious that the diffidence, misunderstandings, and open hostility which have built up on both sides in the past few years are one of the main obstacles to such developments, but, in addition to these states of mind and views, there are security interests on such a scale as to make it probable that they will prevail sooner or later.

Bimbi is perfectly right when he says that the existing processes are likely to be more complex, longer, and less straightforward than it may seem from the official stances, and that the old categories of interpretation might prove inadequate. As he points out the possibility that the United States and the Soviet Union might both deploy defensive systems and gradually eliminate first strike offensive nuclear weapons until they eventually maintain balanced levels of mutual and, I would like to add, relative invulnerability, is not unattractive.

I think that the Soviet Government is sincere when it says that it wants peace, because the Russian people, who have all too much experience of the horrors of war, have peace at heart. If the psychological obstacles to the opening of dialogue can be overcome, it is therefore not impossible that Moscow might constructively accept the solution indicated. This is all the more likely since,

in reality, a possible agreement would not be so revolutionary a departure from the current strategic doctrines as people tend to think and would not abandon but rather reshape the concept based on mutual deterrence.

This last point, namely the fact that the possible deployment of defensive systems would only neutralize "first strike" nuclear weapons and would strengthen deterrence rather than transcending it, is obviously important for the European countries, whose security depends on an effective deterrence strategy based on nuclear weapons and ruling out the possibility of a conventional conflict fought in Europe.

Any agreement which might be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union within these limits, would also give the Europeans a problem of position in the framework of the new balances, and a problem of the new types of relationship which would be established between the two greatest powers. This is a problem which has not been given enough thought and which should not be left in the background: it seems to us that it also shows the need to urgently consider a dynamic return to the path of unity.

CSO: 5200/2804

SPACE ARMS

COMMENTATOR DOUBTS FEASIBILITY OF SDI CLAIMS

PM121016 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 10 Mar 85 p 4

[Francesco Calogero article: "Space Defense Plan Not Feasible"]

[Text] In response to the L'UNITA editor's kind invitation, I am pleased to join the debate on the Strategic Defense Initiative proposed by President Reagan -- partly to correct certain assertions in the article by Guido Bimbi which opened the debate.

Bimbi wrote: "Experience shows us that every weapon researched has eventually been not only produced but deployed, however long that has taken." I do not agree: Experts in these matters are acquainted with innumerable plans for new weapons or weapons systems which, having been studied and having absorbed research and even development funds, have subsequently not been produced -- either because an arms control agreement (for instance on bacteriological weapons) has been reached or because the project was not feasible from a technological viewpoint (the nuclear-engined aircraft, for instance).

It is precisely this issue of the technological feasibility of a global space defense system that I would like to draw attention -- partly because the unfamiliarity with these matters typical of Italian culture permits inaccuracies and tends to concentrate the analysis on strategic and political problems, while ignoring the technological substance which, after all constitutes the objective factor that must be faced sooner or later (why was the plan for a nuclear-propelled aircraft never implemented? Because such a project is technologically unsound, and this fact has prevailed against all interests, ideological, strategic, and business).

The fact is that a global defense system that renders nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" cannot be achieved. Perhaps it would be useful to devote a few lines to explaining the foundation for such a drastic assertion.

Let us recall first and foremost that the "strategic" arsenals (land-based ICBM's, missiles on submarines, and long-range bombers) of the United States and the Soviet Union contain about 10,000 nuclear warheads per side, each of them capable of reaching a different target and inflicting much greater destruction than the bomb that razed Hiroshima to the ground (on 6 August 1945, claiming 200,000 lives).

Apart from these there are at least as many so-called "tactical" nuclear weapons, most of them in turn having a destructive power much greater than that of the Hiroshima bomb. There are still more categories of "intermediate" nuclear weapons -- from the Soviet SS-20's targeted on Europe, to the NATO Pershing 2's deployed in Germany and targeted

on the Soviet Union, to the cruise missiles (actually small pilotless airplanes) already deployed or currently being deployed on land, aircraft, and ships, mainly by the United States, and in future by the Soviet Union too (which in any case already started to do so at one time) in their thousands, each one capable of delivering with great accuracy a nuclear warhead over 10 times as powerful as the Hiroshima bomb to targets thousands of kilometers away.

Given the destructive capacity of nuclear explosives (a single warhead is enough to eliminate a whole city), a defense system would need to be able to intercept this vast arsenal with an efficiency of more than 99 percent; and it would need to be able to perform this prodigious feat absolutely reliably -- in a response time measured in minutes (or rather a very few seconds, in the case of interception at launch stage) and without ever having been tested in circumstances even remotely similar to those in which it would actually have to operate.

These specific traits characterize a technological system that certainly cannot be achieved in this century and that is difficult to imagine being achieved even in several decades' time. This is irrespective of the availability of one or more techniques of intercepting a single ICBM or cruise missile at the start, the middle, or the end of its trajectory -- which is an entirely different matter (roughly the same difference as there is between replacing a decayed tooth with a false tooth and constructing a complete human being in the laboratory from raw materials, that is, plenty of water and a few minerals).

Having said that, it must still be stressed that the main reason for ruling out the possibility of a global defense system -- that is, one capable of rendering nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" -- lies elsewhere. Indeed, if the adversary's offensive weapons system were to remain unchanged, I would not feel inclined to be so categorical in ruling out the possibility that in 100 or more years' time a defense system with the formidable characteristics specified above could be put into practice. But every step forward in building the defense shield (steps which would be measured in decades) will be matched on the adversary's part by the preparation of technological and strategic countermeasures designed to preserve the offensive capability on which the doctrine of deterrence and, like it or not, strategic stability are based. The fact that in such a race between offense and defense the advantage is very greatly on the side of offense is another point on which everyone is agreed. This assertion too could be supported with a wealth of technical details: For the present, it will suffice to point out that whereas in the case of offense the moment and place of attack can be chosen, the defense must be always on the alert and able to protect everything, starting with its own warning and command equipment. Furthermore, the offense can multiply its vehicles, make them invisible, conceal them amid myriads of decoys indistinguishable in outer space from nuclear delivery vehicles -- and all this at relatively low cost.

Even the advocates of the Strategic Defense Initiative, while mostly opposed to any arms control accord, have had to invent -- to lend some credibility to their arguments -- the elaborate hypothesis of an accord with the adversary involving a limitation of offensive capabilities in line with the development of defensive capabilities, in other words, the dubious theory that the development of defensive capabilities is aimed at strengthening deterrence instead of replacing it. But the prospect of the development of defensive weapons is, in fact, the main obstacle to any agreement on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons; and obviously the aim of rendering nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" signifies precisely the intention of abandoning deterrence as the basis of strategic stability.

If global defense is not feasible, could a partial defense not be useful anyway? Not if it stimulates the rearmament process.

In fact, even the embryonic development of defense capabilities threatens to constitute a potent stimulus to nuclear rearmament, partly thanks to the well known approach of the "worse case hypothesis" that guides the prudent attitude of the military. Therefore, everyone always tends to overestimate his adversary's offensive and defensive capabilities and to underestimate his own. This phenomenon has always imparted a strong boost to rearmament, and it is all the more effective the more uncertain are the actual effectiveness and scale of the opposing arsenals -- and it should be remembered in this connection that because of the long time scale demanded by the development and production of new weapons systems, any assessment must refer not only to actually deployed arsenals but also to those that may be hypothetically deployed in 5, 10, or 15 years' time.

In any case it was precisely the realization of the potential stimulus to nuclear rearmament deriving from any development of antimissile defense that lay behind the 1971 ABM treaty that banned such systems and still constitutes the principal arms control agreement between the United States and the USSR.

Futhermore it is obvious that a disarmament agreement that reduced existing missiles by 50 percent would be far preferable to a space shield that intercepted 50 percent of the adversary's missiles.

Be that as it may, the present U.S. investments in research into new antimissile defense technologies is a long way from the development and testing stage, not to mention decisions on actual deployment; and it is likely that, for the above-mentioned reasons, this stage will never be reached. The uproar surrounding these prospects therefore seems excessive, and it is to be hoped that the Soviet side in particular will avoid unleashing a senseless propaganda campaign lest it be driven by that same impetus to take counterproductive initiatives -- as already happened over the Euromissiles, with the interruption of the Geneva talks on strategic nuclear weapons and on nuclear weapons in Europe, which certainly did not help either to alleviate the tension or to slow the thrusts to nuclear rearmament. Now that negotiations are resuming it is to be hoped that both sides will approach them positively, without forgetting, among other things, the pledge made by the military nuclear powers, and first and foremost by the United States and the USSR, which signed the treaty against the proliferation of nuclear weapons (which came into effect on 5 March 1970 and whose third review conference is to take place in late August this year) -- a pledge to "negotiate in good faith effective measures in connection with ending the nuclear arms race at an early date."

CSO: 5200/2522

SPACE ARMS

AMBIVALENT FRENCH STAND ON SDI, DANGERS OF DISARMAMENT SEEN

PM110822 Paris LE FIGARO in French 7 Mar 85 p 2

[Francois Puaux article: "Europe Threatened With Finlandization"]

[Text] Disarmament is a drug. Although it is a soft drug, it is nonetheless dangerous. Only De Gaulle was strong enough to keep his distance from the "futile displays" in Geneva. Kissinger and then Carter thought they could "control" arms. People realized after the event that the SALT talks had not brought anything under control and that Moscow had succeeded in getting round the ceilings fixed for launchers by equipping them with multiple warheads and seeking, with a kind of frenzy, overwhelming regional superiority in Europe by deploying its SS-20 missiles there.

Ronald Reagan, who is a realist, would have liked to bury "arms control," but he was forced to resume preliminary negotiations because the pressure from the media and from congress is enormous. We are living in the "age of the masses," heralded back in 1895 by Gustave Le Bon, who observed that the thinking of the masses, who are always struck by the mysterious side of things, knows neither doubt nor uncertainty and consists of simple images unmoved by argument. Disarmament is one such image, and the parliamentary assemblies, faced with this problem, cannot escape the simplistic attitude of the masses.

However, the resumption of the American-Soviet talks in Geneva ought to produce more anxiety than hope, especially among the Europeans. In fact the latter have eyes for "star wars" alone. Britain, the FRG, and France have come a long way from their initial anxieties about the "uncoupling" of the United States and Europe which might be produced by space defense, but they remain essentially suspicious. London and Bonn at least agree that the United States should continue its program and that it would be dangerous to allow the Soviets alone to continue their research, which is already far advanced in the sphere of powerful lasers.

France, for its part, is trapped by an ill-conceived initiative which it took last June. A few days before his visit to Moscow, Mr Mitterrand thought it politic to submit to the Geneva disarmament conference a plan for banning not only the deployment but even the testing of any beam weapon (in other words the essential part of Reagan's plan).

The president of the republic was congratulated by the Soviet leadership and last month Moscow called for the start of discussions on this subject at a high level. They will take place in the spring. This is likely to give Washington the unpleasant feeling that France is playing an ambiguous game, because at the time when Paris was giving Moscow its agreement Mr Roland Dumas, on a visit to the United States, was informing the WASHINGTON POST of the French Government's "legitimate curiosity" about the "attractive philosophy" behind Mr Reagan's plan, the very plan which, according to our representative in Geneva on 7 June, might "jeopardize stability and hence peace." Work that out if you can.

Ronald Reagan's strategic defense initiative is a major project and it cannot be halted--any more than progress can be halted. Space defense will be "on the table" in Geneva, but the principle will not be negotiable.

The real danger for the Europeans lies elsewhere. The Americans want to obtain a reduction in the big Soviet Mirved intercontinental launchers, the SS-18 and SS-19 missiles, which are particularly dangerous first strike weapons. However, if space weapons are not negotiable, with what can they pay for possible Soviet concessions on the ICBM's? By abandoning all or part of the MX missile program, whose value as a bargaining counter is not concealed in Washington, but perhaps also by cutting into the intermediate nuclear forces, the Euromissiles.

The Pershing II missiles, whose withdrawal was for a long time a Soviet precondition for the resumption of talks in Geneva, are a particular target, and there are many people in Washington who would willingly exchange them for even some of the SS-18 missiles.

The Real Danger

The "zero option" is, in principle, still a valid American offer. If the Russians ever accepted it we would see the withdrawal of all the American Euro-missiles at the same time as the SS-20 missiles. That would leave the new SS-22 missiles recently deployed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, missiles with a range of 900 km, which classes them just below the intermediate nuclear forces but could reach Germany, France, or Britain with an accuracy of several dozen meters just the same as the SS-20S.

Furthermore we cannot forget that the so-called "walk in the woods" compromise proposed in 1982 by Paul Nitze, the Geneva negotiator, purely and simply eliminated the Pershing missiles, although it is an excellent example of "linkage," keeping only 75 Cruise missiles on the American side, as against as many SS-20 missiles. If Moscow had said yest, the matter would have been settled, despite the reservations of a section of the Washington Administration (Footnote) (The inclusion of the British and French nuclear forces in the INF negotiations is the other problem which should concern Europe. London and Paris are totally opposed to it, and Washington has so far been very firm in its refusal).

Some of us forecast 2 years ago that the pacifist movement in Germany would collapse as soon as the first Pershing missiles were deployed. That was indeed what happened after December 1983. If by some misfortune, these missiles, which have taken on a symbolic value, were to go back across the Atlantic, there is every reason to think that that departure would be followed by a new wave of neutralism and pacifism among our neighbors.

This is the real danger, remote but just beneath the surface--the danger of Finlandization, the danger of learning too late that there are wars the enemy can win without firing a single missile.

CSO: 5200/2526

SPACE ARMS

MARSHAL TOLUBKO DESCRIBES U.S. PLANS FOR SDI

AU111455 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 8 Mar 85 p 6

[Interview with Marshal Vladimir Tolubko, commander in chief of the USSR Strategic Rocket Forces and USSR deputy minister of defense, by Atanas Atanasov, RABOTNICHESKO DELO correspondent; "in Moscow, in March"; first paragraph is RABOTNICHESKO DELO introduction]

[Text] The forthcoming Soviet-U.S. negotiations in Geneva are among the few causes for optimism in the contemporary international situation. The progressive and peace-loving world public links its hopes for the preservation of peace on our planet to these negotiations, without, of course, neglecting the factors that are the causes for the threat to peace. These causes originate from the militarist aspirations of the United States, substantiated by "contemporary" concepts of the Washington administration. One of these aspirations is the idea of the so-called space-based system of antimissile defense. Marshal Vladimir Tolubko dwelled on the aggressive nature of this system in an interview with Atanas Atanasov, our Moscow correspondent.

[Tolubko] The idea about the so-called two-tier system of antimissile defense was set forth quite frankly for the first time, in an article entitled: "Defense in Outer Space -- This Is by No Means 'Star Wars'", which was published at the end of January 1985 in THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE. The authors of this article were not just anyone, but quite special people, namely, Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's former national security adviser, as well as Max Kampelman, the leader of the U.S. delegation to the Geneva negotiations, and Robert Jastrow, a physics professor. From the technical point of view, the idea of a space-based antimissile defense represents a two-tier system. The first basic system will be deployed over the territory of the USSR. It will include four artificial earth satellites in stationary orbits over the USSR at a height of 35,000-36,000 km. Their task will be to quickly register launches of Soviet missiles and to automatically signal the launches to the antimissile command headquarters situated on the territory of the United States. In addition to this, the installation is envisaged of 10 artificial satellites on solar-synchronized orbits at heights of 20,000, 10,000, and 6,000 km, through which 100 other artificial satellites carrying antimissile weapons will be guided and commanded. Each of these 100 satellites will have 150 antimissile missiles on board with heat-operated self-propelling missile heads that will weigh 200 to 400 kg. They are supposed to strike Soviet missiles during their flight at a height of 100 to 800 km over the territory of the USSR. By the year 2000, these artificial satellites are to be replaced with stations for laser, ray, or electromagnetic strikes.

[Atanasov] How effective is the first tier expected to be?

[Tolubko] The first tier is expected to strike at 70 percent of the Soviet missiles prior to the separation of the launch platforms from the warheads. The remaining 30 percent are within the range of the second tier, deployed on U.S. territory and within the air and outer space territory of the United States. It will consist of 10 reconnaissance and guidance aircraft that will maintain contact with the four satellites in stationary orbit over USSR territory. On the territory of the United States a total of 5,000 antimissile missiles, each weighing 2 tons, will be deployed. They are envisaged to strike at 70 percent of the platforms carrying warheads that have passed the first tier. Thus, it is envisaged that the total effectiveness of the overall system will reach 90 to 92 percent.

[Atanasov] What about the cost of constructing this system?

[Tolubko] According to initial U.S. evaluations, expenditures for the first tier are supposed to exceed \$45 billion, the construction of the second tier will cost over \$15 billion, and total expenditures will exceed \$60 billion. According to recent specifications, the total cost of this system is already estimated to amount to approximately \$100 billion. The U.S. Administration considers this quite an acceptable amount, and is planning to complete the deployment of the two-tier system for antimissile defense after 1990.

[Atanasov] At first glance everything seems in order, there is talk only about defense....

[Tolubko] This is only how the U.S. Administration describes things. First of all, the first tier of the system, as to its very essence, is no longer a defense measure, but represents an offensive operation because it is aimed at destroying Soviet missiles on Soviet territory. In addition to this, where is the guarantee that the 100 artificial satellites are carrying antimissile weapons on board charged with ordinary weapons, and not with nuclear warheads? This is precisely why we can say that this is by no means a defensive system, but a striking-offensive plan to strike the first, disarming blow.

As Comrade Konstantin Chernenko correctly remarked in his recent interview with a reporter from the U.S. CNN television company, ... "The goal is pursued to make an attempt to disarm the other side, to deprive it of the possibility of a reciprocal strike in case of nuclear aggression against it. To put it more simply, the task is assigned to achieve the one-sided possibility of a nuclear strike relying on impunity under the cover of an antimissile defense."

[Atanasov] In other words, the development of a strategic antimissile defense plays a destabilizing role as a means to liquidate the ability of the other side to inflict a reciprocal strike, which increases the temptation to unleash a so-called "instant" war.

[Tolubko] This is precisely so. No one can deny that for as long as 40 years no global conflict has erupted, not because imperialism has become less aggressive, but because the Soviet Union and the Soviet Armed Forces, together with the armies of the other Warsaw Pact member-countries are capable of reciprocating any aggressive step. Nothing but the prospect of inevitable retaliation has cooled down and is still cooling down the passion of many warmongers.

[Atanasov] This is sometimes called a state of "balancing on the brink of fear."

[Tolubko] Names are not important in this respect. It is the essence of the situation that matters. Under the circumstances of a situation in which we cannot talk about

mutual confidence among states with different social systems, it is precisely the fear of retaliation by the Soviet Union that has prevented certain circles from implementing their plans for total nuclear war against the socialist community. It is precisely the manner of thinking in categories such as a "balance on the brink of fear" that was laid down as the basis of the SALT I and SALT II treaties, and to a great extent this was also the essence of the entire practical concept of detente in the seventies. This concept envisaged an increase of security through a reduction of armaments, and not through development of antimissile systems. The U.S. Administration today is gradually withdrawing from these concepts. Even if we should presume that the aforementioned 100 earth satellites will carry only antimissile missiles, there are still the U.S. strategic missiles based on the ground, in the air, and under water, which are constantly being modernized and increased.

[Atanasov] Actually, these missiles would remain "uncountered" [nepokriti] thanks to the existence of a 90 percent effective antimissile defense.

[Tolubko] This is precisely so, because if the United States should introduce the aforementioned antimissile defense, the balance of forces will automatically be upset to its advantage. This fact will automatically and enormously increase the possibility of inflicting a nuclear strike against the USSR without risking the danger of reciprocal action. I once more repeat: All this applies to the situation under which the 100 satellites are not charged with nuclear warheads. What kind of defense is this? The aforementioned system is purely aggressive. It is a new demonstration of policy based on a position of strength.

The argument that space weapons will bring more security is an outrageous lie. They can only produce a further escalation of tension in the world and result in a new round of the escalation of the arms race, and on a much higher and much more dangerous level. The Soviet Union will never agree to the existing balance of forces being upset and if necessary, as many times before, the USSR will adopt all measures for the preservation of this balance of forces. However, we all hope that things will not go that far, and that common sense will prevail at the forthcoming Geneva talks.

CSO: 5200/1031

SPACE ARMS

RAIL GUN DEVELOPMENT LENDS AUSTRALIAN ANGLE TO 'STAR WARS'

Sydney THE AUSTRALIAN in English 21 Jan 85 p 1

[Article by Peter Samuel]

[Text]

AN electrical gun system developed in Australia could provide the best defence against nuclear missiles, says the head of the Pentagon's Star Wars research and development program, General James Abrahamson.

The Australian reported just before Christmas that a senior Pentagon official, Mr Harry Fair, had described the new system, known as the electro-magnetic rail-gun (EMRG), as a "promising, near-term system for Star Wars defence".

During the last election the Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, defended involvement in the rail-gun project, saying Australian interest was confined to what he called the "conventional, tactical application of such guns".

What makes the EMRG such an important weapon is its ability to intercept and destroy nuclear missiles in flight.

Scientists from the Australian National University, led by Mr Richard Marshall, made the breakthroughs in electrical gun systems in the 1970s. It was not long before major American arms contractors and the US Army began exploiting Mr Marshall's work.

The gun uses a long, electro-magnetically charged rail launcher and huge pulses of electricity to propel projectiles at enormous velocities. These turn out to have great application against ballistic missiles in the vast distances of space.

Interviewed recently in the US Air Force magazine, General Abrahamson revealed new details of the EMRG and its potential in a Star Wars defence system.

He said the media had concentrated "unduly" on the "more exotic laser and particle beam weapons", whereas the homing overlay system and the rail-gun would probably enter the strategic defence arsenal before laser weapons.

He said the rail-gun had become a "major candidate" for strategic defence because of the extra velocities its projectiles could attain. Estimates vary, but General Abrahamson said he believed the rail-gun could fire a projectile at 30km a second, several times the speed of chemically powered rockets.

"That kind of speed in the strategic defence context is priceless," General Abrahamson said.

It would have a range of between 3000 and 5000km and have the capability of firing a 3kg projectile from rails about 45m long. The projectile would destroy the target with either an explosive warhead or by impact.

An article in The New York Times at the weekend strongly urged the early development of US defences against Soviet nuclear missiles.

The authors, former president Mr Jimmy Carter's national security adviser, Mr Zbigniew Brzezinski, Mr Robert Jastrow who ran NASA's

Apollo moon project and Mr Max Kampelman, the newly appointed chief of the US arms control negotiating team, argued for an early defence system to protect US retaliatory missiles and command centres, aimed at discouraging the Soviets from contemplating a disarming first strike against the US.

Such systems, the authors say, could be in place by the early 1990s at a cost of about \$US60 billion (\$A74 billion).

CS0: 5200/4302

SALT/START ISSUES

U.S. REPORT ON USSR SALT VIOLATIONS HIT; COUNTERCHARGES MADE

PM191425 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 11, Mar 85 pp 5-6

[Vladimir Lomeyko article: "Crying 'Stop Thief!': Favorite White House Ploy"]

[Text] Sin and accuse others seem to be the shortest way of describing the U.S. Administration's credo on international agreements. With arrogant constancy, the White House cooks up "reports" containing groundless allegations against the Soviet Union. These "reports," presented with great pomp to U.S. Congress and, through the mass media, to the world public, pursue a dual aim. On the one hand, they seek to level further slanderous accusations against Moscow, charging it with violating its commitments. On the other hand, they are intended as a red herring to divert public attention from the United States' own sins in the field of arms limitation.

At the end of February the Soviet Foreign Ministry issued a statement on U.S. violations of international obligations and attempts to conceal these violations by groundlessly accusing the Soviet Union. The statement noted that the Soviet Embassy in Washington had recently made representations to the U.S. State Department over the slanderous campaign unleashed in the United States in connection with another administration "report" to congress on alleged "violations" by Moscow of its international commitments.

This [is] not the first time Washington has attempted to use fabrications to cast aspersions on the Soviet foreign policy of peace and to ascribe to the Soviet side "violations" and "omissions" in the observance of arms limitation agreements. The Soviet Union has already given its assessment of these unseemly U.S. actions, as, for instance, in a memorandum published on 30 January, and in the TASS statement of 21 October 1984.

This time, as in previous instances, the Soviet side firmly rejected the groundless White House allegations.

Anyone who reads the latest White House "report," however, cannot help asking himself what grounds Washington could claim to pose as a guardian of international agreements, as a judge presiding over the affairs of the international community? Is it not another manifestation prompted by the messianic spirit that has recently been so much in evidence in the White House? These questions are all the more justified since the present administration has neither any moral, nor formal right to judge others' observance of agreements which it fails to honour itself.

Reading the White House "report," one is struck by its total lack of proof. It bristles with such expressions as the Soviet Union has "apparently violated" a point of the SALT-2 Treaty, or "has probably violated" or "may have violated" the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

All this brings to mind what Andrei Gromyko said to political observers on 13 January this year: "As for the insinuations that the Soviet Union does not abide by some commitments under agreements it has concluded, they are sheer inventions. You will have noted that the memorandums and letters the U.S. Administration sends to congress and sometimes brings to the knowledge of the United Nations with allegations of this kind, contain expressions like these: There are doubts that the Soviet Union abides by such and such commitments. But there are no direct statements with proof based on fact that the Soviet Union really violates anything. We categorically deny it. No, the Soviet Union is not in the habit of violating its commitments under treaties and agreements signed by it and other states, be it a bilateral or multilateral agreement.

Yet the White House persists in its wrongful practice: for the louder the "accusations" against Moscow become, the easier it is to divert attention from its own unseemly actions. And the facts testify that these actions are aimed at undermining the system of arms limitations and agreed measures to strengthen international security that required such an effort to set up. Here are but a few of these facts.

First, amidst all the ballyhoo about Soviet violations, Washington is trying to conceal the well-known fact that the United States long ago embarked on undermining the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, signed in 1972 for an indefinite period. (And yet this is the document that made it possible to conclude the interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms in 1972, and the SALT-2 Treaty.) The most vivid proof of this policy of Washington's is the officially proclaimed programme of "star wars," which envisages the creation of a large-scale anti-ballistic missile system with space-based elements. And that is expressly forbidden by the 1972 treaty.

But matters are not confined to plans and intentions. As the Soviet Foreign Ministry statement points out, the United States is going ahead with the creation of mobile anti-missile radar stations and with the testing of Minute-man missiles in order to turn them into anti-missile weapons. Both these projects are in direct contravention of the clear provisions of the 1972 treaty. Multiple antimissile warheads are being developed. Pave Paws radar stations are being deployed to back up the anti-missile defences across most of U.S. territory. But this seems to be only the prelude to a far-reaching programme for the militarization of space.

Washington is trying to present all this as modest scientific research. But who is taken in by such claims? Even many public figures and politicians in the United States admit that such statements are unconvincing. The NEW YORK TIMES has written, for instance, that "no programme proclaimed with trumpets from the Oval Office, described as vital and funded with an initial budget of \$30 billion, will be 'research' in Soviet eyes."

True enough. Those \$30 billion are just an appetizer for the U.S. military-industrial complex, to whet its appetite for another round of the arms race, this time at cosmic altitudes and speeds. A staggering \$1 trillion or more has been earmarked for space strike weapons.

There is another alarming aspect to these plans. The militarists today want to initiate a space marathon that would jeopardize the lives of those who have as yet no idea of nuclear holocaust or laser weapons. They want to deprive future generations of their choice and to make them live in a state of confrontation.

Second. Space weapons are described as defensive to mislead people, to deceive the uninitiated and the gullible in order to gain supremacy in outer space. The aim is to achieve military superiority and get the opportunity of delivering a nuclear strike with impunity.

It is not by chance that American officials are trying to shake and if possible, to torpedo the indefinite-term anti-ballistic missile treaty. It is a thorn in their side, for it prevents them from sating their militaristic appetites in outer space. As it attacks the treaty, Washington is nothing loath to ditch the whole process of nuclear arms limitation and reduction.

Praising his new programme, President Reagan has declared that the United States does not seek military superiority or political advantage, and that its sole objective is to search for ways to lessen the danger of nuclear war. But what is the real state of affairs?

"While the Defense Department has begun research aimed at making Soviet nuclear missiles impotent, a small air force programme is trying to ensure that U.S. nuclear missiles never meet the same fate." That is the opinion of both the NEW YORK TIMES and the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE.

The project called the forward-based strategic missile systems programme provides for a sharp rise in its funding from President Reagan's budget. The money will be used to develop and test more sophisticated, variable trajectory warheads, decoys, and other means intended to penetrate any defence system that the Soviet Union might create.

The fact that these plans are doomed to failure does not change their aggressive essence.

Third, the very fate of the SALT-2 Treaty is damning evidence of the cavalier attitude to international legal matters on the part of Washington which failed to ratify the treaty, despite its having been signed by the American President. It is worth recalling that in 1979 Washington insisted on the deployment of U.S. missiles in Western Europe, making this a condition of ratification of the treaty. The missiles have now been deployed, but the SALT-2 Treaty has, to all intents and purposes, been thrown overboard. And yet land-based Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles represent strategic first-strike weapons. Such is the true worth of U.S. promises and pledges on the limitation of offensive nuclear arms.

Fourth. At the time of the SALT-2 negotiations, both sides recognized the need to limit long-range cruise missiles. But this did not deter Washington, when it saw it fit, from starting the massive deployment of these strategic offensive weapons and renouncing any limitations on long-range Cruise missiles.

Fifth. It looks as if Washington has a kind of allergy to ratifying international agreements. Even when it does sign an agreement under pressure from public opinion--at home or from its allies--this does not mean that the agreement will be ratified. A case in point is the 1974 treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests. The United States signed it, but has delayed ratifying it, not by a mere year or two, but by 11 years now. It makes any number of excuses, but the true reason is as clear as day: Washington does not want to introduce the specific and effective system of verifying the yield of explosions which is provided for in the treaty. Verification--the White House's hobby-horse--is precisely what upsets the Pentagon.

For it would create an obstacle to the testing of new nuclear warheads which often exceed the agreed yield thresholds.

In order to avoid observing the established restrictions on underground nuclear explosions, Washington not only refuses to ratify the 1974 treaty. It also blocks the resumption of talks on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. And yet the 1974 treaty directly obliges the signatories to conduct such talks.

The list of Washington's violations of its international commitments could be continued. Only details vary--the basic pattern of behaviour remains the same. Everything that ties the hands of the military-industrial complex is either rejected out of hand or is pigeonholed pending ratification. And, shutting their eyes to their own sins, the "custodians" of international justice set about orchestrating a noisy campaign of accusations against the other side.

The world public has expressed concern over the fact that the American side has been especially persistent with its unjustified claims against the Soviet Union on the eve of the nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva. The reason behind the administration's "reports" is not hard to discern. Washington wants to poison the atmosphere of the talks from the very beginning, to impede a businesslike and constructive consideration of the problems of vital importance for the whole of mankind.

As the Soviet Foreign Ministry document points out, the United States must abandon its practice of violating its commitments, and instead direct its efforts towards curbing the arms race. This is the obligation that comes with the Soviet-American agreement to hold talks in Geneva, and it must be strictly and fully observed. The American side must show as much interest in the positive outcome of these talks as the Soviet side does.

CSO: 5200/1037

SALT/START ISSUES

REACTION TO ARMS LIMITATION VIOLATION CHARGES BY U.S.

Lomeyko Briefing on Violations

LD271251 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1130 GMT 27 Feb 85

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] There was a briefing today in Moscow at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center for Soviet and foreign journalists. Comrade Lomeyko, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Department, acquainted those assembled with a report from the Soviet Foreign Ministry on violations by the United States of its international obligations and attempts to conceal these violations with the help of groundless accusations against the Soviet Union. The USSR Foreign Ministry representative said in particular:

[Begin Lomeyko video recording] The Soviet Embassy in Washington recently made a representation to the U.S. State Department in connection with a slanderous campaign unleashed in the United States over another administration report to the U.S. Congress on violations of its international obligations which the USSR allegedly committed. The unproven and groundless claims contained in this report from the White House are resolutely rejected.

The report from the USSR Foreign Ministry cites several facts indicating that the United States is not fulfilling its obligations according to the SALT II accord and is taking steps to get around it by one means or another and, in general, indicating its scorn for its legal and moral and political obligations.

One cannot fail to be made cautious by the fact that the continuation of the above-mentioned line by Washington combined with attempts to cast doubt on the honesty of the Soviet side come precisely on the eve of talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva with the clear aim of poisoning from the very outset the atmosphere surrounding the talks and hampering businesslike and constructive examination of the problems to be tackled at them.

The USSR Foreign Ministry document points out that the United States must put an end to its practice of violating commitments it has made upon itself and turn its efforts to curbing the arms race. This obligation also arises from the Soviet-U.S. accord on holding talks in Geneva, every part of which must be strictly observed. The U.S. side must show an interest in the positive outcome of the talks no less than that shown by the Soviet side. [end video recording]

U.S. Helsinki Violations Alleged

LD271144 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1030 GMT 27 Feb 85

[Excerpt] Moscow, 27 Feb (TASS) -- Answering a question about other [as received] U.S. violations of its pledges, Vladimir Lomeyko referred, as an example, to the U.S. violations of the Helsinki accords.

The United States signed the Helsinki Final Act. It made a pledge to promote European peace and security, the drawing together of European states and cooperation between them, and the intensification, development, and strengthening of the detente process on the continent. The United States puts its signature to one thing, but does something quite different, grossly violating its obligations.

An increase in military tension in Europe, the deployment here of new first-strike nuclear weapons, attempts to question existing European realities, disorganization in moral trade, economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation in the region: All this is the American "contribution" to the development of the Helsinki process.

When asked what aims the United States is pursuing in making farfetched complaints against the USSR on the eve of the Geneva talks, the USSR Foreign Ministry representative said: "These ploys are clearly being employed by the U.S. side in order not just to poison the atmosphere of the talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva right from the outset, but to hamper a businesslike and constructive review of the problems that are to be tackled at them."

Foreign Ministry Rebuttal

LD270908 Moscow TASS in English 0851 GMT 27 Feb 85

["At the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow February 27 TASS -- A few days ago the USSR Embassy in Washington made a representation to the U.S. Department of State in connection with a slanderous campaign set off in the United States by another "report" of the administration to U.S. Congress, which alleged "violations" by the Soviet Union of its international obligations. The unsubstantiated and groundless charges contained in the White House "report" have been categorically rejected.

The American side has neither moral, nor formal right whatsoever to pose as a guardian of agreements, since its record of disregard for them in recent years has been a component of the U.S. policies and practices.

1. It is not for the first time that Washington, using all kinds of inventions, is attempting to cast aspersions on the consistent peace-loving policy of the USSR, to ascribe to the Soviet side nonexistent "violations" and "omissions" regarding compliance with arms limitation agreements. Such unseemly actions by the United States have already been properly characterized, in particular, in the Soviet aide-memoire published on January 30 and in the TASS statement of October 21, 1984. This new propaganda move by Washington demonstrates yet again that the U.S. Administration has been inventing "accusations" against Soviet policy to distract the attention of public opinion from unprecedented military programmes it is pursuing, from its policy of disrupting the

system of arms limitations and measures to strengthen international security, the building of which took so many years.

2. The Washington talk of alleged Soviet "violations" is intended to camouflage the fact that the United States long ago set about to undermine the 1972 treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems -- a most important instrument of unlimited duration which made it possible to conclude the 1972 interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms as well as the SALT-2 treaty. This intention was, in fact, officially disclosed in connection with the announcement of "star wars" programme calling for the establishment of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements, which is prohibited by the 1972 treaty.

Things have gone beyond mere statements. In direct contravention to the clear provisions of the 1972 treaty, the United States has proceeded full speed to developing mobile ABM radars, testing of the Minuteman type missiles for giving them ABM capabilities, developing multiple type warheads for ABM missiles, and deploying the "Pave Paws" radars to provide radar support for anti-ballistic missile defense of a greater part of the U.S. territory, and so forth.

Major industrial corporations and research centres in the United States are being involved in the plans for militarizing outer space. Enormous resources -- 26 billion dollars -- have been earmarked for these purposes. This is only a beginning. Total outlays for implementing the plans of an arms race in space strike weapons are to exceed one trillion dollars.

Washington can hardly fail to understand that carrying out the programme of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements would inevitably result in an uncontrolled arms race in every direction, make limitations, let alone reductions, of strategic offensive arms impossible, and would dramatically heighten the risk of nuclear war. In spite of this they stubbornly refuse to abandon the scheduled programmes, seeking to make them irreversible in order to deny the U.S. leaders freedom of choice for the decades to come. They would also like to impose the current diplomacy of force and the policy of militarism and arms race on the future generations.

What is more, attempts are also being made to involve the West European allies of the USA in the space adventure. Counting primarily on the support of Bonn, a front of proponents of transforming outer space into a springboard for aggression is being knocked together. This is how the NATO's unity and solidarity are seen in Washington. This is a far cry from vital interests of the peoples, including those of the countries which are allies of the United States.

3. The sole purpose of declarations by American representatives to the effect that strike weapons are defensive arms is to deceive people, conceal the desire to achieve military superiority, to obtain a possibility for delivering a nuclear strike with impunity. The futility of such plans in no way makes them less dangerous. And this should be clearly seen in order to preclude the irreparable.

It is not an accident that attempts are being made on the American side to shake loose in some way or other and then to wreck the ABM treaty which is of unlimited duration. No doubt, it is an obstacle to militarizing outer space, it stands in the way of those who are set on this inhuman and immoral task. By its attacks on the treaty Washington is seeking to torpedo the process of nuclear arms limitation and reduction altogether.

It is a firm stand of the Soviet Union that the ABM treaty should remain fully valid. This is the premise from which it proceeds in its practical actions. It is a fact that no amount of slander can disprove.

4. As to the SALT-2 treaty, Washington has refused to ratify that document altogether and has actually wrecked it, which in itself is a gross violation of universally recognized international norms. This action of the present administration is an affront to the entire world public opinion which highly appraised the SALT-2 treaty and rightly hoped that its entry into force would pave the way towards new effective agreements aimed at halting the arms race and reducing the threat of war.

Washington would not reckon with the interests of the peoples. And what is more, it has become clear now that its statements of intention to "refrain from actions" undermining the SALT-2 treaty were made but for the sake of form. The actual plan was different -- to circumvent the limitations established by the treaty, attempt to upset the parity recorded in it and obtain military advantage.

This has found its crudest and outrageous expression in the decision to start the deployment of new U.S. nuclear missiles in some NATO countries. The Pershing-2 and ground-launched cruise missiles which are being deployed in Western Europe are strategic weapons. More than that, they are first strike systems. This is how Washington treats the obligations it assumed to limit offensive nuclear arms.

And it is by far not the only example of the U.S. side trying to circumvent or, in other words, violate the agreed provisions. It is also done through direct participation by the United States in building up and improving nuclear missiles systems of some NATO countries both through the transfer of such systems or their components and through providing technological information.

During the SALT-2 negotiations the U.S. side, like the Soviet side, acknowledged the need for limitations on long-range cruise missiles. Later, however, the U.S. started massive deployment of this dangerous new kind of strategic offensive arms and refused to impose any limitations on such cruise missiles.

5. Washington's true attitude to the obligations resulting from the SALT 2 treaty is also revealed in the fact that the draft defense budget for the fiscal year 1986 just submitted to Congress by the administration lays down plans for deploying strategic offensive weapons which, if implemented, would mean a radical U.S. break-out of the treaty limitations on ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. They are trying to lecture others on the need to comply with international obligations while themselves actually preparing for yet another flagrant violation.

6. Another example is the 1974 treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests. The same line is evident here. The U.S. did sign the treaty but has been refusing to ratify it for eleven years now. The reason is simple: Washington obviously does not wish to put into effect the clear-cut and effective system of verification of the yields of tests which is provided for in the treaty. Indeed, such verification would become an obstacle for the Pentagon in carrying out tests of ever new nuclear devices which more often than not are accompanied by breaches of the agreed threshold of explosive yields and, in some cases, by ejections of radioactive substances into the atmosphere. In short, the United States refuses -- under all sorts of contrived pretexts -- to ratify the 1974 treaty, in order to avoid abiding by the constraints placed on underground nuclear explosions. In doing so, it also blocks the resumption

of negotiations on a complete and general nuclear weapon test ban which are clearly and unambiguous mandated by the treaty.

7. An enormous threat to mankind is posed by such barbarous weapons of mass destruction as chemical weapons. The international community has outlawed chemical warfare in the 1925 Geneva protocol which has been strictly complied with in its entirety by the Soviet Union -- one of the first to accede to that instrument. It took the United States fifty years just to ratify the Geneva protocol. In the meantime, U.S.-made chemical agents have killed and maimed thousands upon thousands of people in Indochina and have caused irreparable damage to the environment of that region. Many U.S. servicemen have also suffered from the chemical warfare conducted by the Pentagon in South East Asia at the orders of the administration.

Now again, while portraying itself a proponent of a ban on chemical weapons the United States is obstructing an international agreement in that regard. In the meantime chemical weapons are supplied to bands invading Afghanistan, and America is poised for chemical rearmament. Here again there is a clear contradiction between words and deeds, between U.S. obligations and Washington's practical actions aimed at grossly violating and circumventing those obligations.

8. The USA has affixed its signature to the Helsinki Final Act. Along with other states it has solemnly committed itself to promoting the cause of European peace and security, of bringing the European states closer together and enhancing their cooperation, as well as of deepening, developing and consolidating the process of detente on the continent.

What, however, has been the actual U.S. policy with regard to European affairs? Whipping up military tensions in Europe, deploying new first strike nuclear weapons in the region, trying to question the existing European realities, to disrupt and impede the normal course of trade, economic, scientific and cultural cooperation in the region -- such is the U.S. "contribution" to the development of the Helsinki process. Here again, the USA professes one thing but does something entirely different in flagrant violation of its commitments.

9. The above facts, the list of which could be continued, cannot but raise the question, and a major and principled one at that, as to Washington's good faith as regards the international obligations assumed.

The Soviet side has repeatedly drawn the attention of the U.S. Administration to the above-mentioned facts as well as to relating specific issues.

So far the U.S. side has provided no articulate answer to the questions raised. The publication of voluminous "reports" containing falsifications of the other side's policy cannot justify avoiding these issues.

The issues regarding compliance with the existing agreements on the limitation of strategic arms, if approached seriously, as the Soviet Union does, should be discussed not for the sake of dubious propaganda effects, but exclusively with a view of ensuring the normal functioning of these agreements and accords. The Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission was established, as is known, to provide a mechanism for this purpose. The Soviet side in the commission proceeds from the above-mentioned purpose, while the U.S. side takes a different approach, one devoid of elementary decency.

The Soviet Union strictly complies with its international obligations and the entire world knows it. No one will succeed in impairing the high prestige of the Soviet Union's policy.

10. One cannot but be put on guard by the fact that the U.S. side is resorting to such unseemly tactics just as the negotiations on nuclear and space weapons are about to start in Geneva, with the clear intent to poison from the outset the atmosphere surrounding those talks, to hamper businesslike and constructive consideration of the issues to be resolved.

If some in Washington believe that propaganda ploys can help shirk responsibility for the poor state of Soviet-American relations, for the lack of progress in limiting arms and reducing the threat of war, such beliefs are groundless. The United States will be well advised to give up the practice of violating the obligations assumed, and to turn its efforts to curbing the arms race.

This is required by the Soviet-American agreement on holding the negotiations in Geneva, and this agreement should be strictly implemented in all its components. The U.S. side should be no less interested in a positive outcome of the negotiations than the Soviet side.

The Soviet Union is ready to seek at the negotiations radical solutions which would prevent the arms race from spreading into outer space and would lead to its cessation on earth. A potential for resolving these tasks exists. It will take political will, readiness for reasonable compromises and a genuine desire to see stability and peace strengthened.

PRAVDA, TASS Versions Compared

[Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 28 February 1985 in its first edition carries on page 4 a TASS report entitled "In the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs," on the Soviet rebuttal to U.S. charges of arms accord violations. The PRAVDA report has been compared to the TASS version, published above, revealing the following variations:

Paragraph 1, line 1, PRAVDA omits dateline.

Paragraph 2, line 2 reads in PRAVDA: ...of agreements, since it is known that its scornful attitude toward them in recent...(rewording);

Paragraph 3, line 5 reads: ...been properly characterized, including the Soviet aide-memoire...(rewording);

Paragraph 6, line 2 reads: ...involved in the implementation of plans for militarizing... (inserting "implementation of");

Same paragraph, penultimate and last lines read: ...strike weapons are intended to exceed... (inserting "intended");

Paragraph 10, line 1 begins: ...It is by no means an accident that... (rewording);

Paragraph 12, penultimate line reads: ...the way toward reaching new, effective agreements... (inserting "reaching");

Paragraph 14, penultimate line reads: ...first strike systems (sredstva dlya naneseniya pervogo udara). This is how... (supplying vernacular);

Paragraph 15, line 3 reads: ...improving nuclear missile systems (sredstva) of some NATO... (supplying vernacular);

Paragraph 17, line 4 reads: ...implemented, would mean that the United States would far overstep the treaty limitations... (rewording);

Paragraph 18, line 6 reads: ...ever new nuclear charges which more often... (substituting "charges" for "devices");

Paragraph 19, line 5 reads: ...the meantime, U.S.-made toxic substances have killed... (rewording);

Paragraph 20, lines 1 and 2 read: ...United States is sabotaging an international agreement... (substituting "sabotaging" for "obstructing");

Same paragraph, line 3 reads: ...are supplied to interventionists invading Afghanistan, and... (substituting "interventionists" for "bands");

Paragraph 25, line 1 reads: ...the questions raised. These questions cannot be swept aside by publishing all kinds of voluminous "reports" containing falsifications of the other side's policy. The issues regarding... (rewording and picking up paragraph 26, line 1);

Paragraph 29, line 1 begins: ...If some people in Washington believe... (inserting "people");

Same paragraph, line 3 reads: ...beliefs are groundless. It is time for the United States to give up... (rewording);

Last paragraph, line 3 reads: ...cessation on earth. The potential (vozmozhnost) for resolving these... (supplying vernacular).

CSO: 5200/1020

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SURVIVAL OF CABINET, CRUISE MISSILE SITUATION VIEWED

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 12 Jan 85 p 9

[Article by J.M. Bik: "Can The Cabinet Survive Until 1 November Or Longer?"]

[Text] The American Undersecretary of State Burt said this week in Brussels that there are 396 SS-20 installations operational now in the Soviet Union. That is 18 more than on 1 June 1984, the date of the cruise missile decision of the Lubbers cabinet. If the number of operationally employed SS-20's has not been reduced to 378 or less by 1 November 1985, then the cabinet will decide to employ 48 cruise missiles in 1988. If there is an American-Russian accord on such weapons before that date, then the Netherlands will participate in it, possibly reducing the number of cruise missiles on the base in Woensdrecht. But there is little optimism about such a timely accord or about timely, voluntary SS-20 reductions.

Before 1 November, many events will influence national voting behavior on that day. There will be a debate--it has already started here and there--on whether the American counts are correct; whether they can be trusted; whether counting could not be done differently (and better); how many effective nuclear heads the SS-20 has, etc. That debate will not alter the fact that for many years American counts have been accepted as a usable basis; in fact, the Soviet Union accepts it and the Dutch cabinet (and the Second Chamber) did so too, this past June, for instance. That will probably stay like that for a while.

Further, another factor will be the judicial force yet to be mobilized against the employment of cruise missiles, for instance by way of a mass legal action against the state or by way of an already announced tribunal of (legal) experts whose names, however, have not been disclosed yet but whose independence has already been established according to the organizers. There could be a national petition, and in any case there will be campaigns, M. J. Faber, secretary of the IKV [Interdenominational Peace Council], promised again this week.

Another factor that will become apparent after a few months is the significance of the so-called Montebello Decree of the fall of 1983--a reduction in NATO tactical nuclear warheads in Western Europe from 6,000 to 4,600. That decree, to which Minister De Ruiter (Defense, CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal]) has committed himself "quite extensively" according to Prime Minister Lubbers, does

not mean that the Netherlands can terminate nuclear weapon roles on a large scale or even terminate the nuclear role of the artillery corps of the army, as the CDA (and the PvdA [Labor Party], D'66 [Democrats '66]) would like to do. Once that becomes general knowledge, the mood at the Binnenhof and elsewhere will not improve by the fall. There will be quarrels about the budget, media policy, the abortion act (whether or not surgery should be covered by insurance), among other things, during increasing political profile needs.

Partly because of the prospect of such difficulties, on different occasions at small gatherings this week two ministers (members of VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] and CDA, respectively) did not want to bet that their cabinet will last until 1 November or survive that date. Actually, both of them rather betted on the opposite. It should be added that these two do not always seem to fully support the cabinet's policy; however, their show of gloom was striking. Besides, both insisted that the CDA as a whole would not (does not want to) digest a positive employment decision, even though their brothers Lubbers, Van den Broek and De Ruiter signed the cabinet decision of this past June 1. Both took the possibility into account that the CDA and VVD, which appeal to about the same type of voters, could possibly form a cabinet together again after a split concerning the employment issue (or concerning an earlier "replacement" cause for a crisis in the cabinet, for instance the 1986 budget) and the elections which would follow.

This is a risky scenario because making calculations "beyond elections" has failed before; sometimes the voter does not act upon it. Moreover, rationally speaking, the government parties cannot expect much good of a crisis in the summer or fall of 1985. In that case, the VVD risks missing the political gain of a positive employment decision (because such a decision would be a barrier between PvdA and CDA in 1986), and would have to be satisfied with the electoral blow which, in such a case, it can deal the CDA's right wing. The CDA would, apart from that blow, risk the loss of a considerable number of its not unsuccessful team of ministers (and a change of policy!), as it would then have to cooperate with the larger PvdA which would claim the post of prime minister and quite a few ministerial posts from the CDA. Therefore, the bet that the cabinet will survive 1 November, can very well be made. It was made with one of the ministers. Distilled, foreign, tasty.

Reservations

Logically speaking, however, an early crisis is possible before the spring of 1986, several months before the elections; not in the cabinet, but in the parliament. Then, the CDA election program will be ready and confirmed by a party council of 21 September or 26 October 1985. It is assumed that on November 1, a positive employment decision will have been made, which the election program has already anticipated a little earlier. Several weeks later the text of a treaty (agreement) with the United States and a bill to approve that treaty will be presented to the Second Chamber. After the Christmas recess, end of January 1986, the Chamber will have a procedure debate on that bill. At that time, the list of CDA candidates will be just about ready. The list will not be made before the program is drawn up, as was the case at previous occasions; rather, it will be done after it. So, the party committees

know the personal reservations---former ARP [Antirevolutionary Party] members, pay attention!--before they give their advice on the nominations. That---and the fact that the original CDA elements (KVP [Catholic People's Party], ARP and CHU [Christian Historical Union] will not be given separate consideration for the first time, can make a lot of difference for the assigned place.

Reservations or no reservations, when the Chamber votes on a delaying procedure motion of the opposition concerning the approval of the bill, the question of whether they will have a chance to return to the Chamber after the elections (May 21), will be very important for a large number of CDA members. It is possible that the number of Kamikaze pilots is dangerously large for the cabinet while much more than procedure is at stake. Maybe Prime Minister Lubbers has made too light of inside warnings that 1 November 1985 is "a late date" for the cruise missile decision.

12433

CSO: 3614/58

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOCIALISTS' VAN MIERT ATTACKS GOVERNMENT ON CRUISE MISSILES

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS WEEKBLAD in Dutch 9 Feb 85 p 17

[Article and interview with Socialist opposition leader Karel van Miert by Jan Schils: "'The Slippery Roads Within CVP and Government Have Apparently Been Underestimated'"; date and place not given]

[Text] Belgian Prime Minister Martens and his Christian People's Party [CVP] have suffered two electoral blows, and so he continues to fiddle around with the date for the deployment of 48 cruise missiles. In this interview, Socialist opposition leader Karel van Miert strikes out at Martens, at deployment and at U.S. policy.

There are some people in Belgium who may still contend, after the tragicomedy presented by Prime Minister Martens and his Christian People's Party over the past few weeks with regard to the cruise missiles, that "Martens is playing it shrewdly." Here and there it is even suggested that the cruise missiles are no longer in a position to crumble Martens' Roman Catholic-Liberal cabinet. However, reality is otherwise. Over the past few weeks, the Belgian cruise missiles have been world news, and they will certainly remain so.

Belgium agreed in 1979 to the NATO dual decision [on implementing deployment of cruise missiles while at the same time pursuing arms reduction talks at Geneva], endorsed in August 1981 the deployment schedule (signed by Defense Minister Swaelen, who is now CVP chairman), and was to begin this coming 15 March with the stationing of 16 cruise missiles in 1985, with the rest to be added in 1986 and 1987. All of this according to the agreement concluded within NATO.

But what has happened since 1979? Under pressure from the peace movement, public opinion in Flanders slowly turned against the stationing of cruise missiles in Belgian Florennes. The Flemish Socialists, who in 1979 formed part of the Belgian cabinet and certainly in that year and in 1980 did not voice any official veto against the arrival of the missiles, but who had indeed formulated stipulations for deployment, began to adapt to the change in Flemish public opinion. The Socialist Party (SP) became an opponent of the missiles; after the parliamentary elections of next 8 December it will

not join in a pro-missile government, and if it does participate in a government it will push for removal of the missiles should they be deployed in the meantime.

In the period from 1981 to 1984, two elections have been held in Belgium (for city councils and the European Parliament). Both times, Martens' Christian People's Party was issued a reprimand. The CVP lost some 25 percent of its voters. With an eye to the 8 December parliamentary elections, the CVP wants at all costs to at least maintain its present strength in order to be able to continue its center-right coalition with the Liberals. However, recent opinion polls have shown clearly that the present coalition has already lost the majority. Consequently, the CVP drew the obvious conclusion that deployment of the controversial cruise missiles before the elections would be tantamount to political suicide.

Martens and Tindemans (minister of foreign affairs) were sent to President Reagan to explain to him the specifics of the Belgian situation. They came away empty-handed, which still did not prevent Martens from announcing that the missiles would be in place by the end of 1987 if "Geneva" has not produced anything by then. This was music to the ears of the left (labor) wing of his party, but the Liberals and French-speaking Christian Democrats were boggled, to which Martens replied that the NATO allies would be consulted about whether they could agree to this (political) time extension. If not, a military timetable would again be drawn up in consultation with NATO.

Tindemans was then sent out to call on the NATO allies. Everywhere he ran into a brick wall. "Deploy," Andreotti said, and in London Thatcher let it be known that she expects of Belgium a "hard stance," that is, deployment beginning the middle of March. The other NATO countries, including the Netherlands, were no less adamant in their refusal.

Spit Out

The Flemish Socialists are also furious. They can clearly "spit out" the CVP, and Martens in particular, several SP members of parliament said after the most recent cruise missile debate in the Belgian Chamber. Martens does not refrain from accusing the SP itself of effecting a considerable turnabout in its position on the cruise missiles for sake of electoral favor.

[Question] The CVP says that in 1979 you backed the NATO dual decision and manifested that by remaining in the cabinet coalition.

[Karel van Miert] "That story is entirely false. For the simple reason that we at that time advocated, together with the Dutch government and that of Denmark, postponing the dual decision. At that time we were upholding a 6 month postponement. At a particular moment this was also adopted as the Belgian government's position with the understanding that Belgium would continue to uphold this position within NATO as long as Belgium was not alone in it. Things then happened behind the scenes that we only later found out

about. Specifically, Belgium was the first to drop out, leaving the Netherlands and Denmark in the lurch. Consequently, parliament was approached at the last minute where, however, the NATO dual decision had never been put to a vote. Furthermore, it was stipulated under pressure from us that there would be no deployment decision for Belgium. And like the Netherlands, Belgium reserved the right to make a decision for itself.

"Thus it is total nonsense to say today that the SP was for deployment then. That was never the case. On the contrary, we stipulated at that time that Belgium reserve the right to make its own decision. A period of 6 months was thus stipulated under pressure from us as a result of--I would almost say--the dirty trick played on us, in that Belgium's position was not upheld as agreed upon."

Element

"The issue was not played put correctly in parliament either, in that the problem was immediately allowed to become a question of confidence in the cabinet instead of there being a debate in parliament on the main point of the NATO dual decision. That's what happened. This can be verified, even in the newspaper accounts of that time. But even if our position is interpreted as approval of the dual decision, there was still the element of the dual decision that negotiations were to be conducted. It took 2 years before the Americans were ready to sit down at the bargaining table. Thus even this dual decision, seen retrospectively, has for some time ceased to be a dual decision.

"Add to this the fact that in 1980, when we were coalition partners in the government, Defense Minister Swaelen and his colleague Nothomb at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted a decision on deployment. And plans were then drawn up under Swaelen without us, the coalition partner, knowing about it. We opposed it and added, 'OK, if you want to go so far as to ask for a vote of confidence, then the government will fall.' The Belgian government consequently postponed any decision on deployment.

"Summarized in concrete terms, the situation is like this. First of all, if no decision was made at that time on deployment, it was both times solely because of the SP position within the cabinet. Secondly, the problem of the dual decision is set in a different context, in a bit of foul play and on the other hand in the question of confidence within the cabinet. Moreover, we had no reason for not supporting the cabinet. For that matter, at issue at that point was a problem that was not being approached in the same way as now. For my part, I wanted at that time to go so far as to let the cabinet fall over the missile question, but the party leadership didn't think it was worth a cabinet crisis. I must say, however, that some people have a short memory. Even Martens is parading around saying that we endorsed the NATO dual decision in 1979, while he was entirely aware of the foul play then."

Ridiculous

[Q] The CVP, and also the Belgian government, has been floundering so much with the missile problem over the past few weeks that no one understands anything about it anymore. Internationally as well, Belgium has made itself look ridiculous by arousing the greatest amount of confusion in this issue. How do you explain this strange Belgian approach?

[Van Miert] "What is going on at the moment within the government and the majority concerning the missiles could be termed a genuine slalom course. It is clear that things have been shifting within the CVP since the European elections. I think it's possible to say that thanks to the peace movement and thanks to the results scored by the SP during the European elections, people within the CVP have rebelled, saying that the party must take this into consideration. After this, the new CVP position, which included the real possibility of in fact postponing the missile deployment, did indeed come as a surprise. It is a fact that the CVP has moved somewhat closer to us.

"The question was how to translate that to the government level. Here the CVP is very divided. Tindemans has long been for deployment, Martens probably as well. But then one has to take into consideration the turnabout that the CVP has made. According to the latest state of affairs--at least unless they've changed their minds again, one just never knows with the CVP--they want to postpone deployment until after the elections and then in fact catch up again by the end of military timetable in 1987. But the slippery roads within the CVP itself and within the government have apparently been underestimated.

"To my knowledge, Belgium has at no point obligated itself to anything, unless of course there are secret commitments. This is quite possible, but in that case there have then been lies in the face of public opinion. The Netherlands has certainly gone its own way as well. The Netherlands has said, as I understand it, that it doesn't want to do like other countries. The Netherlands is seeking its own position. Why doesn't Belgium do that? Why is this circus being staged here? The Belgium government must simply accept its responsibility in this matter, certainly if it wants to continue to take full account of the majority of the population."

Washed Through

"The people do not want the missiles. There is already complete overarmament. These missiles have absolutely no military significance. NATO didn't really even make the dual decision anyway. It had already taken place on Guadeloupe. NATO simply washed it through later. Anyone, even a child, could see that the Russians would respond to the deployment of the first missiles. That means the SS-22 and SS-23. And this time its much more serious than with the SS-20s, because these missiles are in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, that is, on other people's territory. The Russians have thus begun to imitate what the United States is doing in Western Europe.

"For the superpowers this European situation is secondary. It's a side issue. After all, it's on other people's territory. Agreements are being reached only on strategic weapons. And we still don't know whether Mr Weinberger might be so good as to perhaps indeed negotiate seriously with the Russians. We don't know. We thus remain consistently against deployment. It's the only signal that a small country can give."

After the no voiced by NATO, Martens' government should now be forced to decide in favor of deployment, but the left wing of the CVP does not want it, so that there is again an atmosphere of crisis in Brussels.

12271

CSO: 5200/2502

INTERMEDIATE RANGE-NUCLEAR FORCES

FLEMISH CHRISTIAN LEFT OPPOSES CRUISE MISSILES

Brussels LE SOIR in French 20 Feb 85 p 2

/Text/ The Flemish Christian Workers Movement (ACW) has thrown quite a monkey wrench into the country's political machinery. It has asked the Martens government to refrain from making a decision at this time on the installation of the first 17 cruise missiles in Florennes; what is more, its leaders have announced that the movement will not participate as such in the peace demonstration scheduled for 17 March 1985 in Brussels. This taking of a stand by the Flemish Christian Workers Movement--one of the principal wings of the CVP, the main party of the governmental coalition--is not of such a nature as to simplify the decision which has to be taken very shortly by Martens V on the missile question.

The ACW is explicitly requesting that the government postpone its decision on the installation of the first missiles, while at the same time adding that "the government's final and overall decision should be accompanied by a clear signal to the Soviet Union by means of which optimal opportunities would be offered to produce effective disarmament agreements." According to the ACW, such a signal would not, however, be meaningful "unless the Soviet Union itself gives a positive response within a reasonable time frame. This postponement should be expressly linked with a clear deadline. During this period of postponement, the Soviets should in turn send a clear signal which would indicate that for them, too, the term disarmament means not only words but acts."

In this regard, the ACW added that it has always advocated "reciprocal, simultaneous and verifiable" disarmament.

"A small country like Belgium," the ACW went on to say, "should ceaselessly take initiatives along these lines. Nothing can be neglected, so that the Geneva negotiations will have the maximum chance of success."

The Fait Accompli

As regards the "No Missiles" national demonstration, scheduled for 17 March, the ACW has announced that it will not participate. The Movement regrets the manner in which the VAKA /Flemish Action Committee Against Atomic Weapons/--the Flemish counterpart of the National Action Committee for Peace and Development (CNAPD)--has managed to monopolize this demonstration in accordance with its own thinking and to impose the substance of its objectives upon the other organizations and associations. "Everyone knows," the ACW said, "that within the peace movement in our country there are two distinct factions. In this regard, the ACW deplores the fact that the VAKA, which belongs to one of these factions, has not considered it necessary to consult with the entire peace movement on the different aspects of the initiative. Confronted by "the fait accompli," the ACW, therefore, will not participate in the demonstration. However, its members can march in the parade, "but as individuals."

This double position taking by the ACW will certainly find an echo in the monthly CVP general meeting, which has been scheduled for this Tuesday evening. The conclusions to be drawn from the different orientations expressed during the Gand congress are on the agenda. One section was devoted to question of the missiles. What will be done by the CVP deputies who are close to the ACW? They make up half of the parliamentary group (23?). If a vote of confidence is taken in the Chamber of Representatives as the result of a governmental "communication" announcing a decision to install the first missiles, will these deputies follow the precise directives of the Workers Movement or will they exercise their own judgment "in good conscience," as they have been asked to do by their president, Frank Swaelen? In any event, this is a real test of "conscience" for all of them...

8143

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

GRINEVSKIY SPEAKS AT STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

LD151508 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1350 GMT 15 Mar 85

[Text] Stockholm, 15 Mar (TASS) -- Oleg Grinevskiy, leader of the USSR delegation as a special ambassador, spoke at a meeting of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe. He called the attention of the participants in the Stockholm forum to the important assessments of the present dangerous international situation and to the urgent task of strengthening peace and security which are contained in the speeches made by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The Soviet representative said that the present responsible stage of world development demands that all states make consistent efforts to prevent the arms race in space and to end the arms race on earth, to establish an atmosphere of trust and cooperation among peoples, and to eliminate the threat of war, first and foremost, nuclear war.

O. Grinevskiy went on to say that the USSR has displayed flexibility and has introduced a proposal at the conference on the basic provisions of a treaty on the mutual nonuse of military force based on the joint initiatives of the socialist countries. This proposal calls for talks that would breathe new life into this very important undertaking. We are prepared also to elaborate and adopt practical measures in the sphere of purely military detente. The delegations of the Bulgarian People's Republic, the GDR, and the USSR recently submitted a document with a proposal to limit the scale of military exercises.

O. Grinevskiy stressed that, in all of these directions and in the political and military spheres, the USSR and the socialist countries are ready to go forward and seek mutually acceptable decisions so that the Stockholm conference can result in weighty understandings on the strengthening of trust and security in Europe.

At the same meeting, Ambassador Oldrich Pavlovskiy, representative of Czechoslovakia, proposed on behalf of the CSSR, Polish Socialist Republic, and the USSR, that notification be given of major military exercises of ground troops in Europe and its adjacent waters and airspace from a level of 20,000 men and above, carried out independently or with any components of air forces or navies. Such notifications, the proposal states, could be sent 30 days before the start of the exercises.

CSO: 5200/1042

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

U.S. TRIES TO 'DICTATE' TO DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

LD062157 Moscow TASS in English 2129 GMT 6 Mar 85

[Text] Geneva March 6 TASS -- TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Korzhev reports:

If partners are marching out of step with the USA, they should alter their step. Washington's representatives firmly adhere to this principle at many international forums. The Geneva conference on disarmament is not an exception.

Throughout February the United States delegation was performing functions of chairman of the conference. While other participants heatedly debated acute problems of arms limitation and reduction, were criticising the stalemate existing in the talks over many years, were making concrete proposals, the U.S. side actually kept mum, apart from a speech of Director of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Kenneth Adelman who came to Geneva for the purpose. He tried unceremoniously to "dictate" to the conference the framework of the talks suiting the USA.

Within a month of work it was clearly manifested that a vast majority of delegations reject the U.S. provisions and demand insistently that the conference should get down to practical discussion of priority items of the agenda, among which an important place is assigned to the question of a ban on nuclear weapon tests. Its importance was pointed out by delegations of Argentina, Mexico, India, Sweden, Kenya, as well as the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

At yesterday's meeting new head of the U.S. delegation Donald Lowitz apparently decided to "call the conference to order" again. He declared that Washington regards the test ban only as a "long-term objective," not at all a priority one. At the same time he rejected the theses on the sufficiency of existing technical means of verification and expediency of imposing a moratorium on tests before they are banned by an appropriate international treaty, the theses that enjoy broad support.

However paradoxical, the U.S. representative called other delegations to "respect each other's positions." Going by everything, the U.S. delegation has a lop-sided view of "mutual respect," which causes growing indignation of other participants.

As to the essence of the matter, the head of Bulgaria's delegation Konstantin Tellalov stressed that the ban on nuclear weapon tests would consolidate international security and would promote progress in the sphere of nuclear disarmament by placing a barrier in the way of creation of qualitatively new types of nuclear arms. The latest session of the United Nations General Assembly confirmed that the majority of countries object to the United States attempts at delays about discussing the problem, delays whose purpose is to make possible the continued implementation of new U.S. military programmes.

CSO: 5200/1016

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

ISRAELYAN, OTHERS SPEAK AT GENEVA MEETING

Calm Relations Stressed

LD282257 Moscow TASS in English 2215 GMT 28 Feb 85

[Text] Geneva, February 28 TASS -- The Soviet Union has no task, nor can it have any task more noble than protecting peace on earth and consolidating relations of peaceful coexistence between all states, the head of the Soviet delegation, Viktor Israelyan, has told a regular sitting of the Geneva conference on disarmament.

The course of debates at the current session graphically shows that peoples are tired of living in an atmosphere of ever heightening international tension and war menace, they are sincerely striving for curbing the arms race and establishing normal, calm relations between states without sabre-rattling and reciprocal threats, he stressed.

An overwhelming majority of other participants clearly realize the chief tasks of the conference. According to Celso Antonio de Sousa Silva (Brazil), only specific political and legal commitments will make it possible to put an end to the nuclear arms race.

According to David Meiszter (Hungary), in the year of the 40th anniversary of the victory over fascism and the tragedy of Hiroshima, the world community should undertake steps to prevent the repetition of the past horrors, since a new war with the use of nuclear weapons threatens all of mankind with extermination.

A majority of the conferees favour the earliest establishment of a structure of auxiliary working bodies of the conference, which would make it possible to start practical discussion of such topical issues as prohibition of nuclear tests, non-militarization of outer space and prevention of nuclear war -- the subjects so stubbornly opposed by delegations from NATO countries.

Argentinian representative Julio Carasales stressed the inadmissibility of the tactics of "linking" these major issues with secondary subjects, used by Western countries in a bid, specifically, to cast aspersions on the New Delhi Declaration of six non-nuclear states.

Chernenko Speech Circulated

LD281557 Moscow TASS in English 1544 GMT 28 Feb 85

[Text] Geneva February 28 TASS -- The text of the speech of Konstantin Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, president of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, at a meeting with the electorate in Moscow has been circulated here as an official document of the Geneva conference on disarmament.

Introducing this important document today, Viktor Israelyan, the head of the USSR delegation, pointed out that the Soviet leader has again convincingly reaffirmed the Soviet Union's principled policy on matters of struggle for an end to the arms race and for the removal of the threat of a world war. The main theses, which were formulated in the speech and which concern the approach to new bilateral talks with the United States, fully determine the USSR's stand at the disarmament conference, too.

The course of the discussion at the present session, the Soviet representative went on to say, vividly shows that the peoples have got tired of living in an atmosphere of increasing international tension and the war threat and that they sincerely strive for curbing the arms race and for establishing normal, calm relations between states without sabre-rattling and mutual threats. "To the Soviet Union, there is no and cannot be a loftier goal than to preserve peace on earth and to strengthen relations of peaceful coexistence between all states despite the differences of their socio-economic and political systems. Peace, detente and disarmament are the main requirement of our epoch," Viktor Israelyan emphasized.

CSO: 5200/1016

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS

ROGERS CONCEPTS MAKE MBFR PROGRESS IMPOSSIBLE

PM081630 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Mar 85 Morning Edition p 5

[Valentin Falin "Political Observer's Opinion": "Strong-Arm Diplomacy"]

[Text] Politics is like chess: Without mistakes there would be no losers. Nevertheless, according to current American popular belief, a political tie is by no means a success, while a tie benefiting the other side means a defeat altogether. So why settle for less, when Washington is experiencing an unprecedented surge of energy and is prepared to have its own way under any circumstances: by means of talks or without them, by formally taking note of other states' interests or by simply ignoring these interests.

U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz expresses this neoconservative philosophy of the administration in a formula according to which diplomacy and strength are two sides of the same coin. Diplomacy relies on strength and represents it. The greater the strength, the more effective U.S. diplomacy. Strength emerges as an extension of politics. It translates words into actions or at least the possibility of actions into violence or the possibility of violence, if we are to call a spade a spade.

Washington demands that we should revert to something we have been trying to avoid for the 40 years, since World War II. Strength and nothing but strength drives the wheels of history, and whoever is stronger is therefore in charge, if we were to believe G. Shultz, who is considered in the United States to be the man capable of "most intelligently" adapting R. Reagan's hard line to "the real world."

"Intelligently" in this instance means not provocatively, on the quiet, in a roundabout way, as opposed to the patent "hawks" roosting mainly in other departments.

But let's not abuse the "hawks" just for the sake of abuse. Following the President's shift from the single-track militarist route to the more complex alternative of moving to the accompaniment of lip service to arms control and even a nuclear arms ban, the "hawks" have also expanded their vocabulary. Why not keep up with fashion? Since the MX first-strike missile has been canonized as a "guardian of peace," there is, of course, no reason at all why the course of an arms race in space should not be described as an "extremely humane strategic defense initiative" or the mass preparations for global and local military adventures presented as a U.S. "contribution" to international security.

General B. Rogers, NATO supreme allied commander in Europe, is not alone in this. He is, most probably, just more eloquent than others, and this may be precisely why he was

recently invited to Washington to enlighten the gentlemen of the Senate who, in the Pentagon's view, are rather tight-fisted when it comes to reviewing requests for military expenditures.

According to B. Rogers, the North Atlantic bloc is "the most successful movement in defense of peace throughout history." The funds invested in it will continue to produce returns. The only things necessary are "an appropriate strategy, sufficient capability to implement it, and resolve to execute this strategy." The strategy, according to the general's assurances, does exist. It is founded on the first use of nuclear weapons by the bloc "for defense purposes" and on a combination of "a certainty of response" with "the uncertainty of the precise nature and scope of that response."

Let us note that, under the rules adopted by the North Atlantic alliance, "aggression" means not just an attack using armed forces but also any development of events that is "justifiably" perceived by the bloc members as a "direct" threat to their interests. A "response" may occur, in particular, in the event of attack on NATO aircraft "finding themselves" on a "defense" mission in the socialist countries' airspace. Strikes are not ruled out as part of retaliation for some kind of "terrorist acts." I am no longer talking about the involvement of the bloc's military potential, its combat forces and its airfields and other infrastructure facilities, in projects of so-called "horizontal escalation" envisaging the spread of military operations to any part of the world at the Americans' discretion, even if a conflict were to occur at the opposite end of the globe.

The "appropriate strategy" has been tested (theoretically) in the course of endless staff and troop exercise involving top-ranking officials from the relevant NATO states. So what is missing? The nuclear forces have been more or less in order since "the United States and the United Kingdom have embarked on programs to modernize their strategic forces," provided, according to the reservation made by Rogers, that these programs are "fully implemented." Things are not too bad as regards the "modernization of intermediate nuclear forces," a term by which Gen Rogers means the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in West Europe. But "NATO's major weakness" still rests with the conventional forces, as a result of which, if a non-nuclear conflict were to start, "the NATO political authorities would fairly quickly face the decision to authorize the release of theater nuclear weapons."

Anyone unwilling, the general went on, to "rely excessively on the first use of nuclear weapons at the initial stage of the war" must satisfy the requirement for non-nuclear rearmament of the bloc's armies. The "improvement" of conventional forces would, in his words, "permit a deliberate and determined decision by NATO political authorities to resort to nuclear weapons." It appears from the context of B. Rogers' statement that conditions for such a "deliberate and determined decision" do not presently exist. The presence of stronger forces would, furthermore, ensure the invulnerability of NATO's "nuclear delivery means, and essential command and control systems until they are needed."

The supreme commander is "encouraged" by the decisions made by the bloc's members over the past year to expand the facilities for "reinforcement acceptance" and also to stockpile ammunition stocks and particularly the "long-term planning guideline for strike attack against the second echelon forces" of Warsaw Pact countries. Literally two lines further on, the general adds to the "second echelon" "maneuver groups," "third echelon," and "reserves" as additional targets for preemptive total strikes against Warsaw Pact forces. But since all these blanket strikes will be non-nuclear, there is nothing to worry about.

In order to implement the plans it will be necessary to ensure the proper "mix of cost- and mission-effective direct and indirect attack and standoff weapons systems for the follow-on force attack mission." The "existing chemical weapons capability" must be "modernized" and made ready for use. "Modernization of the U.S. special operations forces" will be needed, and also "enhancement of the potential for infiltration/exfiltration of agents" and so on. There are so many tasks and duties that there is no way of coping with them at the present ceiling of 346,400 [as published] U.S. servicemen in Europe, as imposed by Congress. B. Rogers attempted to offer proof for his request that this ceiling be rescinded. By building up its troop strength in Europe and pouring in cash for long-term expenditures the United States would encourage the other NATO countries to do the same. All this, of course, for the sake of more "lasting peace," "better security," and avoidance of "pre-mature use" of U.S. and British "nuclear weapons."

So how is it possible, given such aims, to progress in the talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe? It is not possible. This is also why the previous Geneva talks collapsed. Progress is lacking at the Stockholm conference for the very same reason. The United States and NATO have altogether different concerns and different loyalties.

One more question comes to mind when studying B. Rogers' deliberations. It was noted in the U.S. Defense Department's 1 February 1983 report to Congress that the United States has no strategy for using its conventional forces in isolation from the use of nuclear forces. Other U.S. documents have made it known that all components of the nuclear capability, tactical, medium-range, and strategic, are subject to use within the framework of a unified comprehensive operations plan. So, the general could have been making fools of the senators, luring them with non-nuclear bait. On the other hand, there could have been an unofficial conspiratorial agreement to deceive the public by offering assurances that the Americans are engaged, both in space and on earth, in rendering nuclear weapons "harmless" and that they are seriously intent on this.

I don't know for sure what impression B. Rogers made on the senators with their acute sense for electoral success. Judging by the 6 March vote in the Senate Budget Committee, it was by no means what he expected. An 18 to 4 majority of senators voted to cut the administration's military expenditure in the next 3 years by 79 billion dollars.

We can imagine that the administration will not give up that easily. I noted earlier that Gen B. Rogers is one of many. He is just one of the legion of those who are pressing for strength with whose help the State Department hopes to give a "new gloss" to its diplomacy.

CSO: 5200/1030

END